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THE DEVELOPMENT

OF

MODERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

ESPECIALLY IN GERMANY

BY

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BOSTON AND CHICAGO

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TO

MY FATHER

WHOSE ASSISTANCE AND ENCOURAGEMENT MADE POSSIBLE
MY YEARS OF POST-GRADUATE STUDY

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INTRODUCTION.

THIS little work is the outgrowth of graduate studies originally undertaken for my own intellectual satisfaction, and with no definite plan of adding to the immense theological literature of our time. The impulse to this line of reading was received from the lectures of Professor George P. Fisher of Yale, on the History of Doctrine — the most interesting and stimulating course of my seminary years. A fourth year at Yale, and a year in Heidelberg and Berlin, with subsequent reading, furnished the materials for the most part and developed the general theory of the work. An appointment as Williams Fellow in Harvard Divinity School, giving access to the Harvard libraries and to the many advantages of lectures and personal advice from instructors, made it possible to bring my conclusions to final literary expression.

My general problem in the work is to explain historically the origin of the prevalent skepticism which denies the miracles and the supernatural claims of Christianity, ridicules its "other-worldly"

character, and would establish a kingdom of happiness for men on earth instead of in heaven.

This tendency to emphasize the worth and dignity of man and to question the need and the validity of a divine revelation I have characterized as the Greek spirit. It is the worldly wisdom which Paul condemns, and it is at enmity with the spirit of Christianity, whether it appears in Origen or Pelagius, Kant, Hegel, or Schleiermacher. It is the source of the scientific assumption of the uniformity of natural law, which, as I endeavor to show especially in Strauss, begs the question as to the miraculous contents of the Scriptures. I choose the field of German religious thought to illustrate these truths, because the development of the principles is there clearly marked and easily followed; and German thought is now the leading influence in the theological world.

It will be seen that my plan in the work is to contrast the opposing Greek and Christian tendencies in the three forms they have assumed in Christian history: (1) With Origen and Augustine; (2) in Calvinism (or Lutheranism) as opposed to Arminianism; (3) in the so-called liberal and conservative schools of this century. In the Renaissance period this contrast is very striking,

for it appears unmistakably as the struggle of the Greek spirit with the Christian. This being my plan, it seems to me advantageous and even economical of space to give a thorough discussion of Origen and Augustine, with whom the opposing tendencies appear in their early and most characteristic form. This plan is most advantageous because, in discussing the first (Augustinian) period of German theology, I can dismiss the different theologians with a brief statement, suggesting merely the individual variations from the Augustinian type. And the same holds true largely of the second period in relation to Origen. As the first period of German thought is Augustinian, so the second may be said to be Greek (Origenistic). The development of liberal thought culminates in Hegel; and Hegel's Christianity, as Kaftan well says, is simply Origen's Logos doctrine stripped of its traditionally Christian features.

And, further, the fact that in writing a history of modern liberal thought I can profitably devote a great portion of my space to the early fathers is a suggestive illustration of an important fact; namely, that the boasted discoveries of modern liberalism are for the most part ancient history, and

that the Christian Church has prospered in the past (and will probably continue to do so in the future), not by accepting, but by rejecting and combating these alleged discoveries.

It is apparent, of course, that the treatment of the theology of the present century is very cursory, and that many distinguished names are not mentioned. This was necessary from the limit of space, but may be a real advantage, as it may make the general movement of thought more readily apparent to the reader, than if he were confused with a maze of names and details. While a few of the most prominent thinkers — as Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher — are discussed with a considerable degree of fullness, the work in general is concerned with principles rather than men. It may be full enough for the layman who wishes merely to know something of the general tendency and final result of modern religious thought; but I hope the principal use of the work may be to impel theological students to further reading and serve them as a guide through the tangled field of German theological literature.

My thanks are due to the instructors in the Harvard Divinity School whom I heard last year in this general field — to Professor Francis G.

Peabody, for his valuable course in the Philosophy of Religion, and to Professor John E. Russell, of Williams College, not only for his course on "The Ground and Content of Christian Faith," but for personal criticisms and suggestions. Professor Russell's keen and discriminating discussion of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, in the course just mentioned, was of the greatest assistance to me, and has affected at almost every point my estimate of these great thinkers.

I divide the subject-matter at the Aufklärung into two general periods. During the first period theology is determined, formally and materially, by traditional churchly and scholastic principles; in the second period religious thought undergoes a profound modification in form and content, resulting from the changed social, ethical, and philosophical conditions of modern times. The dividing point which I assume is more or less arbitrary and of course somewhat indefinite. The eighteenth century is the battleground of the old orthodoxy against the characteristic principles of modern culture. The latter gradually work out to clear expression in Kant and Hegel, and are formally introduced into the theological field by Schleiermacher.

A note is added at the end of the book, giving a brief historical discussion of the Greek Logos doctrine.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT, ESPECIALLY IN GERMANY.

FIRST PERIOD.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

CHAPTER I.

THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

CHRISTIANITY first appeared as a matter essentially of the heart and moral life — enthusiastic love for a crucified Saviour, the redeemer from sin. Its early teachers had small respect for the intellectual speculations of worldly men: "Let no man make spoil of you through his philosophy and vain deceit" (Col. 2:8). It was impossible, however, that the Church should long occupy this position, as Christianity spread throughout the Roman world and came into permanent relations with Greek and Roman culture. Thoughtful men in the Christian community felt impelled to bring the new truth in Christ into harmonious relations with their whole mental life, and became restive under the disdainful assertions of the learned that Christianity was a barbarous superstition to which only fools were called. Hence the attempt to

employ the Christian revelation as a means for reaching speculative truth — that is, transforming it from a moral to an intellectual system — and to commend it to the learned as the highest and final philosophy. The impulse to make clear to himself and exhibit in systematic form the content of his faith and its relation to other spheres of truth is a natural and necessary one for an intelligent Christian — the source and justification of theology. This attempt, however, manifests a constant tendency to obscure the moral elements of Christianity and run out into a one-sided intellectualism. Especially was this true in the conditions existing in the early Christian centuries, when the world of thought was a chaos of effete religions and disintegrating philosophies confusedly mingled with theosophic speculations and ascetic superstitions from the Orient.

Early in the second century (123 A.D.) Aristides, an Athenian philosopher, presented to the Emperor Hadrian an apology for the Christian faith, which is said to have borne the title, "To the Emperor Hadrian Cæsar, from the Philosopher Aristides of Athens." [1] The union of Oriental and Christian elements produced various heresies, as the

[1] Harnack, I, p. 379.

Gnostic; but the best Christian thinkers always found Greek philosophy, especially the Socratic, kindred in its aim and spirit because of its lofty and pure ethical conceptions. The earliest extant apologies, those of Justin Martyr, commend the Christian religion to the emperor-philosopher, Antoninus Pius, by comparing Christ to Socrates and representing him as incarnate reason. "And when Socrates endeavored, by true reason and examination, to deliver men from the demons, then the demons themselves, by means of men who rejoiced in iniquity, compassed his death as an atheist and profane person; and in our case they display a similar activity. For not only among the Greeks did reason (Logos) prevail to condemn these things through Socrates, but also among the barbarians were they condemned by Reason Himself (Logos), who took shape and became man and was called Christ Jesus."[1] Christian theology, properly so called, found its birthplace at Alexandria, the seat of Philo's philosophy; and the characteristic aim of the Alexandrian school of theology is to combine Christianity and the profound and fascinating speculations of the best Greek thinkers into the final and perfect system

[1] First Apology, I, 5.

of truth. The father of Christian theology, Origen, in reply to Celsus, quotes his opponent as saying that "the Greeks are more skillful than any others in judging, establishing, and reducing to practice the discoveries of barbarous nations." Origen proceeds to remark: "Now this is our answer to his allegations and our defense of the truths contained in Christianity — that if any one were to come from the study of Grecian opinions and usages to the gospel, he would not only decide that its doctrines were true, but would by practice establish their truth, and supply whatever seemed wanting from a Grecian point of view to their demonstration, and thus confirm the truth of Christianity."[1]

In referring to the system of Origen, Harnack says: "It was at the bottom a philosophical system."[2] It is often remarked, and in the main truly, that the Eastern Church was predominantly speculative, the Western practical; the first tendency leading to the development of theology proper — doctrines of God, person of Christ, etc. — the practical tendency of the West, on the other hand, to the development of anthropology — doctrines of sin and grace. Origen stands as

[1] Against Celsus, I, 2. [2] Outlines of History of Dogma, p. 318.

the most conspicuous representative of the Eastern Church, which develops rather a philosophy than a theology; while the great significance of Augustine lies in the fact that in him the practical tendency of the West finds true expression, yet is preserved from a one-sided extreme by a philosophical temper and insight and a genuine and symmetrical religious life. He brought theology back from the speculative extremes of the East, restoring it to genuinely ethical, religious ground — where the daring flights of speculation were restrained by the authority of the sacred Scriptures and of the true Christian tradition and Christian consciousness which he found in the Catholic Church.

The ideal Christian with the Alexandrian School is the "wise man" (Gnostic), as in the purest Greek ethical schools, the Socratic and the Stoic. Clement, the teacher of Origen, says: "It is the greatest of all lessons to know one's self. For if one knows himself, he will know God; and knowing God he will be made like God, not by wearing gold and long robes but by well-doing, and by requiring as few things as possible."[1] Religion is represented as essentially a matter of

[1] Instructor, III, 1.

knowledge. "Could we, then, suppose any one proposing to the Gnostic whether he would choose the knowledge of God or eternal salvation; and if these, which are *entirely identical*, were separable, he would without the least hesitation choose the knowledge of God, deeming that property of faith which from love ascends to knowledge, desirable for its own sake."[1] The knowledge of God in mystic contemplation issues in a perfect union with God, after the thought of Philo and the Neo-Platonists. "What is really good is seen to be most pleasant, and of itself produces the fruit which is desired — tranquillity of soul. On this wise it is possible for the Gnostic already to have become God. . . . For, universally, liability to feeling belongs to every kind of desire; and man, when deified purely into a passionless state, becomes a unit. In the contemplative life, one in worshiping God attends to himself, and through his own spotless purification beholds God holily; for self-control, being present, surveying and contemplating itself uninterruptedly, is as far as possible assimilated to God."[2] Gregory Thaumaturgus, the devoted disciple of Origen, writes of his master's use of the Greek philosophers in his

[1] Stromata, IV, 22. [2] Ibid. IV, 23.

teachings: "He was the first and only man that urged me to the study of the Greeks. For he deemed it right for us to study philosophy in such a wise that we should read with utmost diligence all that has been written, both by the philosophers and poets of old, rejecting nothing (for indeed we did not yet possess the power of critical discernment), except only the productions of the atheists." [1]

[1] Panegyric to Origen, 11, 13.

CHAPTER II.

ORIGEN.

IN the preface of his great theological treatise, *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν*, Origen sets up as criteria of Christian truth, the Scriptures and apostolical tradition. "All who believe and are assured that grace and truth were obtained through Jesus Christ derive the knowledge which incites men to a good and happy life from no other source than from the very words and teachings of Christ" — the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament. . . . "Since, however, many of those who profess to believe in Christ differ from each other, . . . that alone is to be accepted as truth which differs in no respect from ecclesiastical and apostolical tradition." These two sentinels of Christian truth, however, posted so conspicuously at the gateway of the theological edifice, were unable to prevent the entrance of a vast deal entirely foreign to the thought both of Scriptures and apostles. This came about largely because of Origen's allegorical interpretation of the Bible — the method used by

Philo in reconciling the Scriptures and the Greek philosophers. "Then, finally, there is one opinion throughout the whole Church, that the Scriptures were written by the Spirit of God, and have a meaning, not only such as is apparent at first sight, but another, which escapes the notice of most. This spiritual meaning is known to those only on whom the grace of the Holy Spirit is bestowed in wisdom and knowledge."[1] An interesting example of Origen's allegorical theory is found in the "Principles," IV, 1:16: "Who is so foolish as to suppose that God, after the manner of a husbandman, planted a paradise in Eden and placed in it a tree of life, visible and palpable, so that one tasting of the fruit by the bodily teeth obtained life? And, again, that one was a partaker of good and evil by masticating what was taken from the tree? And if God is said to walk in the Paradise in the evening, and Adam to hide himself under a tree, I do not suppose that any one doubts that these things figuratively indicate certain mysteries, the history having taken place in appearance and not literally."

It is not necessary to dwell on Origen's doctrine of God, except to note that it shows the unde-

[1] Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, Preface, 8.

veloped nature of the trinitarian doctrine in his day. It is the subordination view, characteristic of Greek theology in general, finding the ground of the divine unity in the precedence of the Father. "It is clearly delivered in the teaching of the apostles, first, that there is one God, who created and arranged all things, etc. Secondly, that Jesus Christ himself, who came into the world, was born of the Father before all creatures, etc. Then, thirdly, the apostles related that the Holy Spirit was associated in honor and dignity with the Father and the Son. But in his case it is not clearly distinguished whether he is to be regarded as born or innate (uncreated), or also as a son of God or not; for these are points which have to be inquired into out of Sacred Scripture."[1] The trinitarian controversies of the third and fourth centuries do not concern us. Augustine determined the form of the trinitarian doctrine for the Western Church, asserting the procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son.

In his doctrine of the Son, Origen's emphasis is on Christ as the Word or Wisdom, through participation in whom creatures become rational. "God the Father bestows upon all existence; and

[1] Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, Preface.

participation in Christ, in respect of his being the Word of reason, renders them rational beings. The grace of the Holy Spirit is present, that those beings which are not holy in their essence may be rendered holy by participation in it. . . . That those whom he has created may be unceasingly and inseparably present with *Him Who Is*, it is the business of Wisdom to instruct and train them, and to bring them to perfection by confirmation of his Holy Spirit and unceasing sanctification, by which alone they are capable of receiving God. In this way then shall we be able at some future time, perhaps, to behold the holy and blessed life in which we ought so to continue that no satiety of that blessedness should ever seize us — while we ever more eagerly and freely receive and hold fast the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. But if satiety should ever take hold of any one of those who stand on the highest and perfect summit of attainment, I do not think that such an one would suddenly be deposed from his position and fall away, but that he must decline gradually and little by little." [1] This passage is essentially Platonic in thought, and the lucid and elegant style reminds of the poet-philosopher of Greece.

[1] Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, I, 3.

Wisdom trains its pupils for the higher life, as the captives of the Cave figure of the Republic are led up to the ideal world; and the fall of the hapless spirits who tire of the ecstatic vision is a feeble echo of the Phædrus. Substitute the vision of the world of ideas for "holding fast to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," and "the back of heaven" for "the highest and perfect summit of attainment," and you have the souls in the train of Zeus, coming out and standing on the back of heaven, to gaze out upon the world of ideas, when some through carelessness fall away, their wings are broken, and they descend to the world of sense. "For the immortal souls go out and stand upon the back of heaven, and the revolution of the spheres carries them around, and they behold the world beyond. . . . During the revolution the soul beholds justice, temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute. . . . But when the soul fails to behold the vision of truth, and through some ill-hap sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and her feathers fall from her and she drops to earth, then the law ordains that this soul shall pass in the first generation into that

of a man."[1] This Christian Platonism of Origen is interesting and beautiful and may possibly be true; but this Logos — Wisdom — who leads his disciples up out of the disturbing cares of the world to serene heights of philosophic contemplation is not the Saviour of Paul, burdened with an awful load of moral guilt, and crying, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord."

For Origen, therefore, the fall of man is in the preëxistent state, instead of in Adam as with Augustine. Mortal being exists as a shadowy copy of the Divine Being, much as with Plato earthly things have only a derived existence by partaking of the nature of the idea. In the following passage there seems to be also the suggestion of an analogy between the Trinity and Plato's god, the Idea of goodness. "For in the Trinity alone, which is the author of all things, does goodness exist in virtue of essential being, while others possess it as an accidental and perishable quality, and only then enjoy blessedness when they participate in holiness and wisdom and in divinity itself."[2] In falling from the heavenly state souls are assigned different grades of being,

[1] Phædrus, Jowett, I, pp. 552 and 553. [2] Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, I, 6.

according to their moral desert; some angels, some principalities, powers, thrones, etc.; as with Plato, according as a soul has seen more or less of truth, it becomes a philosopher, king, politician, physician, etc.[1] All the fallen spirits are to be finally restored. "We think, indeed, that the goodness of God through his Christ may restore all his creatures to one end, even his enemies being conquered and subdued. . . . Those who have been removed from their primal state of blessedness have not been removed irrecoverably, but have been placed under the rule of these holy and blessed orders, that they may recover themselves and be restored to their condition of happiness." In the chapter "On the End of the World,"[2] Origen says: "I am of the opinion that the expression by which God is said to be 'all in all,' means that he is all in each individual person. Now he will be 'all' in each individual in this way; when all which any rational understanding, cleansed from the dregs of every sort of vice and with every cloud of wickedness completely swept away, can either feel or understand or think, will be only God; and when it will no longer behold or retain anything else than God,

[1] Phædrus, Jowett, I, p. 553. [2] Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, III, 6.

but when God will be the measure and standard of all its movements." (We find here suggested Clement's Neo-Platonic vision of God and absorption into the divine.) A full-fledged doctrine of transmigration is not lacking to prove Origen's loyalty to his master in philosophy: "The souls having been for many ages, so to speak, improved by this stern method of training, advancing through each grade to a better condition, reach even to that which is invisible and eternal, having traveled through by way of training every single office of the heavenly powers."[1] He is uncertain, however, as to the restoration of the Satanic powers, anticipating Joseph Cook in suggesting fixedness of character as justifying eternal punishment. "But whether any of those orders who act under the government of the devil will in a future world be converted to righteousness, or whether persistent and inveterate wickedness may be changed by the power of nature into habit, is a result which you yourself, reader, may approve of."[1] In the chapter "On the Soul,"[2] we might find Plato's doctrine of eternally existing souls, as their origin is left entirely unexplained; the divine creation, however, elsewhere

[1] Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, I, 6. [2] II, 8.

stated,[1] is doubtless assumed. "We have to inquire whether perhaps the name soul, which in Greek is termed ψυχή, be so termed from *growing cold* out of a better and more divine condition. . . . From which it appears to be made out that the understanding (νοῦς), falling away from its status and dignity, was made or named soul; and that if repaired and corrected it returns to the condition of the understanding."

In the chapter "On the Incarnation of Christ,"[2] Origen promises to investigate "How and why Christ became man." Here again, as in Book I, Christ is the Logos, Reason; his death is only significant as stimulating curiosity concerning the question of Christ's humanity, or as preliminary to the resurrection — the latter being a spectacular victory over the hosts of evil. We look in vain for any expression suggesting the tremendous moral conflict of a Paul, Augustine, or Luther, looking to the cross of Christ as the only hope of the sin-cursed soul. "We are lost in the deepest amazement that such a nature, pre-eminent above all others, should have divested itself of its condition of majesty and become man; . . . but of all the marvelous and mighty

[1] II, 1. [2] II, 6.

acts related of him, this is altogether beyond the power of mortal frailness to understand and feel — how that mighty power of divine majesty can be believed to have existed within the limits of the man who appeared in Judæa; nay, that the wisdom of God can have entered the womb of a woman, and have been born an infant, and have uttered wailings like the cries of little children!"

By far the greater part of the chapter is devoted to the discussion of the possibility and the limits of the union of the human and the divine in Jesus. Christ is to Origen a moral teacher like Socrates — his wisdom greater and more sure because divine, and his influence more potent and lasting because of his victory over death and hell and the continued working of his Spirit; but the difference is one of degree rather than kind. Origen discusses the incarnation and life of Christ not with the spiritual earnestness of a conscious sinner, but as a student who finds here a magnificent and fascinating problem, historical and philosophical.

In chapter i, Book III, the freedom of the will is discussed at great length. Origen's whole ethical system — moral self-development under guidance of the divine reason — presupposes

human freedom, and the only point of difficulty for him is to explain the Scripture passages, especially Romans ix. "Animate things are moved from themselves, a phantasy springing up in them which incites to effort. And in certain animals phantasies stir up the effort in an orderly manner, as in the case of a spider weaving. . . . The rational animal, however, has, in addition to its phantasial nature, also reason, which judges the phantasies, and disapproves of some and accepts others, in order that the animal may be led according to them. . . . Now, to fall under some one of those external causes which stir within us this phantasy or that, is confessedly not one of the things that are dependent upon ourselves, but to determine that we shall use the occurrence in this way or indifferently, is the prerogative of nothing else than the reason within us." Many Scriptural passages are quoted which exhort and command men to righteous living, and Origen concludes: "There are innumerable passages in Scripture which establish with exceeding clearness the existence of freedom of will." Considering the other aspect of the Biblical teaching, what of the hardening of Pharaoh? The illustration used in Heb. 6:7, 8 is the key to the difficulty. The

same rain, falling on cultivated ground, produces fruit; on the neglected and barren places, thorns and briars. "The same operation which was performed through the instrumentality of Moses proved the hardness of Pharaoh on the one hand, the result of his wickedness, and the yielding of the mixed Egyptian multitude who took their departure with the Hebrews."

The punishment of Pharaoh is a salutary warning as an exhibition of the divine justice; and though Pharaoh loses his life in the Red Sea the result is not permanently serious, for Origen is a thoroughgoing probationist. "It is not without reason that he who is abandoned is abandoned to the divine judgment, and that God is long-suffering with certain sinners; but because it will be to their advantage with respect to the immortality of the soul and the unending world that they be not quickly brought into a state of salvation. . . . For God governs souls not with reference to the fifty years of the present life, but with reference to an illimitable age. . . . For souls are, as one may say, innumerable, and there is one only admirable administrator who knows both the seasons and the avenues and the ways; namely, the God and Father of all things, who knows how he

conducts even Pharaoh by so great events, and by drowning in the sea, with which latter occurrence his superintendence of Pharaoh does not cease. For he was not annihilated when drowned; for 'In the hand of God are both we and our words.'"

How does Origen deal with Romans 9:18–21? (1) Paul deals with men as though they possessed freedom, and in 2 Tim. 2:21 says: "If a man *purge himself*, he shall be a vessel unto honor." (2) Men largely determine their own characters, and, so far as they are shaped by external circumstances, it must be remembered that their present condition is the result of the choices of the prenatal life. "What absurdity is there in supposing that a more ancient cause for Jacob being loved and Esau being hated existed with respect to Jacob before his assumption of a body and with regard to Esau before he was conceived in the womb of Rebecca?"

Origen's system was open at both ends in respect to the earthly life. This fact enabled him to escape many difficulties which have proven so perplexing to later theologians, who must account for everything in the comparatively short interval between Adam and the day of the sinner's death.

Having a prenatal period where sin originates, and an eternity of future time in which the infelicities of the earthly life may be readjusted, his solutions of these questions are of little service to later thinkers where the conditions of the problems are so very different. This wide difference in the conditions of the problems, however, suggests Origen's wide divergence from original, Scriptural Christianity, and the need of that theological reformation which was accomplished by Augustine.

Origen could not have satisfied himself, however, with these philosophical vagaries of a prenatal fall and an endless probation as solving the question of the will, if he had possessed a really profound view of human sin and the need of divine grace. His account of the work of Christ and the Spirit in the process of salvation is extremely meager and unsatisfactory. The will of man is free; his nature is essentially good, though he is the victim of ignorance and moral weakness; he might possibly work his way back to blessedness unaided, but God has graciously sent the Son to hasten the process. Christ is the reason, instructing men like a Greek philosopher; the Spirit's work is yet more uncertain in nature and

scope, being little more than the memory of Socrates in the minds of his disciples. He is rather at a loss to account for the Holy Spirit theoretically and practically, but accepts the existence of the Spirit as taught in the Scriptures and by the Church, and concludes that as Christ makes men rational the Spirit makes them holy; in conflict with the implicit assumption underlying his system — the Socratic identification of knowledge and virtue. And it is further to be noted that if the will is to be at every moment free, in the sense of being as likely to choose evil as good, a most discouraging moral prospect is set before us. After having won our way, by infinite effort and after the lapse of ages, back to the blessed life, can we never be sure of persisting in that state, but are we in danger every instant of again swerving from rectitude and being obliged to begin again, Tantalus-like, the weary struggle after the vanished good?

Origen is essentially Neo-Platonic in his view of matter. God is the only true essence, earthly matter is the μὴ ὄν, appearance, having apparent reality as sustained by the divine power.[1] The Logos could not unite with a material body, as

[1] Harnack, I, p. 528.

matter is essentially defiling; but the union of the human and divine in Christ was mediated by a preëxistent soul. Here is the theoretical ground of Origen's ascetic tendency, appearing in his self-mutilation and confirming the monastic movement in the Eastern Church.

It should be said, however, in justice to Origen, that his system was infinitely superior to the crude and fantastic theories which were so numerous in his time, produced by a union of Christian and heathen elements. It would be unfair to one of the strongest and purest champions of the cause of Christ, who gave his body to cruel tortures for his Master's name, if we should fail to recognize his broad culture, his candid and Christian temper, and his vast service to Christian thought in giving his faith an exact systematic form. Although in consequence of the tendency of his time the philosophical in his system gained the preponderance over the strictly theological, this resulted from the worthy purpose to commend his faith to the culture of his age, and in giving his religion a Platonic form he combined it with the noblest philosophy of the ancient world. His system may be considered as the best representative of that form of Christianized philosophy which

was produced by the first mingling of heathen and Christian thought, and as such forms an instructive contrast to the system of Augustine.

I have dwelt at some length on Origen's system because we find in it one of the two great types of theology, and a thorough understanding of its characteristic principle will greatly facilitate our progress through the later history of religious thought. Whenever and wherever intellectual speculation, based on a non-Christian philosophy and unrestrained by a deep religious sensibility, gains the preponderance in Christian thought, the outcome is practically the same — a strong emphasis of the dignity and freedom of man, which is destructive of the New Testament doctrine of salvation by the free grace of God; and there is difficulty in accounting for Christ and the Spirit — Christ usually becoming merely a teacher who brings quicker and easier truth which men could have gained for themselves, and the Spirit a vague influence for inciting to moral resolution. This is in general true of this type of thought, whether appearing in a Pelagius or an Arminius, a Lessing, Kant, or Hegel.

CHAPTER III.

AUGUSTINE.

ORIGEN and Augustine are separated by the space of two hundred years. "The doctrinal and church history of the following centuries is in the East the history of the philosophy of Origen. The Arians and the orthodox, the critics and the mystics, the world-dominating priests and the world-forming monks could support themselves by Origen and did not neglect to do so," [1] and at length pretty well all parties, finding him no longer useful, united in declaring him a heretic. Yet his theology, as the first comprehensive and systematic exposition of Christian truth, though corrected and abandoned in details, was the model for succeeding systems and has left a permanent impress on Christian thought. The speculative tendency, conspicuous in Origen, found many and worse representatives in the following two centuries, and this tendency found an inexhaustible mass of attractive material in questions relating

[1] Harnack, I, p. 555.

to Christology and the Trinity. The violence and rancor of these controversies were rather intensified than diminished by the interference of the emperors, after Christianity became the state religion; and when heresy became synonymous with treason, the evil consequences of theological divisions were rendered more serious and bloody by the intrigues of political ambition. As the result of these historic movements, Augustine found the professed followers of Christ split up into eighty or one hundred sects,[1] more energetic in combating each other than in overcoming their common foe of heathenism; while the Roman bishop in the West and the metropolitan bishops in the East were contending for primacy as possessors of the true Christian and apostolic tradition and authority. The fall of the Western Empire, which seemed so disastrous, may have been a real benefit as freeing the Church from corrupting contact with the state; but had not Augustine appeared just at this time, to restore Christianity to a Scriptural and a rationally churchly basis and gather the disintegrating elements of Christian doctrine into a compact and systematic form, we may well doubt, humanly speaking, whether the

[1] Schaff.

treasures of Christian truth and faith would have been preserved to modern times through the dark and stormy period of the middle ages.

It is unnecessary to state at length the external facts of Augustine's life; his birth near Carthage of an un-Christian father and the pious Monica; his unusual intellectual gifts which made him a man of commanding influence and a successful teacher of rhetoric; his early life of immorality which was the shame and sorrow of his later years, and which he laments with the earnestness and pathos, and often in the language of the Psalmist; his inquisitive mind drawing him to the Manichæans, and when their groundless pretensions to superior wisdom are exposed, his satisfaction in Plato's lofty speculations; his relations with Ambrose at Milan, under whose influence he is converted, with tears and an agony of mental conflict which suggests the experience of Paul on the Damascus road; his thorough consecration of his bodily and mental powers to the service of Christ and his Church — living a celibate life, preaching one or more times daily, enriching exegetical literature by numerous commentaries, employing his splendid dialectical and rhetorical abilities in combating the errors of Manichæism,

Donatism, and Pelagianism; until at last, while his episcopal city of Hippo was besieged by the victorious army of the Goths, his noble and passionate spirit ascended from the tumults and alarms of earth to that divine rest to which he had long aspired. And indeed no person who wishes to understand and properly estimate Augustine should content himself with a second-hand discussion of his life and work. It is a cruel injustice to one of the greatest and most interesting personalities of history to condemn his system because of some doctrinal extremes, and heap contempt on his character because of his early excesses, without such a study of his own works, especially the Confessions, as shall give some adequate conception of the intellectual strength hallowed and restrained by spiritual humility, the practical insight and administrative ability combined with an idealistic devotion to truth and holiness which mark this rich and many-sided nature.

It is more difficult to give a concise and clear exposition of Augustine's teachings than in the case of Origen, for the former wrote no comprehensive work like the *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν*. His views are set forth largely in controversial writings, where

the discussion is rendered prolix and confused by reason of allusions and arguments of merely local interest and value.

And as the doctrines of Augustine never came to complete and systematic expression in any single work, so they are lacking in unity and consistency among themselves. It is a common fact of experience and history that antagonistic opinions may repose quietly side by side in a man's mind, and this is especially true, perhaps, of great men whose vigorous mental grasp gives them a firm hold upon supplementary poles of truth. Having passed from a state of general religious doubt, through the speculations of the Manichæans and the Platonic philosophy into the faith of the orthodox Church, each of the stages of his intellectual and spiritual progress left its mark, more or less permanently, upon his thought and character. His writings composed near the time of his conversion show most clearly the influence of the Neo-Platonic philosophy, being an attempt to express his new spiritual experience in terms of his valued philosophy. In this early period and to a less degree through life, in setting forth his theological views he uses largely the traditional style and terminology of the philosophized Chris-

tianity which Origen had made the ruling theological influence, often apparently unconscious that the old theological forms were inadequate or contradictory to his altered doctrinal standpoint. He holds fast, as authorities of Christian truth, both the Scriptures and the teaching of the Church, assuming that these standards of truth are identical in content, and leaving undetermined which is to be accepted in case of a conflict. He emphasizes the doctrine of sin and the renewing grace of God as the essential groundwork of Christianity, yet does not so subordinate all the doctrinal material to this principle as to free theology from the traditional form which identified salvation and knowledge. In his early controversy with the Manichæans he advocates the freedom of the will; in the anti-Pelagian writings he denies it. His fundamental doctrine of salvation by free grace renders superfluous and perhaps injurious all monkish asceticism and *ex opere operato* view of the sacraments; yet he advocates the one because of his earnest desire for personal holiness and for an impressive example of stainless Christian virtue, and the other in the interests of churchly order and unity of doctrine and practice. We may find in him points of resemblance to Lessing and

Schleiermacher — not a system maker but a sower of suggestive and fruitful ideas in widely separated fields of thought.

Augustine lays great stress upon the authority of Scripture, quoting it constantly in all his doctrinal discussions. His method of interpreting Scripture is much more sober and literal than Origen's, yet retains to some extent the allegorical method. "All that Scripture, therefore, which is called the Old Testament is handed down fourfold to those who desire to know it — according to history, ætiology, analogy, and allegory. Thus it is handed down according to history, when is taught what hath been written and what hath been done; what hath not been done, but only written as though it had been done. According to ætiology, when it is shown for what cause anything is done. Analogy, when it is shown that the Old and New Testaments are not contrary the one to the other. According to allegory, when it is taught that certain things which have been written are not to be taken in the letter, but are to be understood in a figure."[1] As an example of Augustine's allegoric interpretation the discussion of David's sin is noteworthy. "The literal David was guilty of

[1] Profit of Believing, 5.

a heinous crime. On the other hand, He who was the desire of all nations loved the Church when washing herself on the roof; that is, when cleansing herself from the pollutions of the world, and in spiritual contemplation mounting upon her house of clay and trampling upon it; and after commencing an acquaintance, he puts to death the devil (Uriah), whom he first entirely removes from her, and joins her to himself in perpetual union." [1] The orthodox Church Fathers were often at their wits' end to frame answers to the keen and satirical criticisms of the Manichæans, and it is not surprising that they were loth to surrender entirely the allegorical method which could discover a wealth of edifying suggestion in the most unpromising material.

In the work against Pelagius,[2] Augustine writes as though reason were to subject itself entirely to the authority of Scripture — a wide departure from the position of Origen. "Let us not suppose that human nature cannot be corrupted by sin, but rather believing, from the inspired Scriptures, that it is corrupted by sin, let our inquiry be how this could possibly have come about." And yet he speaks again [3] as though the Scriptures were

[1] Reply to Faustus, the Manichæan, XXII, 87. [2] Nature and Grace, 22.
[3] Christian Doctrine, I, 39.

merely a means for the development of faith, hope, and love in the believing subject who is then able to stand without their support. "And thus a man who is resting upon faith, hope, and love, and who keeps a firm hold upon these, does not need the Scriptures except for the purpose of instructing others." This idea seems to open a wide door to fanaticism, but reveals in Augustine that same depth of religious feeling which we find in the leading reformers, regarding the Bible as the external standard of faith yet seizing its spiritual contents, making them its own and so feeling able to stand independently of the written Word.

Another authority and standard of Christian truth is the Catholic Church. Augustine's intellectual struggles caused him to estimate highly any legitimate aid to faith, and his grand conception of the city of God existing in eternal power and majesty in contrast to the decaying Roman state, made it easy for him to clothe the Church with an authority, the pernicious consequences of which were entirely hidden from his eyes. In his work "On the Profit of Believing," (20) he exhorts Honoratus, "If now you seem to have been tossed to and fro enough, and wish to put an end to labors of this kind, follow the pathway of

Catholic teaching, which hath flowed down from Christ himself, through the apostles, even unto us, and will hereafter flow down to posterity." The Catholic Church is "most true mother of Christians." "Christ has given the keys to his Church, that whatsoever it should bind on earth should be bound in heaven, etc.; that whosoever should believe and should repent and turn from his sins, should be saved by the *same faith and repentance* on the ground of which he is received into the bosom of the Church."[1] We find here the beautiful presentation of the ideal Christian order, where faith feeds upon the Christ of the Scriptures, and the Church mirrors the same Christ in life and sacrament and preached Word. But what confusion and disaster ensues, and how the body of Christ is rent asunder, when the fanatic exalts his faith, the Romanist his church, and the Protestant his Bible, — each in one-sided antagonism to all other standards of truth.

His early view of God is colored by his Platonic associations, and is practically that of the eternal and ineffable being, to be reached by ecstatic vision; as in the passage describing the spiritual experience of his mother and himself at Ostia.

[1] Christian Doctrine, I, 18.

The following is a characteristic specimen of this early period, displaying the verbose and artificial style of the Latin rhetorician of the late Roman period, yet ennobled by a profound and genuine religious feeling, and giving an insight into his strongly emotional nature: —

"O God, Framer of the Universe, grant me first rightly to invoke thee; then to show myself worthy to be heard by thee; lastly, deign to set me free. God, who hast not willed that any but pure minds should know the truth; God, the Father of truth, the Father of wisdom, the Father of the true and crowning life, the Father of blessedness, etc. Henceforth thee alone do I love, thee alone I follow. Thee alone I seek, thee alone am I prepared to serve, for thou alone art Lord by a just title, and of thy dominion do I desire to be. Hear me, hear me, graciously hear me, my God, my Lord, my King, my Father, my Cause, my Hope, my Wealth, my Honor, my House, my Country, my Health, my Sight, my Life!"[1]

In his severe conflict with religious doubt he anticipated Descartes' "*cogito ergo sum*," and henceforth found his faith as a fact of inner expe-

[1] Soliloquy, I.

rience to be studied and analyzed, and consequently as a window opening out to God. "In respect of these truths I am not at all afraid of the Academicians who say, 'What if you are deceived?' For if I am deceived, I am."[1] Hence the knowledge of self (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) is for Augustine, as for Clement and Origen, the way to knowledge of God, but in a genuinely Christian sense. In this devout study of inner experience Augustine was led to many observations of the inner life which are distinct and valuable contributions to psychological science — especially in his discussions of memory and the will. Augustine developed and stated for the Western Church the doctrine of the Trinity, finding in the human mind analogies to it. "For we both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being and our knowledge of it."[2] For his religious sensibility God is by preëminence goodness and love. "For love of thy love, do I this."[3] Yet his Platonic preconceptions linger, making God the one substance, over against which nature is scarcely more than an appearance, and the higher spiritual experiences of the Christian have to his thought the form of the ecstatic vision.

[1] City of God, XI, 26. [2] Ibid. XI, 26. [3] Confessions, XI, 1.

We have now to consider the group of doctrines which are especially associated with the name of Augustine — universal sinfulness because of Adam's fall and consequent bondage of the will to evil, and the eternal punishment of all except a comparatively small number who are converted through the work of Christ and the Spirit, for no merit of their own, but in consequence of God's eternal purpose to manifest his attribute of mercy in relation to a chosen few.

This group of doctrines came to final form and expression with Augustine in connection with the Pelagian controversy. Pelagius was a monk coming originally from Britain probably, and living for the most part in and about Rome. He was a man of earnest moral purposes, but of no very profound religious experience or intellectual power. He was familiar with the masters of Greek philosophy, a sympathetic student of Origen, and he was in general well fitted to become the champion of that compound of Aristotelian-Christian and Stoic-popular philosophy which prevailed largely among the cultured Christians both in the East and in the West. The goodness and justice of God were emphasized; whatever God has made must be essentially good;

man's natural disposition and tendency is to choose the good; choice of evil and continuance in it can be but a temporary state. Man's moral reformation is to be wrought out by an energetic exertion of his real and better nature, and to this an ascetic life is favorable. God's grace, manifested in Christ, always helps those who help themselves, which when sifted down to its kernel means practically, as with Origen, that the divine grace was operative in creating men good, and the Christian revelation illuminates human ignorance and stimulates its weakness to moral resolution. While urging men at Rome to live a moral life, Pelagius was often met by what he regarded as the unmanly and hypocritical excuse that error and sin are natural to man. It is said that he first came into conflict with Augustine by excitedly opposing Augustine's saying, "Give what thou commandest and command what thou willest,"[1] as Augustine relates in the "Gift of Perseverance" (53). This superficial view of the religious world was in polar opposition to Augustine's deep experience of sin and grace, and aroused him to most energetic protest. Augustine's strong point in the controversy was

[1] City of God, X, 45,

that if man is essentially good and can work out his own salvation, grace is denied and Christ died in vain. His weak point and the one of which Pelagius takes the best advantage is his view of nature — the oft-repeated question, "Who art thou that repliest against God?" affording small relief to outraged reason and humanity, which inquires, "Why did God create the world if the mass of human beings are foredoomed to perdition?"

Augustine differs from Origen in placing the fall into sin, not in a preëxistent state, but in Adam, the father of the race. We find here a certain Platonic coloring which enables Augustine seriously to hold what seems to us the absurdity that all his descendants, being *ideally* present in Adam, were justly held answerable for his sin. "When Adam sinned by not obeying God, then his body lost the grace whereby it used in every part of it to be obedient to the soul. . . . As a consequence, whoever is born of the flesh has need of spiritual regeneration — not only that he may reach the kingdom of God, but also that he may be freed from the damnation of sin."[1] "Because he forsook God of his free will he experi-

[1] On Forgiveness, I, 21.

enced the just judgment of God, that with his whole race, which being as yet all placed in him had sinned with him, he should be condemned. Whence even if none should be delivered, no one could justly blame the judgment of God. That, therefore, in comparison of those that perish *few*, but in their absolute number many, are delivered, is effected by grace, is effected freely; thanks must be given because it is effected, so that no one may be lifted up as of his own deservings, but that every mouth may be stopped and he that glorieth may glory in the Lord."[1]

The thoroughgoing nature of Augustine's doctrine of depravity is made clear in reference to the condition of infants. All are sinful because of Adam's fall, and as such will forever perish unless baptized. "What, then, some one says, even the infant needs a liberator? Certainly he needs one. The witness is Mother Church herself, who receives the child for washing, and either for dismissing him from this life freed, or nurturing him in piety. Recognize the misery, extend the help. By as much as they cannot speak for themselves, by so much more pityingly let us speak for the little ones. Certainly if the

[1] Rebuke and Grace, 28.

child could speak for himself he would repel the voice of opposition and cry out, ' Give me Christ's life! In Adam I died; give me Christ's life; in whose sight I am not clean even if I am an infant whose life has been but one day on the earth.' "[1] At one point, however, his rigorous consistency yields a little to his humanity. "It may be correctly affirmed that such infants as quit the body without being baptized will be involved in the *mildest condemnation* of all. That person, however, greatly deceives both himself and others who teaches that they will not be involved in condemnation."[2] However monstrous this doctrine of infant damnation may seem to us, our estimate of Augustine in relation to it is greatly modified if we consider that he did not construct it as a speculative theory in the studious seclusion of his episcopal palace, but encountered the difficulty as a practical problem of his daily ministry, and his primary interest was not to consign the children to perdition but to save them. If it is true that all, infants included, are lost sinners, and a child can be saved by so simple a rite as baptism, he is a dangerous Christian teacher who fails to raise the voice of warning, and he is a very

[1] Sermon, 293. [2] On Forgiveness, I, 21.

unnatural parent who neglects this extremely easy and inexpensive method of accomplishing so desirable a result.

The one and only way of escape from this universal state of sinfulness is through the free grace of God revealed of Christ. The havoc wrought by sin is so great, the defect in human nature so radical, that man is of himself helpless to choose and follow the right unless made the recipient of the divine aid. Hence in the Pelagian controversy the doctrine of the freedom of the will was a prominent issue. Augustine held that in his present state man's moral nature is in confusion; some impulses and aspirations to good move within him, but his predominantly evil tendency makes it impossible that these impulses should really gain the ascendency. The only result, therefore, can be a state of ceaseless and hopeless conflict, "When I would do good evil is present with me" — a state made painfully vivid to Augustine by memories of his conversion.[1] Obviously the only view of the will which Augustine can hold in consistency is the profound one that the ruling choice of the life must be either for evil or for good; and as habit constantly tends to

[1] Confessions, VII, 17.

fixedness, the free and spontaneous service of God, lost in Adam, can be restored only by divine grace. This view restores unity to the moral character destroyed by the Pelagian view of the will as a series of ictic choices, and is in the main Augustine's theory. The ideal ethical condition is not a state of moral anarchy, but rather of firm allegiance to the wisest law. The Divine Being, infinitely powerful, yet also infinitely wise and good, is unable to choose the foolish and the wrong — not in consequence of a defect but of the perfection of his character. The aim of moral development is not liberty but bondage to the highest. Augustine shrinks, however, from pushing to the extreme his denial of freedom to the unregenerate man; for he feels that he is drawing perilously near to making God the author of sin, which "God forbid!" He evidently felt that the doctrine of the fall of the race in Adam was bearing as much weight as he could safely put upon it, and feared the consequences of declaring that all are born the irresponsible servants of Satan, so that Adam's choice alone bars the way to the impossible conclusion that God is responsible for the evil. Augustine therefore endeavors to prove that men still have power of choice so

as to be responsible — though this freedom is extremely unsubstantial in character, and Augustine maintains it by a rather unworthy jugglery of the expressions "free from sin" and "free from righteousness." "Who of us would say that by the sin of the first man free will perished from the human race? Through sin freedom indeed perished, but it was that freedom which was in paradise to have a full righteousness with immortality. . . . For free will in the sinner up to this extent did not perish — that by it all sin, especially those who sin with delight and with love of sin. . . . They are not, then, free from righteousness except by the choice of the will; but they do not become free from sin save by the grace of the Saviour. . . . This will, which is free in evil things because it takes pleasure in evil, is not free in good things for the reason that it has not been made free." [1]

However carefully Augustine may guard the point, yet his emphasis was so strong upon the sovereignty of God and the impotence of the sinner, and his doctrine of the freedom of the natural man was so incomprehensible in character, that his discussions and writings naturally enough

[1] Against two Letters of the Pelagians, I, 5, 7.

gave the impression that the unregenerate possess no freedom. Men therefore began to inquire, "Why continue the ghastly mockery of offering salvation to men incapable of accepting it — why rebuke the wicked or commend the virtuous?" These questions were raised by a company of monks in the North African city of Adrumetum, who were so seriously disturbed by the difficulty that Augustine addressed them two letters on the subject. He first quotes numerous Scripture passages to show that man is free and responsible. "No man therefore when he sins can in his heart blame God for it, but every man must impute the fault to himself. Nor does it detract at all from a man's own will when he performs any act in accordance with God. Indeed, a work is then to be pronounced a good one when a person does it willingly; then, too, may the reward of a good work be hoped for from him concerning whom it is written, 'He shall reward every man according to his works.'"[1] He then takes up the other side and shows that faith and salvation are the free gifts of God, unmerited by any, "lest any man should boast." "If eternal life is rendered to good works, as the Scripture most openly de-

[1] Grace and Free Will, 4.

clares, how can eternal life be a matter of grace? . . . This question seems to me to be by no means capable of solution unless we understand that even those good works of ours which are recompensed with eternal life belong to the grace of God." [1] Augustine's own proper view of the will, however, finds pretty clear expression in chapter xxxi. "There is always within us a free will — but it is not always good; for it is either free from righteousness when it serves sin, — and then it is evil, — or else it is free from sin when it serves righteousness — and then it is good. But the grace of God is always good; and by it it comes to pass that a man is of a good will, though he was before of an evil one." I have no doubt that the passage in this letter which was most helpful to the monks of Adrumetum, in case they followed its suggestions, was that near the close: "Peruse attentively this treatise, and if you understand it, give God the praise; but where you fail to understand it, pray for understanding, for God will give you understanding." Nevertheless the monks do not seem to have arrived at a very clear view of the matter, for one of them was reported later as saying that "no man ought to be rebuked for not doing God's

[1] Grace and Free Will, 19, 20.

commandments, but that prayer only should be made on his behalf." Augustine replies to this in a second letter on Rebuke and Grace. A man in sin should be rebuked, "for if such a one is called according to the purpose, beyond all doubt God is co-working for good to him even in the fact of his being rebuked."[1] Calvin well comments on these letters of Augustine: "Thus there is left to man such a free will, if we choose to give it that appellation, as he describes in another place, that he can neither be converted to God nor continue in God but by grace; and that all the ability which he has is derived from grace."[2]

How are we to explain Augustine's obscurity and apparent lack of candor in relation to the free will of the unregenerate man? Was it merely to defend his system from the reproach of the Pelagians that he destroyed human responsibility and made God the author of sin? Not entirely so, I think. He had known in his own moral life bondage to sin, yet with a consciousness that he ought to free himself and yet that he could not; and at length he had been given power from God to renounce evil and choose the good. He had thus harmonized in his religious feeling the polar

[1] Grace and Free Will, 25. [2] Inst. II, 3, 14.

truths of bondage and responsibility, freedom and dependence on God. The *facts* of his freedom and responsibility during the tremendous struggle of his conversion remained always sure to his moral nature, however imperfectly he might be able to interpret and reconcile these facts from the theoretical standpoint.

Augustine teaches that a definite and unchangeable number of souls are predestinated to eternal life, not on account of any merit of their own, but as vessels for the display of the divine mercy, while it is pretty distinctly taught on the other hand that the rest of mankind are predestinated to damnation as vessels of wrath. Augustine's primary presentation of predestination is in its positive aspect in relation to the elect, as with Paul in Romans viii, where is the joy and strength of dependence on God. "But sayest thou God's will concerning myself is to me uncertain? What then? Is thine own will concerning thyself certain to thee? Since then both are uncertain, why does not man commit his faith, hope, and love to the stronger will rather than the weaker?"[1] But for most men the somber shadows of the negative doctrine make a far deeper impression than the alleged

[1] Predestination, 21.

glories of the election to grace, so that to the average man the whole doctrine brings more of uncertainty and dread than encouragement. In the treatise "On the Soul and its Origin,"[1] Augustine says: "The fact undoubtedly is that numberless infants pass out of the body (to eternal damnation) before they are baptized. God forbid that I should cast about for any futile effort to dilute this stern fact" (as by asserting that original sin may be remitted without baptism). "I simply hold what I see the apostle has most plainly taught us: that owing to one man, all pass into condemnation who are born of Adam, unless they are born again in Christ, whom he has predestinated to everlasting life as the most merciful bestower of grace; whilst to those whom he has predestinated to eternal death, he is also the most righteous rewarder of punishment, not only on account of the sins which they add to the indulgence of their own will, but also because of their original sin, even if, as in the case of infants, they add nothing thereto." Predestination to death is an inscrutable mystery, but "who art thou that repliest against God?" "Let the vessels of mercy understand how freely

[1] IV, 6.

mercy is offered to them because to the vessels of wrath, with whom they have common cause and measure of perdition, is repaid wrath, righteous and due."[1] Robert Burns' "Prayer of Holy Willie" may be suggested as the comment of common sense on this doctrine.

In the case of the elect the gift of perseverance is added to that of predestination, so that it is impossible that they should permanently fall away from the Christian life. But how about Adam? Was the gift of perseverance a part of his moral perfection in Eden? If so, how could he sin? If not, how can he be held responsible? And if he was not responsible, God is the author of sin and Augustine's system vanishes into thin air. Augustine discusses this point in "Rebuke and Grace,"[2] and very unsatisfactorily, giving a wordy and superficial comparison of Adam's fall with that of the evil angels. There is evidently no third alternative between the inexorable horns of the dilemma just stated, so that we find Augustine at last practically acknowledging the weakness of the crucial doctrine of the system, by obscuring it in a fog of dialectical verbiage. We shall see in considering Calvin's system that he sweeps

[1] Against two Letters of Pelagius, VI, 16. [2] 26–29.

away all such arguments as shallow and unmanly subterfuges, and boldly declares that God predestinated Adam to sin. He is the one prominent theologian of the Christian centuries who has had the courage clearly to enunciate this doctrine, which to the average mind is subversive of all morality and faith.

That Augustine's extreme emphasis of the sovereignty of God brought him into kinship with Calvin's view, appears in the idea that sin and evil have a proper and necessary place in the economy of creation. "As the beauty of a picture is increased by well-managed shadows, so to the eye that has skill to discern it, the universe is beautified even by sinners, though considered by themselves their deformity is a sad blemish." The wickedness of angels and men "embellishes the course of the ages, as it were an exquisite poem set off with antitheses."[1] Hence we find the paradox that this system, which began with the strongest emphasis of the heinous nature and, to human strength, resistless power of sin, ends with the assertion that evil has its æsthetic and even its moral uses — bad in the concrete, but in its general cosmic aspect beneficial. It has always,

[1] City of God, XI, 18, 23.

however, been found difficult to preach this doctrine with profit to the laity.

Augustine's system presents to us enough of contradictions and obscurities, yet these elements give no ground for neglecting or disparaging the valuable and fruitful points which he presents; for this is the common case of every thinker who has sought to comprehend within the limits of a definite system the incomprehensible things of God and the world. Let us estimate him and his work in relation to that fundamental principle which is and must ever remain in some form the essential kernel of the Christian religion — salvation by faith in Jesus of Nazareth, rather than by any device of human wit or virtue; a doctrine which so sadly needed emphasis in his day. Let us estimate him in relation to this doctrine, rather than to those intellectual perplexities in which he became involved, largely through loyalty to this central principle. In its central elements his system is sound and vital, consonant with the Scripture, Christian tradition, and Christian consciousness. It is perhaps the first great system in which the Christianity molds the philosophy, instead of *vice versa*. This fact appears in the last point in his system to which we must allude

— his doctrine of Christ and the Holy Spirit. Augustine has a real and important work for each of these divine persons to do; Christ is a real Saviour, conquering the devil and liberating the captives, and the Spirit has a work of superhuman difficulty in restoring to goodness an obstinate will and a character hardened in evil habit. And it is to be noted that Augustine's interest in Christ is primarily moral rather than intellectual — he is in harmony as Origen is at variance with the first Christians in seeking and magnifying not primarily the Logos, Wisdom, but Jesus, "who should save the people from their sins." "How hast thou loved us, O good Father, who sparedest not thine only Son, but deliveredst him up for us wicked ones! . . . For us was He unto Thee both victor and victim, and the victor as being the victim; for us was he unto Thee both priest and sacrifice, and priest as being the sacrifice; of slaves making us thy sons, by being born of thee and serving us. Terrified by my sins and the load of my misery, I had resolved in my heart, and meditated flight into the wilderness; but thou didst forbid me and strengthen me. O Lord, I cast my care upon thee! Thine only Son — He in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge — hath redeemed me with his blood."[1]

[1] Confessions. X. 43.

It is evident, however, that many of the extreme and contradictory elements in Augustine's system are due to the influence of the Greek philosophical spirit, from which it was impossible that any thinker in that age should totally free himself. The Greek demands that all shall be made clear. For his inquisitive science the darkness of mystery must be driven from every most minute crevice of the universe — a plausible guess is much better than a confession of ignorance. This intellectual temper finds in Christianity a new philosophy, which, if it is worthy of that name,— especially if it is of divine origin,— must furnish the key to all truth in earth and heaven. To men of this mental habit the doctrine of justification by faith rather than works cannot be substantiated except by showing its necessary relation to all possible facts and persons. His harsh and contradictory doctrines flow for the most part from the attempt to make clear to the intellect those fundamental moral antinomies which can be apprehended only in religious feeling. He is largely successful in clearing the atmosphere of the lower theological region, but it is by the hazardous method of gathering all the clouds of mystery into the sphere of the divine. As interpreted by the aver-

age mind, the heavenly Father becomes the remote, cloud-enthroned despot, of resistless power and superior to the laws of reason and morality; directing all things to the spectacular display of his glory, supremely indifferent to all the woe and tears and tragedy of human life; the counsels of his will, terrible and relentless, smiting men out of the darkness like the secret decrees of the English Star Chamber or the Venetian Council of Ten — a situation ominous for the succeeding theological development.

How could men develop and advocate systems so repugnant to reason and feeling as the majority of mankind find the Augustinian and Calvinistic systems? Calvin was a lawyer, determined at all hazards to construct an invincible case against the Romish doctrine of works, and cut it up at the roots. Paul, Augustine, and Luther, however, the men from whom this type of theology originated, were men of strong religious feeling, who found their hope and joy for this life and the life to come in the faith that all is in the hands of God. Their deep religious sensibility made them certain, first, of personal salvation, and second, that the *good* God would do all for the best. But later men, less intense in emotional nature, were

not so sure of either of the points just mentioned — hence Pelagianism and Arminianism. For if a man takes such a system seriously and has any doubt as to either of these points, it becomes a frightful instrument of torture. The common run of men either do not take these systems seriously or deny their validity.

In essence Augustine and Schleiermacher are one — religion is the feeling of dependence on God. The form is different: one, Christian, Scriptural, churchly, objective; the other, pantheistic, philosophical, subjective; and they begin at different ends — the one with God and the other with man. Yet the inner principle is the same — glad and peaceful resignation of all into the hands of the all-powerful and all-good God. The extreme forms of resignation appearing in the two systems are in a way similar; the first willing that self and friends should be damned for the glory of God; the second not demanding a conscious personal immortality — readiness to lose one's self in God, willing submission to self-annihilation.

One source of the wide influence of Augustine's system doubtless lies in the fact that the *great* religious and philosophical systems have been monistic. This applies especially to modern thought,

since matter and spirit are more clearly distinguished than in the ancient world. It applies in a somewhat different sense to the Greek systems, for Greek philosophy as a whole is more or less distinctly monistic. The dualism of Plato and Aristotle is more apparent than real. Plato's Ideas and Aristotle's Prime Mover exist apart from the world, while world-soul and world, body and soul, constitute a unity and practically do all that is done.

In modern thought, influenced by Christianity, the strong emphasis of personality in man introduces a real dualism. Here is perplexity and confusion for philosophy and science. What shall be done to obtain a unity which shall group all things harmoniously under itself? Three courses are possible: (1) God alone truly exists and operates; theory of Augustine, Calvin, Spinoza, Hegel. (2) Man alone may be assumed; (a) Fichte's Ich; (b) materialism, denying God and Spirit; (c) ignoring God, who becomes an unknown x, as with Spencer. (3) The apparent dualism may be accepted as real, the attempt being made to define the limits of the divine and human power and activity — Pelagianism, Arminianism.

The first assumption (1) produces the strong systems, attractive to vigorous minds because of their rigorous consistency — as Lessing regarding Spinozism as the only philosophy. Yet the thinkers seldom yield complete allegiance to these systems, and the common mass of humanity are persistently, unconsciously, and invincibly dualistic.

The name of Augustine is of the greatest significance for the whole European world; not only in relation to its theology, but to almost every department of philosophy, science, and culture. Siebeck[1] draws an interesting and suggestive parallel between Augustine and Aristotle — the latter as the characteristic spirit of the Greek world; the former as the thinker who first became essentially emancipated from Hellenic thought and introduced a genuinely Christian type of speculation. This comparison is of interest in passing from Augustine to the Reformers. Luther regarded Aristotle as his most powerful and dangerous enemy in the field of thought, for the ruling tendency in the Roman church as he found it was, under the influence of the Renaissance, to reduce Christianity to an Aristotelian-Pelagian philosophy.

[1] Harnack, III, p. 95.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RENAISSANCE.

WHEN Leo X was made Pope he said to Giuliano (duke of Nemours): 'Let us enjoy the papacy since God has given it us.' It was in this spirit that Leo administered the Holy See. The keynote which he struck dominated the whole society of Rome. At Agostino Chigi's banquets, prelates of the Church and apostolic secretaries sat side by side with beautiful Imperias and smooth-cheeked singing boys; fishes from Byzantium and ragouts of parrots' tongues were served on golden platters, which the guests threw from the open windows into the Tiber. Masques and balls, comedies and carnival processions filled the streets and squares and palaces of the Eternal City with a mimicry of pagan festivals, while art went hand in hand with luxury. It seemed as though Bacchus and Pallas would be reinstated in their old realm, and yet Rome had not ceased to call herself Christian. The hoarse rhetoric of the friars in the Coliseum mingled with the Latin

declamations of the Capitol and the twang of lute-strings in the Vatican. Meanwhile amid crowds of cardinals in hunting dress, dances of half-naked girls and masques of carnival bacchantes, moved pilgrims from the north with wide, astonished, woful eyes — disciples of Luther, within whose soul, as in a scabbard, lay sheathed the sword of the Spirit, ready to flash forth and smite." [1]

We have seen how Origen distorted original Christianity by pouring it into the molds of the Platonic philosophy; we have now to consider the revival of ancient learning which made an Epicurean philosophy and ethics practically supreme in the Italian church. The former was followed by the reformation of theology by Augustine, the latter by the Reformation, not so much theological as moral, of Luther.

I have said that Augustine was the first thinker who became essentially emancipated from Hellenic thought, and introduced a genuinely Scriptural and Christian type of mental and moral life. The ascetic tendency of the early Christian centuries — a reaction from the moral pollutions of paganism — and the calamitous condition of the

[1] Symonds, Age of the Despots, p. 399.

Christian world during the barbarous Middle Ages, brought into prominence those teachings of Christ and the apostles which emphasize the corrupt and perishable nature of the present world. The science and learning of antiquity were more and more neglected as superfluous or pernicious. Why should a wretched sinner, on the crumbling verge of eternal perdition, waste the flying years, given for prayer and penance, in studying the plants and bugs or even the suns and stars of a world soon to melt forever in the fires of an universal conflagration? Why should he who possessed the final and perfect truth in the Holy Scriptures concern himself for the vain and empty speculations of human reason? Soon this indifference to ancient learning, aided by the general decay of letters in Western Europe, produced a state of ignorance which veiled almost completely the glories of that early world of culture. Augustine, in the latter part of the fourth century, knew little or no Greek, and the study of this language was more and more neglected, so that the scant learning of the Middle Ages was dependent upon such of the Greek masterpieces as had been translated into Latin, or had reached the Western world in more or less corrupt Arabic

versions. The logic of Aristotle was the one Greek work which was in general use and authority, because its abstract forms could be filled with a specifically Christian content, and be employed in bringing the Church doctrines to clearness and consistency. And, furthermore, this medieval type of thought not only darkened and circumscribed the intellectual life, destroying the dignity and worth and free activity of the mind, but also placed the natural appetites and feelings of mankind under the ban of corruption and sin — poisoning at its source the most copious fountain of human happiness. The monk was exalted as the ideal; participation in the business and struggle of worldly living and in the relations of the family life was a concession to human weakness, admissible only for persons unable to rise to the nobler and holier state of the cloister. The thought of the age takes concrete form in St. Simon Stylites, on his pillar, year after year, —

"Battering the gates of heaven with storms of prayer,
Have mercy, Lord, and take away my sins,"

indifferent to the streams of humanity which flow by on their predestined way to misery and destruction; or in St. Anthony, in his gloomy cavern

with skull and crucifix, fighting in never-ending struggle an imagination emptied of pure and wholesome objects and consequently peopled by images of voluptuous beauty. This view of life was possible only in a semi-barbarous society, where native appetite and brute impulse were more potent than abstract theory. It was generally assumed that a plain and practical man was not expected to live up to the Christian ideal, and he therefore paid little attention to religion till the approach of death and the purgatorial fires brought him a suppliant before the altar of the Church — a useful institution in such emergencies. When permanent governments emerge from the political chaos of the Middle Ages, when war gives place to peaceful industry and commerce, and men begin to illuminate and adorn life with art and letters, such a religious system must be either reformed or abandoned.

These conditions began to be realized in northern Italy about the eleventh century. There appear here a number of independent republican states — usually single cities or small confederacies of cities and towns — which played a part in the history of modern culture not unlike that of the cities of Greece in antiquity. In their

struggles against their hereditary feudal lords the people were usually aided by their bishops, and it was the long conflict of the Church with the emperors which furnished the cities the opportunity and the means for securing a practical independence. Their geographical situation — at the gateway of Italy, between the papal territories on the south and the German empire on the north, so that they were constantly courted by both parties in the struggle — developed in these cities a free and self-reliant spirit which prepared them for the most ambitious enterprises. Their location was also favorable for commerce with all parts of the world, and the result was a rapid accumulation of wealth and a general movement towards a broader culture and a more refined and luxurious life. In his strong sense of individuality the Italian of that period resembled the ancient Greek, and the outcome was not unlike among the two peoples. Neither people was ever welded into a political unit by a sentiment of genuine nationality, and their political history is the record of the wars of petty commonwealths and the suicidal conflicts of rival factions, never stilled until foreign domination brought that peace which is the stagnation of death. Such

conditions, however, seem best adapted to produce the most remarkable results in the shortest time. Every man and every community is alert and active, clear of eye and quick and sure of hand, and while the eager rivalry crushes the weak in ruthless fashion, the strong and fortunate push on to the greatest achievements. In the ferment of this eager life, the traditional churchly doctrine and view of life was quickly tested and found wanting. Men were seeking the solid and the worthy in every field of activity, grasping in their own hands the realities of life, and seeking the deepest fountains of satisfaction and enjoyment. There was an impatience, amounting to disgust, with respect to all that was shallow and partial and unreal, and a demand for a life, practical and theoretical, which should be full-orbed and symmetrical. These Italians were the heirs of the dim traditions of Roman greatness which had penetrated through the darkness of the intervening centuries, and they were always proud to be reckoned as the subjects of the Roman empire, however remote the connection between the existing state and the grandeur of the storied past. In the fragments of Roman literature, art, and architecture they possessed, and in the literary

monuments of Greek antiquity which were made known to them at this time, they found suggestions of the broader and richer life they were seeking. They found here a life, an earthly life, serene and sunny, unclouded by fears of an angry God or an endless hell; a virtue which meant manhood, self-respect, high ambition, and noble endeavor, instead of the contemptible weakness and indolence and self-abasement of the starveling monk; they found an ideal of free and harmonious activity, of enjoyment of all earthly good and beauty, which to the thought of the Renaissance had produced a golden age in the past, and need only be studied and reproduced to make old earth bloom again with the flowers and fruits of Paradise.

The result was a most extraordinary enthusiasm for the learning and art of antiquity. And all this enthusiasm was needed for the gigantic task before them. They set to work for the mastery of the Greek language with few and fragmentary Greek manuscripts and without grammars, lexicons, or classical dictionaries. The drudgery of the elementary work done by these Italian scholars was something prodigious, and places modern culture under a lasting debt of gratitude. Late in the fourteenth century, the Greek Chrysoloras,

said to have been the most accomplished and eloquent Hellenist of his age, was induced to come to Florence to teach Greek in the university. In his "Commentaries" Leonardo Bruni, a distinguished scholar, tells of his early struggle as to whether he should abandon the law for the study of Greek. "I reckoned it a crime to omit so great an occasion of learning the Greek literature; and oftentimes I reasoned with myself after this manner: Can it be that thou when thou mayest gaze on Homer, Plato, and Demosthenes, together with other poets, philosophers, and orators, concerning whom so great and wonderful things are said, and mayest converse with them and receive their admirable doctrine — can it be that thou wilt desert thyself and neglect the opportunity divinely offered thee? Through seven hundred years no one in all Italy has been master of Greek letters; and yet we acknowledge that all science is derived from them. Conquered at last by these reasonings, I delivered myself over to Chrysoloras with such passion that what I had received from him by day occupied my mind at night in hours of sleep."[1]

The rapid and splendid development of art at

[1] Symonds, Revival of Learning, p. 110.

this period finds no parallel in history except in the age of Athenian glory. The fragments of Greek sculpture were studied as ardently by the artists as the fragments of ancient manuscripts by the literati, with the result that Italian art, which was held in the service of the Church, became constantly more natural and human, and to an almost corresponding degree less religious. The gaunt and haggard saints of early Christian art became the Greek athletes of Michael Angelo, and the angular and ugly Madonnas were transformed into the radiant and lovely womanhood of Titian's "Assumption."

The ancient ideals were exalted in every sphere of life. The passive virtues of Christianity were despised, as proper to the spiritless and slovenly monk; and virtue took on the Roman sense — manhood, self-assertion, conquest. The man of the age did not aim to be honest, upright, and brave, but clever and successful; not vice and crime, but simplicity and failure were to be avoided. Politics was the business of most men of spirit in those stirring days when a bold and unscrupulous leader might hope to make himself ruler of some Italian city or principality; and politics was the art of intrigue, deception, and

murder — reduced to a system in Machiavelli's Prince. The popes were among the princes of Italy by reason of their possession of the papal territories, and it is curious to note that when Machiavelli seeks examples of his ideal prince he finds them at the papal court. He bestows the infamy of his praise upon Pope Alexander VI and his son Cæsar Borgia. "I know not what better precepts to display before a new prince than the example of his (Cæsar's) actions."[1] "It is of great consequence to disguise your inclination, and play the hypocrite well. Alexander VI never did nor thought anything but cheating, and never wanted a matter to work upon; and though no man promised a thing with greater asseveration and confirmed it with more oaths and imprecations, and observed them less, yet understanding the world well he never miscarried."[2]

The strong and weak points of the papacy as a temporal principality were thoroughly understood by the politicians of the time. It was to be regretted that the Pope was unable to name his successor, and hence could not provide securely for the future of his children and dependents,

[1] Prince, chap. vii. [2] Ibid. chap. xviii.

especially as the former were of uncertain name and social standing. Cæsar Borgia is said to have intended to secularize the papacy and make it hereditary; but the stupidity or rascality of the servant who gave the poisoned cup to Alexander instead of to the man the pope intended to murder, brought all these brilliant projects to a sudden period. Machiavelli sets forth the advantages of the papacy in the Prince, chap. xi: "There remains nothing of this nature to be discussed, but of ecclesiastical principalities, about which the greatest difficulty is to get into possession, because they are gained either by fortune or virtue, but kept without either, being supported by ancient statutes universally received in the Christian Church, which are of such power and authority they do keep this prince in his dignity, let his conversation or conduct be what it will. These are the only persons who have lands and do not defend them; subjects and do not govern them; and yet their lands are not taken from them, though they never defend them; nor their subjects dissatisfied, though they never regard them; so that these principalities are the happiest and most secure in the world, by being managed by a supernatural power, above the wisdom and contrivance of man."

At the threshold of the modern age, as at the beginning of the ancient world, we find our ancestors eating, somewhat willfully and intemperately, of the fruit of the tree of knowledge — in neither case with wholly satisfactory consequences. The watchword of the eager students of the period was "Litterae Humaniores"; but the general outcome of the movement, in society, Church, and State, was that men were not so much humanized as brutalized. The cult of wisdom and beauty produced a specious strength and a superficial refinement, but rotten at the heart, as Taine says.[1] The revival of heathenism culminated in the papacy of Alexander VI — the seating of Antichrist in the most holy place.

There did not lack a prophet, however, to rebuke the idolatry of the people and foretell the divine judgments upon Antichrist and his servants. Girolamo Savonarola was of noble family, his father being court physician in the opulent and splendid city of Ferrara. From boyhood his ideal was the devout and holy life of the best medieval Christianity, his favorite authors being Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. The classical learning of his day took little hold upon him, for

[1] "They tore one another to pieces like beautiful lions and superb panthers." — Taine's English Lit., p. 355.

he saw the liberty of the Renaissance give birth to the license of every evil passion, and a state of public and private life which moved his intensely moral nature with disgust and horror. At the age of twenty-three he left his home and entered the order of St. Dominic, greatly to the disappointment of his parents, who had planned for him a brilliant career at the court of Este. "The motives by which I have been led to enter into a religious life are these: the great misery of the world; the iniquities of men — their rapes, adulteries, robberies; their pride, idolatry, and fearful blasphemies; so that things have come to such a pass that no one can be found acting righteously. I could not endure the enormous wickedness of the blinded people of Italy; and the more so because I saw everywhere virtue despised and vice honored."[1] But the youthful enthusiast found small comfort in the churchly institutions of the day, and soon in a poem on "The Ruin of the Church," we hear him sigh: "Where are the doctors of old times, the saints, the learning, charity, chastity of the past? Who has wrought this wrong?" And the answer is: "The proud mother, Rome." Preaching later at Florence, in

[1] Letter to his father.

the city where Lorenzo the Magnificent was at the height of his power and the philosophic sensualism of the Medici was the universal ideal, he had the courage to declare that the philosophers were in hell, and that an old woman knew more of saving faith than Plato.[1] On his first visit to Florence he failed to attract any public attention; but later, when the burden of his prophecy had taken definite form and his wonderful powers of oratory had developed, his success was instantaneous, phenomenal, and to the day of his death his supremacy was unchallenged by any rival. His message was: "The Church will be scourged, then regenerated, and this quickly;" and the message was delivered with the boldness, the earnestness, the melting tenderness, and the terrific invective of a Hebrew prophet. The scandalous state of the Church was as clearly pictured as the corruption of common life, and when Alexander VI placed the ban of excommunication upon the city of Florence, Savonarola replied by denouncing the Pope as Antichrist and demanding that a general council be convened to depose the false pope from the holy seat of St. Peter. During Savonarola's supremacy in Florence, Christ was declared to be

[1] Symonds, Age of the Despots, p. 461.

the head of the state; heathen pageantry and bacchanalian songs gave place to devout hymns and religious processions; obscene pictures and manuscripts of Boccaccio and the classic poets were given to the flames. The reform, however, was too sudden and violent to be permanent, and soon the party of the old order raised its head and Savonarola was executed by cord and fagot before the Palazzo Pubblico. His appearance at this juncture at the center of the humanistic movement is significant as the protest of genuine Christianity against the paganizing excesses of the Renaissance, and is a prophecy of the coming Reformation. Luther was a boy of fifteen years at the death of Savonarola. Nineteen years later the theses were nailed to the door of the Wittenberg church, the storm burst out of the north, and the Church was "scourged, then regenerated; and this quickly," as compared with the slow progress of most world movements in the long life of humanity.

CHAPTER V.

THE REFORMATION.

IT is common to class the German Reformation as one of the beneficent results of the general Renaissance movement — the protest of the Zeitgeist against the intellectual and spiritual tyranny of Rome. This is in a sense true, for the intellectual light which made it possible and guided its course came from the revival of ancient learning; and when Luther's word of protest was once spoken all the dim strivings of the age after a broader and richer life ranged themselves on the side of the reformer. Yet the word itself was primarily moral rather than intellectual — in temper and purpose Luther was more nearly akin to Savonarola than to Erasmus. That indulgences should be openly hawked through the cities of Germany and sold for money was a shameless desecration of the spiritual treasures of the Church; it was making the temple of God a house of merchandise and a den of thieves. Luther did not at that time entertain a doubt that

the Church of Rome held the keys of heaven and hell. His outraged moral sense and religious feeling declares against a perversion of Christian doctrine, and he is sure that Pope Leo would rather see St. Peter's reduced to ashes than completed by money flowing from such scandalous abuses. Leo X was an easy-going sensualist, of genial temper and a certain degree of refinement. Tried by the standards of his age he was an amiable and worthy gentleman, and would be so known in history had not his high office brought him into sharp and almost ludicrous contrast with the Christian ideal. He regarded the opportunities of life as invitations to use and enjoyment. If he needed money to complete St. Peter's, and he always needed money for that or something else, why should he not avail himself of the superstition of the northern barbarians? A large revenue was one of the accessories of the papacy which he was ready to enjoy with decorous gratitude to God. He could never understand Luther's position, and died in the belief that Luther was moved by jealousy because a rival monastic order gained the commissions from the sale of indulgences. Luther was surprised and shocked to find the Church defending such abuses, and so the

struggle grew till Luther's conception of the errors and corruptions of Rome drove him farther and farther in opposition to the hierarchy; but originally the Reformation was moral and practical rather than doctrinal and theoretical. As Augustine resisted the previous tendency and purified Christian thought against the adverse influence of Greek philosophy, so Luther resisted the tendency of his time and purified the Christian life, endangered by the revival of Greek ethics. The Reformation, viewed from the developed standpoint of our day, was the first battle of purified Christianity with the essentially Greek spirit which is the controlling influence in modern philosophy, science, and culture. In this struggle Christianity came to understand the enemy which must be conquered or somehow reconciled to itself — the religious problem of the modern Church.

"The Reformers themselves considered that their work arrested the progress of unbelief and saved the religion of Europe. Luther says that such were the ecclesiastical abuses in Germany that frightful disorders would have inevitably arisen, that all religion would have perished, and Christians have become Epicureans. The infi-

delity that had taken root and sprung up in the strongholds of the Church in connection with the revival of classical learning threatened to spread over Europe."[1] There were errors and abuses in doctrine, extreme emphasis of churchly power, sacraments, etc.; yet it was more a perversion from circumstance and practice than of essential doctrine. When the Roman doctrine came to deliberate and clear expression in the decisions of the Council of Trent there was little divergence on fundamental principles from the position of the Reformers. The doctrine of justification by faith is stated nearly in the sense of Augustine, though it takes on a semi-Pelagian color from the purpose to oppose the Protestant denial of human freedom and coöperation. The Augsburg Confession says: "They [the Catholic clergy] now begin to make mention of faith, concerning which there was formerly a deep silence; they teach that we are not justified by works alone."[2]

And yet to say that the purpose of Luther was essentially moral rather than doctrinal, "to say that the Reformation began in a protest against abuses of administration, is simply to say that Protestantism was not full grown at the start. In its mature

[1] Fisher, Reformation, p. 9. [2] Article XX.

form, as all the world knows, it was a rejection of papal and priestly authority."[1] The Reformation, in its widest aspect and significance, was the revolt of the expanding powers of modern culture against the ascetic ideal of medieval Christianity, and the authority of the Church to impose that ideal upon men spiritually free — the ascetic ideal which the Roman Church defended against the Reformers, and which that Church still represents. "If any one saith that the marriage state is to be placed above the state of virginity or of celibacy and that it is not better and more blessed to remain in virginity or in celibacy than to be united in matrimony; let him be anathema."[2] It was impossible that this ascetic ideal should maintain itself except in the twilight of semi-barbarism, and the awakening life not only of Italy but of Europe in general was ready to reject it. In the broad stream of the Renaissance development, however, upon whose bosom our whole modern age is drifting, there is room for many eddies and counter-currents, and for local movements, some swift, some sluggish. In Italy the humanist movement was rapid and impetuous, and soon its immoral extremes and its glaring

[1] Fisher, p. 13. [2] Council of Trent, "On Matrimony," Canon X.

contrast with the traditional faith were met by the counter-current of the Reformation. The Roman Church reformed external abuses, and rebuked the excesses of Renaissance culture and art,[1] yet in general remained true to the medieval type. Protestantism gave men liberty, in the expectation that they would freely choose the Christian law — undertook the difficult task of reconciling the right of individual judgment with the existence of a spiritual truth which is one, immutable, and universally necessary for human salvation. And yet all about and beneath these conflicting currents of effort and opinion was and is the main stream of the Renaissance development, giving form and reality to the central problem of our modern world — How reconcile the glorified heaven of the Christian and the glorified earth of the Greek? Much that is best in the non-Christian thought in our day aims to make our common life rich and satisfying by finding the life of God in the miracles and revelations of daily experience; but it has no region of infinite attainment and eternal peace, beyond the inevi-

[1] "In the invocation of saints, the veneration of relics, and the sacred use of images every superstition should be removed, all filthy lucre be abolished; finally all lasciviousness be avoided, in such wise that figures shall not be painted or adorned with a beauty exciting to lust." (Council of Trent, On Sacred Images.)

table limitation and tragedy of the present state. In the solution and synthesis of these problems — the life of God on earth and the life of man in heaven — we may hope for the full-orbed truth of the future.

It is now apparent why the Reformation period developed no essentially new type of theology. The original difference was one of aspect and practice rather than of fundamental doctrine, and each party sought a tower of defense in the great name and authority of Augustine. We have seen that Augustine taught that a man can be justified only by faith, but saving faith is that on the ground of which he is received into the Catholic Church; and the criteria of Christian truth are the Scriptures and the Church, — it being assumed that their utterances are harmonious, and no rule for action being given in case of a conflict. Just this contingency had now arisen, and the result was the natural one — each party quoted Augustine, emphasizing according to personal interest. This difference in purpose and emphasis, however, produced characteristic methods of dealing with the doctrinal matter. Catholic theology becomes semi-Pelagian in defending human works and merit as elements of justification, while in its

emphasis of an absolutely free grace Protestantism goes beyond Augustine in asserting the natural bondage and sinfulness of men; and the Protestant method is affected by exalting the Scriptures as the one pure source of Christian truth. Here are the storm centers of the general controversies of the succeeding period — justification by faith alone, and the unique character and authority of the Scriptures. Within the Protestant body Luther's intolerance concerning the Eucharist gave rise to violent discussions, and prevented the union of the Lutheran and Reformed churches; and the Calvinistic extremes in reference to the divine sovereignty and human depravity culminate at last in the Arminian reaction.

CHAPTER VI.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE REFORMERS.

ALTHOUGH it has been necessary to go far back into history and study the preceding movement of theological thought, our study of German Theology proper begins at that point where the theological science takes on a local and national character — where the all-embracing Roman communion breaks up into a Latin, a German, and an English church.

The history of every important movement in human thought, as is true of the history of our race in general, begins with an heroic age. Though the existing condition of things may have become intolerable, though the mind of the whole people may be vaguely longing for and groping after a truer and better way, yet it is not till some hero of faith and courage appears that this latent feeling is quickened and concentrated into a thunderbolt of indignant protest.

Among the great personalities who appear during the stirring scenes of the Reformation, the

most important for our purpose is Martin Luther. This is true not alone because he possessed the courage first to throw down the gauge of battle before the apparently resistless power of Rome, but because his vigorous intellect, his simple and earnest piety, his tremendous force of character, find expression on every page of Reformation history, and are even yet living influences in the Protestant world. And this is true not only of the strength but of the weakness of Luther, not only of the truth but of the error which he held — each is magnified by the greatness of the man to a larger result of present and future good or evil.

It is also suggestive to observe that Luther's imperfections ally him to the common thought of his time, and fit him to be the mouthpiece of the German people. Had he been as scholarly and reserved as Melanchthon, as clear in intellect, well-balanced in judgment, and as thorough-going in abolishing papal forms and civil abuses as Zwingli, the German people would not have found him the man after their own hearts. It was the son of the miner who had become the professor of philosophy; who read and lectured on Aristotle, and who yet held verbal discussions with Satan and

who knew persons that were possessed by the devil; who reached the mysticism of the age by a faith based not on the externals of Church decrees or scholastic learning, but on a simple and immediate acceptance of the Saviour; who reached the practical man of affairs by exposing the corruptions and freeing him from the pecuniary exactions of the hierarchy; who in his zeal for reform was yet true to the sober conservatism of the German people in retaining what was edifying in the Roman ceremonial and doctrine, and would not separate Church and State; whose style, oral or written, — simple direct language, fertile but unregulated fancy, dealing only with superlatives, overwhelming his opponents with an impetuous stream of argument or invective, always plain and blunt, often coarse and rude, — was so exact an expression of his sincere and earnest but unsymmetrical personality and appealed so strongly to a people not very enlightened or refined; here was the man who was sent to utter the word which was to be heard and obeyed by an age in which great and prophetic thoughts were struggling to free themselves from the fetters of traditional error and superstition.

We find in the nature and circumstances of the

religious controversies of Luther's time prophecies of the acrid and profitless discussions and the dry scholasticism of the succeeding period. These controversies were heated and bitter, as is natural in an age when an opinion was no trifle, but might easily lead to the scaffold or the stake, and when men thoroughly believed there was *one* truth and they could find it in the infallible guide, the Scriptures. This tendency in theological discussion was unfortunately intensified by Luther's example. By native disposition he saw clearly and felt strongly, and expressed his opinions with vigor and often with violence. This natural bent was strengthened in his early battles against Rome, where he was thoroughly convinced he contended against the visible kingdom of Satan. When he was successful in the discussion he gave God the praise; those who refused to be convinced were the children of the devil, and the rage of his opponents gave him satisfaction as showing how sorely their master had been wounded. This spirit of uncompromising hostility to all error may have been beneficial as furnishing a sharp blade with which to cut clear from the corruptions of the papacy; but there can be no question of its injurious effects when carried

over into discussions with fellow Protestants or those friendly to the cause of reform. Erasmus is an atheist and Epicurean, because he holds to the freedom of the human will; Carlsbad, Œcolampadius, Zwingli, are given over to the devil because they do not agree with Luther as to the Eucharist. Here we find the fruitful seeds of discord sown among the Protestant churches, which divided them when they should have stood most united against the attacks of reformed Catholicism, and have brought scandal upon the name of Protestantism and the general cause of Christ by the multiplication of contending sects. That loyalty to truth which stood grandly forth without fear of the lightnings of the Vatican, and has fixed upon itself the admiring eyes of all coming ages, when directed to the unessential differences of the Protestant believers, degenerates into obstinacy and intolerance, rends asunder the body of Christ, and sends down through the future a melancholy train of evil consequences — dissensions, bloodshed, and war.

The early, classical expression of the Lutheran doctrine is the Augsburg Confession (1530). It was written by Melanchthon with the revision and approval of Luther. The Preface, addressed to

the emperor, Charles V, states with simplicity and dignity the willingness of the reform party to discuss the existing differences, that they may be "settled in friendship and love." Then follows in Part I a statement of the chief articles of faith. These articles are thoroughly Augustinian, Augustine being frequently quoted. This appears markedly in the articles on Free Will and The Cause of Sin (XVIII and XIX). The former contains a long quotation from the Hypergnosticon, and the cause of sin is said to be "the will of the wicked, which will *God not aiding*, turneth itself from God." There appear of course some new elements of emphasis or expression in the discussion of Justification, the Church, the Ministry, the Sacraments, Good Works, etc. Part I concludes: "This is about the sum of the doctrine among us, in which can be seen that there is nothing which is discrepant with the Scriptures, or with the Catholic Church, or even with the Roman Church, so far as that Church is known from the writings of the fathers. This being the case, they judge us harshly who insist that we shall be regarded as heretics. But the dissension is concerning certain traditions and abuses, which without any certain authority have

crept into the churches; in which things it would be a becoming lenity on the part of the bishops that they should bear with us, since even the Canons are not so severe as to demand the same rights everywhere."

These abuses are enumerated and discussed in Part II in the Confession. These are "of both kinds" (in the Lord's Supper), of the Marriage of Priests, Mass, Confession, Distinction of Meats and of Traditions, Monastic Vows, and of Ecclesiastical Power. The free spirit of the Renaissance appears characteristically in the article on Monastic Vows: — "The commandments of God and the true worship of God are obscured when men hear that monks alone are in that state of perfection; because that Christian perfection is this — to fear God sincerely, to conceive great faith, to ask and certainly to look for help from God in all our affairs according to our calling. In these things doth true perfection and true worship of God consist; it doth not consist in singleness of life, in beggary, or in vile apparel. The people doth also conceive many pernicious opinions from these false commendations of the monastic life. They hear celibacy praised above measure; therefore with offense of conscience they live in

marriage. They hear that mendicants alone are perfect; therefore with offense of conscience they keep their possessions, and buy and sell. Others do think that all magistracy and civil offices are unworthy Christian men. We read examples of men who, forsaking wedlock and leaving the government of the commonwealth, have hid themselves in monasteries. This they call flying out of the world and seeking a kind of life which is more acceptable to God; neither do they see that God is to be served in those commandments which he himself hath delivered, not in the commandments which are devised by men."

Three types of opinion in respect to the Lord's Supper were developed among the Protestant churches; that of Luther, that Christ was corporally present in the elements; that of Zwingli, that the feast was essentially mnemonic; and that of Calvin, that Christ is spiritually present. Schaff thus compares the Lutheran and Calvinistic views and contrasts them with that of the Roman Church: "Lutheranism seeks the supernatural *in* the natural, Calvinism *above* the natural, Romanism *without* the natural."[1] Luther's

[1] Creeds, I, p. 217.

natural conservatism impelled him to retain all Catholic doctrines and usages which were not distinctly antagonistic to Protestant principles, and this tendency in him was early intensified by the excesses of Protestant fanatics. His religious feeling was concerned in asserting that Christ was really present in the sacrament, and he found in the writings of his "dear master" among the schoolmen, William of Occam, a theory of Christ's presence in the elements which seemed to accord with justification by faith and with the priesthood of all believers. The glorified body of Christ, being omnipresent, must be able to interpenetrate other bodies, occupy the same space as material substances, otherwise it could not be ubiquitous. Therefore the body and blood of Christ are present in the elements naturally and necessarily, and not by the magical operation of the priest. Luther, however, does not rest upon the philosophical argument, but confessedly only on the words of Christ spoken to the disciples at the Last Supper, "This *is* my body." At the conference at Marburg, where he was brought to meet Zwingli, he wrote these words on the table before him, and refused to move from their literal sense. What he considered Zwingli's rationalism

was so offensive to him that he refused Zwingli's hand at parting — an intolerance prophetic of the divisions of later Protestantism.[1]

In his view of the Eucharist, Luther advocates a doctrine so difficult to distinguish from the Catholic teaching as to be a manifest weakness in his controversy with Rome. He says repeatedly he would have liked to abandon the doctrine of the real presence, but the Scripture was too strong for him. In his extreme assertion, however, of the bondage of the natural will, he is clearly influenced by antagonism to the Romish doctrine of works. His controversy with Erasmus on the will is a repetition of the arguments of Augustine and the Pelagians, though Erasmus plainly has the advantage. He arouses Luther's indignation by asserting that the whole question of the relation of the human to the divine action in conversion is unimportant, is not made clear in the Scriptures, and should be preached with caution as liable to misunderstanding and abuse. The paradoxes of Scripture and experience on the point are clearly stated or adroitly suggested. The blunt honesty of Luther drives him into a

[1] "Luther," Encyclopædia Britannica, XV, p. 81. Article on "Occam and Luther," Theol. Studien for 1839, 1.

position alike repugnant to reason and morality. Erasmus must be an atheist or an Epicurean to assert that the doctrine of the will is unimportant, for it is vitally essential to justification by faith; and the bondage of the will is clearly taught in the Scriptures — a point which he finds some difficulty in making good.

"'Who (you say) will endeavor to amend his life?' I answer no man! No man can! For your self-amenders without the Spirit, God regardeth not, for they are hypocrites. But the elect will be amended by the Holy Spirit; the rest will perish unamended. 'Who will believe (you say) that he is loved of God?' I answer no man will believe it! No man can. But the elect will believe it. And as to your saying, 'By these doctrines the flood-gate of iniquity is thrown open unto men' — be it so. Nevertheless, by the same doctrines, there is thrown open to the elect a gate unto righteousness — a way unto God!"[1]

He gives two reasons for preaching the bondage of the will: "First, God has promised his grace to the humbled; but a man cannot be thoroughly humbled until he comes to know that his salvation

[1] Luther's "Bondage of the Will," translated by Rev. Henry Cole, London, 1823, p. 55.

is utterly beyond his own powers, counsel, endeavors, will, and works, and absolutely depending on the will, counsel, pleasure, and work of another, that is, of God only. . . . The other reason is: that faith is in *things not seen.* Therefore, that there might be room for faith, it is necessary that all those things which are believed should be hidden. But they are not hidden more deeply than under the contrary of sight, sense, and experience. . . . Thus He conceals his eternal mercy and lovingkindness behind his eternal wrath; his righteousness behind apparent iniquity. This is the highest degree of faith — to believe that he is merciful who saves so few and damns so many; to believe him just who, according to his own will, makes us necessarily damnable, that he might seem, as Erasmus says, 'To delight in the torments of the miserable, and to be an object of hatred rather than of love.' If, therefore, I could by any means comprehend how that same God can be merciful and just who carries the appearance of so much wrath and iniquity, there would be no need of faith."

Luther's explanation of the hardening of Pharaoh is practically that of Augustine. He rejects the suggestion of Erasmus that the prescience of

God does not impose necessity. "If God foreknew that Judas would be a traitor, Judas became a traitor of necessity; nor was it in the power of Judas or of any other creature to change that will; though he did what he did willingly, not by compulsion; for that *willing* of his was his *own* work; which God, by the motion of his omnipotence, moved on into action as he does anything else." [1] In endeavoring to account for the fall of Adam and sin in general, Luther takes a position which is thoroughly consistent and impregnable so long as one has the courage to defy the natural feeling and common sense of humanity. "God is that being for whose will no cause or reason is to be assigned as a rule or standard by which it acts; seeing that nothing is superior or equal to it, but it is itself the rule of all things. Wherefore, what God wills is not therefore right, because he ought or ever was bound so to will; but, on the contrary, what takes place is therefore right, because he so wills." [2]

Luther frequently asserts that the arguments of Erasmus are utterly trivial and worthless, and he always maintained that he had completely refuted his sophistries; yet he was secretly conscious that

[1] Bondage of the Will, p. 220. [2] Ibid. p. 215.

the general verdict was against him, and he never forgave Erasmus for the humiliation of his defeat. It was intolerable that the idol of his heart, justification by faith alone, should be made ridiculous before the world, as either incomprehensible or immoral. "In one of his sermons he says: 'I pray all of you who have seriously at heart the honor of Christ and the gospel, to be the enemies of Erasmus.' One day Dr. Luther exclaimed to Drs. Jonas and Pomeranus: 'My dying prayers to you would be, Scourge this serpent.' Looking one day at a portrait of Erasmus, Luther said: 'Erasmus, as his countenance proves, is a crafty, designing man who has laughed at God and religion.'" [1]

It has been remarked that Luther's conservative temper led him to aim at preserving a certain union between Church and State, in contrast to the Reformed churches which have proved more favorable to the cause of popular freedom by inculcating the independence of the Church from the civil authorities. At the peace of Augsburg it was left with the civil authorities of each principality or imperial city to determine whether the

[1] Life of Luther, Michelet, p. 129. See article on "Erasmus and Luther," Zeitschrift für Hist. Theol., 1845.

Roman or the Lutheran system should be adopted. The Church was still further brought under control of the State by the consistorial system, which was adopted in most Lutheran communities. The episcopal authority of the Roman bishops was simply transferred to a consistory, the members of which were appointed by the prince.[1] As must always be true in placing religion under State control, while this system gave the Protestant churches an apparent strength they were really weakened by the alliance. Instead of using this ecclesiastical power to guard the purity and advance the spiritual interests of the churches, it was too often perverted to the service of ambition, and the doubtful morals of these defenders of the faith brought scandal on the cause of religion. An illustration of this is found in the case of Philip, landgrave of Hesse, who was one of the boldest and most active members of the Reform party. He requests the theologians of Wittenberg for permission to take a second wife. He says that his "wife is neither good-looking nor good-tempered"; that he has lived in immoral relations ever since his marriage; "and as I won't give up this way of living, I cannot present

[1] "Lutherans," Enc. Brit. XV, p. 85.

myself at the holy table. . . . Were I to take up arms for the gospel's sake, I could only do so with a troubled conscience, for I should say to myself, 'If you die in this war, you go to the devil.' I have read the Old and the New Testaments carefully, and find no other help indicated than to take a second wife; and I ask before God, why cannot I do what Abraham, Jacob, David, Lamech, and Solomon have done?" The Lutheran theologians were placed in a delicate position. They could not condemn the Old Testament without bringing into disrepute the Protestant standard of doctrine and practice. Philip was allowed a double marriage, but with the recommendation that the second should be secret.

"Your highness must be aware of the difference between establishing an universal and granting an exceptional law. . . . We cannot publicly sanction a plurality of wives. . . . If, nevertheless, your highness is fully resolved to take a second wife, we are of opinion that the marriage should be secret.

"Given at Wittenberg after the festival of St. Nicholas, 1539."

(Signed) Martin Luther, Philip Melanchthon, Bucer, etc.[1]

[1] Life of Luther, Michelet, p. 170.

This occurrence, with others indicative of a growing laxity of morals among the Protestants, embittered the closing years of Luther's life. And all through the subsequent centuries State control of the German churches has borne evil fruit, having been unfavorable to purity of doctrine as well as of morals. The resulting doctrinal freedom may have encouraged original investigation, but it has produced a situation so incomprehensible to the American mind — professors of theology in orthodox German universities seemingly as far from orthodoxy in belief and perhaps in practice as our notorious Colonel Robert Ingersoll.

Our sketch of the religious development of the Reformation period would be incomplete without a brief reference to the two other prominent figures of the time — Zwingli and Calvin. Of all the Reformers, Zwingli is most in accord with the enlightened and humane opinions of the modern world. His early life was sunny and joyous. As a student he acquired a love for classical learning, and he was fortunate in having as his teacher in theology the celebrated Thomas Wythenbach of Basel, a man of scholarly and liberal views. Zwingli's religious nature was less profound and

intense than that of Luther, but also less gloomy and morbid, and his serene and symmetrical character is a pleasing object for contemplation in that age when moral earnestness was so prone to run out into fanatical extremes. He was Augustinian in his views of sin and grace, and thoroughly loyal to the main principles of the Reformation; but the rigor of his dogmas was tempered by a genial humanity and a love for classical antiquity. He gave great offense to the orthodoxy of his day by asserting that all infants are saved through the sacrifice of Christ, and even that the best of the heathen philosophers and sages are in heaven, because the Spirit has been in the hearts of all good men of every age and nation.

The theologian, par excellence, of the Reformation is John Calvin. His comprehensive and penetrating intellect gave to Protestantism that compact and systematic form which was to carry it through the terrific conflicts and bloody persecutions of the succeeding period. The theological work of first importance in Protestant literature is Calvin's "Institutes of Theology." His name has displaced that of Augustine as the representative of that type of theology which emphasized the sovereignty of God and human depravity.

It has been already remarked that Calvin goes beyond Augustine in asserting that Adam's fall is the object of a divine decree. Yet he still holds, on grounds certainly mysterious to human reason, that Adam and all men are guilty and responsible. He explicitly rejects what later became the common so-called Calvinistic view — that God *permits* the destruction of the impious, but does not *will* it. "What reason shall we assign for his permitting it, but because it is his will? . . . Besides, their perdition depends upon the divine predestination in such a manner that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves. For the first man fell because the Lord had determined it was so expedient. The reason of this determination is unknown to us. Yet it is certain that he determined thus only because he foresaw it would tend to the just illustration of the glory of his name. Whenever you hear the glory of God mentioned, think of his justice. For what deserves praise must be just. Man falls, therefore, according to the appointment of Divine Providence; but he falls by his own fault."[1] We find here again that fundamental principle of the Reformation theology to which

[1] Inst. III, 23, 8.

Luther appeals against Erasmus. "The will of God is the highest rule of justice; so that what he wills must be considered just, for this very reason, because he wills it."[1]

[1] Inst. III, 23, 2.

CHAPTER VII.

POST-REFORMATION MOVEMENTS.

THESE extreme views in reference to predestination always encountered opposition in the Protestant churches, and it was found difficult to maintain them with rigorous consistency. In Melanchthon's later years he held that the human will coöperates in conversion — "synergism" — and also adopted Calvin's view of the Lord's Supper. These opinions were extremely offensive to the strict Lutherans, and the followers of Melanchthon came to be known as Crypto-Calvinists — Calvinism being regarded as a compound of heresy, rationalism, and hypocrisy. The Lutheran "Formula of Concord," which is directed especially against the heresies of Melanchthon's party, endeavors to reconcile the differences of the predestinarians and the synergists, and ends by condemning both doctrines, without replacing them by any comprehensible statement. "We therefore reject all the errors which we will now enumerate. . . . II. That when God calls us to him, he

does not earnestly wish that all men should come to him. III. That God is not willing that all men should be saved, but that some men are destined to destruction, not on account of their sins, but by the mere counsel, purpose, and will of God, so that they cannot in any wise attain to salvation. IV. That the mercy of God is not the sole cause of the divine election, but that there is also some cause in us, on account of which cause God has chosen us to eternal life. All these dogmas are false, horrid, and blasphemous." [1]

"Supralapsarianism, which makes unfallen man, or man before his creation (that is, a non ens, a mere abstraction of thought), the object of God's double foreordination for the manifestation of his mercy in the elect and his justice in the reprobate, was ably advocated by Beza in Geneva, Gomarus in Holland, Twisse (the Prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly) in England, Nathaniel Emmons (1745–1840) in New England; but it never received symbolical authority, and was virtually or expressly excluded by the Synod of Dort, the Westminster Assembly, and even the Formula Consensus Helvetica. All Calvinistic Confessions, without exception, trace the fall to

[1] Article XI, negative.

a permissive decree, make man responsible and justly punishable for sin, and reject as a blasphemous slander the charge that God is the author of sin. And this is the case with all the Calvinistic divines of the present day."[1]

We may close this period of our discussion by brief references to the doctrine of inspiration and to the Arminian controversy. In relation to both questions, orthodoxy won victories more costly than defeat, and assumed positions so extreme as to foretell an inevitable reaction.

In the attempt to make out the unique infallibility of the Scriptures, the inspiration doctrine was at length pushed to such extremes as to fall by its own weight. This appeared especially in the controversy concerning the Hebrew vowel points. It was the common Protestant view that infallibility was to be asserted of the original Hebrew manuscripts; but the Roman theologians claimed, on the contrary, that the Masoretic text had been corrupted and misplaced by the Jews, and that the Vulgate, having originated before these changes, really afforded the older and correcter text. The Protestants were

[1] Schaff, Creeds, vol. i, p. 454.

still further disturbed by the claim that the Hebrew vowels of the present text belonged to a time much later than that of the original authors — a view set forth by a German Jew, Elias Levita (1538), and Louis Cappel (1622).[1] Though Cappel could appeal in support of his view to Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli, and was followed to a great extent by the learned, yet he was popularly regarded as a man dangerous to the Protestant interest.

The Formula Consensus Helvetica (1675) explicitly condemns his view, declaring that the consonants and vowel points of the Bible are alike theopneustic. "In specie autem Hebraicus V. T. codex, quem ex traditione ecclesiae Judaicae, cui olim oracula Dei commissa sunt, accepimus hodieque retinemus, tum quoad consonas, tum quoad vocalia, sive puncta ipsa, sive punctorum saltem potestatem, et tum quoad res, tum quoad verba θεόπνευστος, ut fidei et vitae nostrae, una cum codice Novi T. sit Canon unicus et illibatus, ad cujus normam, ceu Lydium lapidem, universae quae extant Versiones, sive orientales sive occidentales exigendae, et sicubi deflectunt revocandea sunt."[2]

[1] Ladd, Doctrine of Sacred Scripture, vol. ii, p. 186.
[2] Herzog, Real Ency., Art., "Buxtorf," vol. iii, p. 50.

Arminius was a devout and scholarly man, of mild and candid temper, who was led to modify his views of the Calvinistic doctrines by studies originally undertaken for the purpose of defending them. The theological controversy was unfortunately complicated by political differences, so that, although the Synod of Dort was eminent for the learning and piety represented, the decision cannot be considered an impartial judgment of the doctrinal questions involved. The Arminian party represented not only less rigid theological opinions, but tolerance of religious differences, and a more democratic type of government.

Prince Maurice of the House of Orange, who was the popular hero because of his successes in the wars against Spain, used the controversy to concentrate power in his own hands by destroying the aristocracy. The liberal opinions had been largely received by the upper classes, while the common people and the great majority of the clergy were rigidly Calvinistic.

The Synod (1618–19) consisted of eighty-four members and eighteen secular commissioners. Of these fifty-eight were Dutchmen, the rest foreigners. The whole Dutch delegation was orthodox, so that the case was decided unheard.

The opinions of the Remonstrants had been summed up under five heads, and the Synod in reply used the same number of articles, which have since been known as the five points of Calvinism. A brief summary of the two statements may be in place.

REMONSTRANTS.

ARTICLE I. That God by an eternal purpose hath determined to save in Christ those who, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, shall believe on this his Son.

ART. II. That, agreeably thereto, Christ died for all men and for every man; yet that no one actually enjoys this forgiveness except the believer.

ART. III. That man has not saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will; but that it is necessary that he be renewed in understanding, will, and all his powers.

ART. IV. All good deeds or movements must be ascribed to the grace of God in Christ. But as respects the mode of its operation, grace is not irresistible.

ART. V. Whether Christians are capable, through negligence, of forsaking the first begin-

nings of their life in Christ, must be more particularly determined out of Holy Scripture.

These articles are sufficient for salvation, so that it is not necessary to rise higher or descend deeper.

CANONS OF THE SYNOD.

First Head. Predestination.

"As all men have sinned in Adam, God would have done no injustice in leaving them all to perish. . . . Election is of a definite number, not founded upon foreseen faith or any good quality."

Second Head. Of the death of Christ and Redemption.

"This was the sovereign counsel of God, that the saving efficacy of the death of his Son should extend to all the elect; that he should effectually redeem all those, and those only, who were from eternity chosen to salvation."

Third and Fourth Heads. Of the Corruption of Man and Conversion.

"Revolting from his original purity, and abusing the freedom of his own will, man entailed on himself blindness of mind, horrible darkness, vanity, and perverseness of judgment; became wicked, rebellious, and obdurate in heart and will,

and impure in (all) his affections. . . . God seriously promises eternal life to as many as shall come to him and believe on him. It is not the fault of the Gospel nor of Christ nor of God that those called by the ministry of the Word refuse to come. The fault lies in themselves. . . . But that others obey the call is not to be ascribed to free will, but wholly to God. . . . This regeneration is not such a mode of operation that after God has performed his part it still remains in the power of man to be converted or not; but it is not inferior in efficacy to creation, so that men are certainly, infallibly, and effectually regenerated. . . . Wherefore the will thus renewed is not only actuated by God, but in consequence of this influence becomes itself active. Wherefore man is himself rightly said to believe and repent, by virtue of that grace received."

Fifth Head. Perseverance of Saints.

Although the elect are not delivered in this life from the power of sin, "the weakness of the flesh cannot prevail against the power of God. Yet this certainty of perseverance is so far from exciting in believers a feeling of pride, or of rendering them carnally secure, that it is a source of humility, and of solid rejoicing in God."

It seems strange to us that intelligent and pious men could prefer the confused and paradoxical statements of the third and fourth heads above, to the temperate and reasonable expressions of the Remonstrants on sin and conversion. The time was not favorable, however, for a candid discussion and impartial adjustment of theological differences. Arminianism had a Romanizing color which was not attractive to men who had been for fifty years engaged in a life and death struggle against the Inquisition and the armies of Spain. The religious opinions of opponents were seen through a medium of prejudice which rendered a mutual understanding impossible. "A Spanish soldier, captured by the Dutch at the siege of Alkmaar, about to be executed, begged hard for his life. He finally promised to go down on his knees and worship the devil precisely as they did if he might live." [1]

Arminianism never became numerically strong in Holland, and is now a very small sect almost confined to Rotterdam and Amsterdam. But it gained a considerable influence in the English Church, and through the Methodist communion has become a great religious power. Macaulay

[1] Motley, Dutch Republic, II, p. 469.

reports the witticism of the English churchman who when asked what the Arminians held replied: "They hold the best bishoprics and deaneries in England."[1] The important and praiseworthy work which has been done by the Methodist Episcopal Church may seem to contradict what has been said above concerning the weakness of Arminianism as a Pelagian tendency. The criticisms advanced above apply to a thorough-going system of this type, which consistently holds to the native worth and freedom of man, and reduces Christianity to a system of philosophical propositions and of vague impulses to moral living. This is not true of Methodism. The prayer and the doxology are Calvinistic, the sermon Arminian. The prayer: "O Lord, convert John Smith;" the sermon: "John Smith, convert yourself;" the doxology: "Glory to God" — not to John Smith. Whatever may be the weaknesses of Methodism from a philosophical or a Pauline

[1] History of England, vol. I, p. 62. Macaulay says: "But, even before the meeting of the Dutch synod, that part of the Anglican clergy which was peculiarly hostile to the Calvinistic church government and to the Calvinistic worship had begun to regard with dislike the Calvinistic metaphysics; and this feeling was very naturally strengthened by the gross injustice, insolence, and cruelty of the party which was prevalent at Dort. Opinions which, at the time of the accession of James, no clergyman could have avowed without imminent risk of being stripped of his gown, were now the best title to preferment."

standpoint, its practical earnestness combined with its theoretical inconsistency make it a very effective working system.

The first century after the Reformation is considered the creed-making period of Protestantism. The century and a half succeeding the synod of Dort is a period of dry and unfruitful scholasticism. "The results of this scholasticism may be briefly indicated. Among the later theologians, personal living piety went on diminishing, and in place of faith, came knowledge about faith and orthodoxy, which was the means of leading to those petty controversies and hair-splitting distinctions that characterize the dogmatic theology of that period. Disputations were carried on regarding the language of our first parents and the logic of the angels. The question was discussed whether a single drop of Christ's blood would have been enough for the redemption of the human race; whether the blood shed in Gethsemane remained united with the deity, and whether Christ at the day of judgment would show the scars of his wounds. It was the age of the most violent confessional polemics, when, on the Lutheran side, the inquiry was put, with all

earnestness, whether the Calvinists should be called Christians; and it was openly declared that there was more need to beware of the Calvinists than of the Catholics." [1]

[1] Pünjer, History of Philosophy of Religion, p. 177.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT, ESPECIALLY IN GERMANY.

SECOND PERIOD.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PERIOD.

WE should have in mind an outline of the general history of the period we are now to discuss. About the time of the synod of Dort, the Thirty Years' War began. The influence of this prolonged struggle was most disastrous to all the best interests of civilized society. Many cities and flourishing towns were destroyed, the population was reduced one half, commerce was greatly crippled, art and learning languished. Aside from the injurious moral influence of such a protracted and bloody war, the cause of religion was unfavorably affected because religious controversy entered largely into the struggle; the general result was that there grew up in the minds of many a feeling of disgust in respect to religious controversy which made it possible to raise the question whether religion in general is a blessing or a curse to mankind. After the Thirty Years' War came the period of French influence under Louis XIV. Germany was further divided and humiliated; the

French language and literature were cultivated in all polite circles; the German princes were educated in France, and each endeavored in his little principality to imitate the magnificent despotism of Louis. Something of a national spirit was aroused by Frederick the Great, who came to the throne in 1740. After his successful struggle with Austria some attempts at uniting the north German states were made, but were brought to a period by the calamities of the French conquest. In this period of humiliation a national and patriotic spirit was for the first time developed among the German people. After Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo (1814) the German princes with one accord refused the people the constitutional reforms which had been lavishly promised during the struggles against France. During the succeeding controversy as to representative government, orthodox Christianity was largely made odious to progressive men because employed by the oppressive governments as a weapon against the liberal tendencies of the time. The French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 gave impulse to the liberal movement in Germany; but the Frankfort Assembly (1848) could arrive at no definite and satisfactory policy, and Prussia and

Austria were therefore able to suppress the popular movement. In the struggle with Austria for supremacy in Germany (1866), and with France for the first place on the Continent (1870), Prussia was triumphantly successful, and the outcome of the past thirty years appears in the towering military despotism of the German empire.

The realization, however, of the patriot's dream of German unity has not brought the Golden Age. The traditional Hohenzollern-Bismarckian contempt for representative government asserts itself whenever the military policy is really opposed. Science and letters are encouraged, but the empirical reaction from the transcendental philosophy and the materialistic, brute-force policy of the government are unfavorable to high ideals. The government's conservative attitude towards religion is no real benefit to the cause of orthodoxy, but furnishes a ready explanation of the socialistic rallying cry with which we are becoming so familiar: "Down with God and government." The cause of Christian truth is not advanced when the young German emperor informs his troops that, if commanded by him, they are instantly to shoot down their fathers or brothers, as he rules by divine right. The God of Luther is

not commended to the best thought of Germany by being made responsible for the fantastic performances of this conceited young despot. It is evident, therefore, that the union of Church and State, which in the Italian Renaissance period was largely the cause of the Reformation struggle, perpetuates its evil influence through subsequent Protestant history.

It will be helpful for the understanding of the general intellectual movement after the Reformation to trace briefly the scientific and philosophical development. It is usually difficult to determine the exact limits between the scientific and the philosophical, and is especially so when, as is true of the early scholars of this period, the men to be studied are conspicuous in both lines of work; as Descartes, who was known in his time as a mathematician and physicist rather than a philosopher. There is a more or less constant union between science and philosophy through all our modern thought; but science is in general distinguished from philosophy as being the empirical study of the facts and laws of Nature, as contrasted with that reflection on the scientific results which constructs a comprehensive theory of the universe, and exhibits these scientific laws and facts in their

relation to the ultimate principles of being and knowledge.

The purpose of science, as it originally appeared in modern times, was to introduce an ordered world instead of the confused world of the Middle Ages, ruled by the capricious power of saints and devils; and to make man lord of Nature, its laws conducing to his comfort and pleasure, instead of its superstitious slave. In our repugnance to the extremes of the scientific tendency in our day, we should not fail to appreciate the great benefits science has conferred on our modern age. The superstitious ignorance of three or four centuries ago seems something incredible. It is well known that Luther believed that he was personally assailed by the devil. He was convinced that demoniacal possession was a somewhat common occurrence in his time. He speaks somewhere of a certain child whose peculiar actions indicated that he was possessed by the devil; it was Luther's opinion that the child should be thrown into the river.

I will refer to the common opinions on astrology and witchcraft, as showing the general state of culture.[1] Belief in astrology is very

[1] Ency. Brit., vol. II, pp. 742, 743; vol. XXIV, pp. 619–623

ancient, and the popular belief in it persisted long after the discoveries of modern astronomy made it scientifically impossible. During Luther's lifetime a prediction was published of a universal deluge for the year 1524 — a year which unfortunately turned out to be unusually dry. The prediction was believed far and wide, and a distinguished official at Toulouse, in France, built himself a Noah's Ark in expectation of the coming flood. The theologian Theodore Beza expected the second coming of Christ, because of the appearance of an unusually brilliant periodic star in 1573. The Emperor Charles V and King Francis I of France both engaged astrologers to fight their battles. Their prophecies affected the public funds much as telegrams do nowadays. It was reserved for Dean Swift to laugh astrology out of the more cultured circles of England by his squib: "Prediction for 1708, by Isaac Bickerstaff, Esq."

Witchcraft was a crime in Roman law, and has been a subject of legislation in all modern nations. A vigorous crusade against witchcraft was instituted by Innocent VIII, the reigning pope at the time of Luther's birth. A few years later was published the great text-book on procedure in

witchcraft cases — "Malleus Maleficarum," or "Hexenhammer." Through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries executions for witchcraft were common in all European countries. The number of victims was perhaps greater in Germany than in any other country. It was in Germany that the last execution for witchcraft in Europe took place, at Posen in 1793.

Science was not only to free men from the chains of superstition, but also to confer unspeakable blessings upon the happy generations of the future. The scientific discoveries of the sixteenth century, extending amazingly the bounds of human knowledge, gave the students of that day the loftiest conceptions as to the possibilities of human achievement in the sphere of scientific investigation. As a result the literature of the time gave birth to many Utopian schemes of universal reform, and the most extravagant expectations were cherished as to the progress and felicity attainable by the race, when the superstition of the past should be destroyed and science should be enthroned as the queen of a regenerated world. Bacon's remarkable fragment, The New Atlantis, is an interesting revelation of the scientific mind in that age. A ship in the Pacific is

driven far from her course to the south, and finds there a fortunate country where none of the evils of European society are known, where the people have attained to an extraordinary degree of prosperity and happiness under the wise administration of a group of sages known as the "Order of Solomon's House." These are men who possess the secrets of all ancient learning, and who are supplied by the state with unlimited facilities for scientific research. The state reaps the benefit of their labors, in the wisest sanitary arrangements, and an infinity of ingenious appliances which prolong the lives and promote the general welfare of the citizens. The imagination of Bacon here aims to picture the ideal state. A member of the Order of Solomon's House states to him the purpose of the Order in these words: "The End of our Foundation is the knowledge of causes and secret motions of things; and the enlarging the bounds of Human Empire to the effecting of all things possible." [1] Superstition is to be destroyed, and the race made free and happy by science. The result of these various tendencies appears in the scientific conceptions of the time; the world is a mechanism, an invariable quantity of matter

[1] Bacon's Works, vol. iii, p. 156.

and force operating with the regularity and precision of a perfect machine. It is evident that free spiritual beings whose activities cannot be controlled by, and expressed in terms of, the laws of physical motion would introduce elements of uncertainty into the universal mechanism such as would defeat the scientific purpose. Hence from Descartes down there is a growing tendency to exclude God and human free will more and more rigidly from the machine of nature. It is well to note this scientific assumption appearing at the dawn of modern science, as affecting traditional Christianity, a revelation based upon miracles. The thorough-going application of this scientific assumption of the supremacy of the law of common experience plainly renders it impossible that the records of miraculous occurrences, as we find them in the Christian Scriptures, should be regarded as veritable history.

Philosophical speculation begins first in apparent submission to churchly authority, though with a principle of doubt which was suspected from the first by the orthodox. Descartes attempts, not very successfully, to make a place in his mechanical theory for human free will; and he believes he can demonstrate the existence of God.

Locke sets out to destroy innate ideas, and establishes sensationalism — the mind a *tabula rasa* to receive sense-impressions. Berkeley, in the practical outcome of his system, dissolves the external world into an illusion, and Hume does the same for the Ego, so that complete skepticism results. In the meantime Spinoza has developed a pantheistic doctrine of one substance with two attributes — thought and extension; and Leibnitz, following his individualistic tendency, constructs a world from a system of beings — monads — like Spinoza's substance in including the universe and in being related to nothing without, but acting as though related because of preëstablished harmony. On this system, after Wolff, a rationalistic account of all things in earth and heaven was based.

Kant was a Wolffian in early life, but was "roused by Hume from his dogmatic slumber." He held that the mind is active in knowledge, the mind being not a *tabula rasa* but furnishing certain intellectual forms into which the content of sensation is received and molded. Kant's general result, however, was skeptical; we know only phenomena, and the reason is trustworthy only when regulated by sense-experience. The moral ideas — God, free will, and immortality — cannot be

demonstrated on grounds of reason. The practical reason, however, brings us to these moral ideas which cannot be proven on theoretical grounds; they must be assumed to satisfy the moral need of man, who feels himself obligated to obey a moral law. The strong personality of Kant — equally powerful in intellect and intense in moral feeling — was able to hold in something like unity the apparently contradictory principles of the pure and the practical reason; the way was not long, however, to the conclusions of such men as Lange and Feuerbach, that Kant's system issues in skepticism on the theoretical and illusion on the practical side.

Kant's critical work aroused a most extraordinary enthusiasm for philosophy among the young students of Germany, and became the source of a remarkable speculative development. Fichte undertook to deduce all things from the subjective activity of the "Reines Ich," though in his later years his system took on a more objective and also a mystical character. He was most influenced by the moral side of Kant's system, being by nature an orator and a preacher of righteousness; Nature was to him merely "the possibility of the fulfillment of the

moral law." Schelling's "Identitäts-system" forms the transition to a more objective position, when the giant of the transcendental philosophy appears in the person of Hegel. He is the systemizer who brings to completion the fruitful suggestions of his predecessors in the field of idealism, devoting the stores of his great learning, a marvelous dialectical acuteness, and an infinite toil and patience to the impossible task of deducing the real universe of life and being from the abstract movement of absolute thought. "Hegel starts from the Idea, and professes by the force of dialectic alone to make all things spring from the Idea. This includes the Absolute, which is the pure idea considered in itself and in an abstract manner; Nature, which is the idea manifested and become object; and Spirit, which is the idea turning back upon itself and beholding itself as soul, as society, and as God. God is to Hegel the concrete unity, the idea determining itself, the generating principle of immanence. Religion is the consciousness which God has of himself in finite being; or, again, it is the spirit which is conscious of its essence."[1] We find here an idealistic pantheism where the real physical world

[1] Lichtenberger, Hist. German Theol., p. 15.

and the personal finite spirit have vanished in the void abyss of the Absolute. The idealistic vein is worked out to the very end, and nothing remains for Hegel's followers but to wrangle over the obscurities of their master, in the devout faith that in this philosophy, if it could be understood, are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, or to struggle back as best they may to a *terra firma* of real existences. All the conflicting parties, however, have abandoned the Hegelian dialectic; this method is already an historic reminiscence. Of the extreme left wing Feuerbach runs out into a practical atheism, making the Deity an illusion, an objectivized form of the finite personality; the more moderate of the school, of whom Biedermann is a worthy representative, endeavor with very indifferent success to retain the chief elements of the Hegelian system while giving a substantial reality to the physical world and the finite spirit. It was Hegel's avowed purpose to exhibit the essential content of the Christian religion in unassailable philosophical form; but it is now generally perceived that the result is an abstract speculative form from which the genuinely historical and Christian content has been rigidly excluded. There are

still scholars, however, who are engaged in the unpromising task of galvanizing the pantheistic corpse into some manifestation of useful religious activity.

The most permanently influential element of Hegel's work is connected with his doctrine of nature and history as a rational development. His system is thus in accord with the scientific theory of the universal reign of law as associated with evolution — his system being an exposition, from the standpoint of abstract thought, of the evolution theory which the scientist seeks to establish by study of the actual and historic concrete facts. His most remarkable influence in this field, at least as far as concerns our purpose, has been in relation to the principles of historic criticism. The effect of the Hegelian philosophy upon this field of research was well-nigh revolutionary. Before Hegel's time men felt that the facts of history were so remote, our knowledge concerning them was so scanty, that it was impossible to do more than to join in probable sequence a series of statements concerning battles, sieges, rising and falling dynasties, etc. But if history is a rational development, a movement according to the laws of thought, and this thought is our

thought, then we have the ready means at hand for bridging by probable conjecture the gaps where historic knowledge fails, and for giving life and reality to the story of the past by painting its men and women in the warm and vivid tints of common human experience. It is evident that Hegel here joins hands again with the scientific assumption that law is everywhere supreme — an alliance ominous for mythological tales of every sort, whether connected with Mount Olympus or with Sinai and Calvary; for this law is the law of our thought, of common everyday experience which knows no miracle. This is in essence the principle from which the Tübingen school of criticism sets out, of which Friedrich Christian Baur is usually considered the founder. His critical work, and later Strauss' mythical theory of the New Testament history, are merely the systematic and thorough application of those principles for reconstructing history which are the inevitable outcome of the philosophic and scientific development down to their day. Edward Zeller, son-in-law of Baur, and well representing the general spirit of the Tübingen school, says: "The scientific proof of the fact of a miracle is simply impossible, because the assumption

of it can rest only on the credibility of testimony; the credibility of a witness, however, can be judged only after the analogy of other experience, and therefore events which contradict every analogy of experience, be the evidence what it will, can never have in their favor the preponderating probability."[1] This proposition is simply and undeniably true, if "scientific proof" is taken in the sense it has in the world of science — explanation of phenomena after the analogy of natural law and common experience. Zeller here gives a clear and courageous statement of what is in reality the fundamental critical principle (whether or not all are conscious of it or are willing to avow it) of the advanced schools of criticism to-day. We need not be surprised, therefore, if the results of such criticism are destructive. The mysterious point, to the plain man, is that these men should deem it worth while to devote years of patient and microscopic industry to determine whether the New Testament can be accepted as sober history, when their first critical assumption declares the Scriptural history of Jesus to be simple mythology.

Between the extremes of the Hegelian critical

[1] Geschichte der Deutschen Phil., p. 156.

school and the conservatism of the old orthodoxy stands the mediating school, of which Neander and Dorner are well-known representatives. This school aims to bring the essential content of the traditional Christian doctrines into satisfying unity with the best results of modern science and culture.

The theological party, however, which is of leading interest in Germany to-day is that popularly known as the Ritschlian. This school regards the chaotic state of theology to-day as the inevitable result of the historic development which has given the intellectual the preponderance in the Christian system. The Ritschlians, therefore, set up the apparently promising principle that metaphysical dogma and philosophical presuppositions must be banished from theology, or held rigidly subordinate to the moral elements of the simple Scriptural Christianity of the early church and the Reformation. The position of this school suggests in a striking way the apparent impossibility of freeing German theology from philosophical presuppositions; for while professing to cut clear entirely from metaphysics, it sets out from the conclusions of Kant's Practical Reason, which is commonly regarded in the phil-

osophical world as the weak and perishable portion of Kant's work. Aside from the inconsistency of building upon a metaphysical system a theology which claims as its supreme excellence that it is scriptural and historical rather than metaphysical, the presence of the common critical assumptions is clearly apparent in the interpretation of Scripture and the historic church doctrines.

It will be our task to trace out, with such fullness of detail as our limited space will permit, the theological development indicated above.

There is an interesting parallel between the development of Greek thought and the speculative movement in modern times. Each sets out from a popular religion, more or less corrupted by ignorance and superstition, in pursuit of a satisfying theory of life and the world. It first takes on the form of a naïve realism, which is soon reduced by a deepening critical consciousness to an apparently hopeless skepticism (the Sophists, Hume). Now appears the great reformer (Socrates, Kant) of imperial intellect and strong moral feeling, a many-sided personality which harmonizes the opposing aspects of truth, suggesting the germinal principles and giving

impulse and direction for the succeeding development. And as the reformer's primary interest was moral, his teaching first bears fruit in the preacher of righteousness, the orator, the poet, of the school (Plato, Fichte), who clothes the ethical doctrines of the master in forms the more attractive to the common consciousness because their vague outlines leave room for the play of religious sentiment and the transfiguring halo of a poetic mysticism. And now the intellectualism of the reformer asserts itself in the systemizer of the school (Aristotle, Hegel), who ruthlessly sweeps away the poetic illusions of the preceding teacher and gives the system a rigid logical consistency. The system is now exalted as the final philosophy, its clear and simple principles pointing the way to the goal of all truth; but it is the clearness of the shallow pool as contrasted with the depth and mystery of the ocean. It is soon discovered that such philosophical formulæ do not adequately express the struggle and passion, the wonder and beauty of the unfolding universe. And so there succeeds an eclectic age, when men drift helplessly here and there in search of a satisfying truth. This period of ancient philosophy was terminated by the miraculous appearance of a religion of

revelation. What shall be the outcome of our modern eclectic age? When one considers the tremendous forces arrayed against our faith to-day, he must feel that if Christianity succeeds in making good its claim to intellectual and moral supremacy, a miracle will be wrought scarcely less noteworthy than that of its original manifestation. If Christianity can vindicate its title to empire against the opposition of a materialistic science and a godless culture, this fiery test will go far to show that it comes from God and is designed by him to rule the ages of human history.

It may be well to suggest here that the group of men we shall consider in this paper may give a wrong impression as to the state of religion among the German people in general. These men and the type of thought they represent are, for the most part, heretical in one or more points; they represent the movement in Germany of what we call liberal thought — the effort to reckon with traditional Christianity from the standpoint of present philosophy and culture. I am satisfied that there is as much of orthodoxy and real piety among the common people of Germany as among the same class here, though the forms of its expression are different. The

debates of the schools and the discussions of the learned, with us in America, stand often in very remote connection with the real life of our people; and this is yet more the case in Germany, especially as regards theological discussion. With us a man who is expelled from an orthodox communion moves to Pennsylvania and establishes a new sect, or betakes himself to some city and organizes a People's Church where his theological hobby can be exhibited without let or hindrance. In German pulpits theological and critical questions are studiously avoided; there are few or no allusions to current literature, science, etc., even by way of illustration; the sermon is a simple exposition of the text, with an application to the personal life. We should understand, then, that the theological battles are largely fought out in the universities, and that the opinions of the disputants may be less representative of the beliefs of the masses than is the case with us. It is possible that a German professor, even of a considerable reputation as an author, may no more fairly represent the average of public opinion than does Colonel Ingersoll or Herr Most with us. As students we are reading constantly the books of representatives of the liberal German schools, who

proclaim their doctrine as the culmination of the thought-movement of the ages, and commonly give the impression that all Germany is or soon will be of that opinion. It is much as though Colonel Ingersoll should trace the movement of liberal thought since the Reformation, find everywhere premonitions of his religion of good-fellowship, and close his work with the assertion that all intelligent Americans now hold his views. It is the unusual occurrences, the out-of-the-way persons and things, which attract attention and get into the papers, and also very often into the most popular books and magazines. It is the freaks of nature, — the bearded lady, the what-is-it, — not the average well-formed American citizen, which are exhibited in the museums and advertised in the public prints. The people of Germany read daily in their papers a few lines of "American News": a train robbery, a Kentucky neighborhood war, two Texas girls in love with the same cowboy and fighting a bloody duel to settle the case. These are striking and interesting incidents; but they give the German citizen, who has no other sources of information concerning America, a wrong impression of American manners and civilization. I am persuaded that the opinions

concerning Germany of many intelligent people among us, formed from hysterical denunciations of German rationalism, and also from the noisy liberal literature of Germany, are not much more accurate than their notions about us; and I hesitate to devote the rest of my space to the discussion of a line of heretics, lest I may aid in spreading the belief that there is no orthodox theology or religion in the Fatherland. There is much simple and beautiful piety, much devout learning, in the land of Luther; and I wish the limits of this work would allow me to do justice to these pleasing traits of the German religious life. My task, however, — a worthy and important one, — is to describe the attempts of the earnest and gifted men of that country who have striven to reconcile the faith of our fathers with the canons of modern thought and feeling. "Happy is the nation," no doubt, whose life, religious as well as political, "has no history"; and while it were well for us to contemplate much more than we do edifying examples of unquestioning faith, yet it remains true that honest doubt is often the first step in the way of progress; and an earnest attempt to grapple with the intellectual enemies of faith may be a fruitful subject for

study, if not in positive result, at least as a warning against error.

With the growth of culture in Europe appeared in each country the inevitable attempt of liberated reason to reckon with revealed religion. In each country the movement took a characteristic form; in England deism, in France materialism, in Germany rationalism. English conservatism and the tendency to compromise between the old and the new appears in allowing God to create the world and give the mechanism the first start; but now he must not interfere with the running of the universal machine, for he is expected to sit on his distant throne, in decorous majesty, much as Queen Victoria is the theoretical source of all law and authority, but practically a nonentity in her kingdom. The French tendency to the original and the spectacular results in the atheistic materialism which would reduce the universe to a concourse of atoms, and delights to shock the sensibilities of the pious by insisting that man is a higher development of the ape. In Germany, however, the problem takes the form of rationalism. Here is presented a fascinating group of metaphysical and historical problems; let us enjoy them; let us take plenty of time and dig all round them and

under them; let us expose and refute the hasty and superficial conclusions of the English and the French, and thus exalt the honor of German erudition and confirm our title to the empire of the air. The outcome of deism as compared with rationalism in relation to Christianity is noteworthy. Deism — natural religion — was destroyed by Hume's critical skepticism, and its remnants were absorbed by the Church. Hume's criticism annihilated natural religion, so that the dilemma seemed clearly presented — faith or reason, traditional Christianity or practical atheism. Later German philosophy for the most part tries to save Christianity, by bringing it into some statement which shall harmonize with prevalent thought. The result is a perversion of Christianity, so that the question may fairly be raised whether the hostility of philosophy would not have better served the interests of the traditional faith. After Hume, in England, there is a general aversion to philosophical speculation, as destructive of all that the heart holds holy. We find in England little or nothing similar to the ambitious post-Kantian systems.[1]

[1] Leslie Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, vol. II, p. 59.

CHAPTER II.

LEIBNITZ AND WOLFF.

OUR previous discussion has shown that the post-Reformation theology ran out into a dry and unfruitful scholasticism which reduced Christianity to a group of intellectual propositions. In the latter part of the seventeenth century the healthy religious feeling of the German people reasserted itself in the pietistic movement, under Spener and Francke. The University of Halle was founded by the pietistic party, and this type of the religious life became widely influential towards the beginning of the eighteenth century. The school was thoroughly orthodox in doctrine, but found the essence of Christianity not so much in creed-subscription as in a change of heart and purity of life. Now appeared, however, the beginnings of the characteristic movement of the time, in the rationalism of the Leibnitz-Wolffian school. The first serious struggle occurred at Halle, where Wolff had been appointed professor of mathematics in 1706. He soon broadened the

field of his academic activity to include lectures on the general lines of philosophy, and his lectures, which were delivered in the German language, soon became very popular. His determined purpose to subject all revealed truth to the test of reason brought him into conflict with the pietistic theologians of the university, and the struggle culminated in Wolff's expulsion from the university in 1723. It is said that the consideration which brought King Frederick William to a decision in the matter was not so much a suspicion of the pride of reason in the abstract as a concrete case which was used to illustrate the dangerous tendency of Wolff's teachings. It was asserted that, according to Wolff's deterministic doctrine of the will, if one of the King's giant guards should desert, he could not justly be punished, for he would have done only what had been predetermined for him to do. Wolff was ordered to leave Halle and Prussian territory within forty-eight hours under penalty of the halter. He removed to the university of Marburg, and the heated controversy which followed greatly aided the general diffusion of the Wolffian doctrines. In the course of the next twenty-five years Wolff's system became the dominant philosophical

influence in Germany, and remained so till the rise of the critical philosophy of Kant.

The philosophical problems which confronted Leibnitz were those raised by the system of Descartes — substance, and the interaction of spiritual and material substances. Leibnitz answered the first by a dynamic rather than materialistic theory of the physical world; that the ultimate elements of the universe are not physical atoms but spiritual monads; the primal principle is not matter but force. The second problem is solved by the denial of interaction, causal relation, of any sort in the world. Each monad is a microcosm which in its perceptive power mirrors the universe, and in its active power moves in harmony with the other monads, yet both perception and motion result from a system of preëstablished harmony, which dispenses with any influence or causal relation between the states and activities of the monad and the outer universe. Each monad contains within itself the knowledge of all truth, but this knowledge is for the most part possessed unconsciously; in the lower forms of the physical and animal world the knowledge is almost entirely unconscious, while there is a

constantly increasing clearness of consciousness as one advances through the higher animal forms to man. All knowledge therefore is really innate, and the progress of the soul-monad is in elevating into the light of consciousness the elements of truth previously held unconsciously. A monad which knows itself thoroughly, through and through, would be a deity, possessing all knowledge. Leibnitz shared decidedly the philosophical tendency of his time which sought to express all life in terms of intellect, the ideal being to introduce into every sphere, even ethics and religion, the rigid precision of mathematics. In his early life Leibnitz was greatly interested in the idea of a "philosophical calculus," which should supplement the ordinary logical and scientific methods after the analogy of the higher mathematics, and by means of which, through the elaboration of fundamental notions, propositions could be proven and new truth gained. It is evident that the monad system readily harmonizes with this decidedly intellectual tendency. The perfection of the monad, whether taken alone or in the group which constitutes an individual, lies in the complete development of its knowledge. Will, in man, manifests itself in certain activities neces

sarily connected with certain ideas, and the aim of ethical activity is happiness — the growing sense of completeness of being. As the perfection of the spiritual being lies in clearness of ideas, from which rational activities necessarily flow, the tendency is apparent to exalt thought far above will as the ruling mental faculty. The same is true in relation to feeling; feeling is a state of imperfect, indistinct knowledge. The sense of the beautiful arises from the order and regularity of indistinct sense impressions; pleasures of sense in general are to be "referred to the indistinct perception of an intellectual pleasure." [1]

We therefore find in Leibnitz an emphasis of the intellectual, the supremacy of reason, as strong as in any English sensationalist or French materialist; and at the same time Leibnitz is an orthodox Christian. He indignantly repudiates the insinuation of Bayle that faith and reason are irreconcilable, and it therefore remains only for each man to choose which he prefers and abandon the other. Leibnitz very justly asserts it is impossible to believe that which is unreasonable, and his purpose is so to deal with Christianity that the limits of faith and of reason shall be clearly

[1] Zeller, Geschichte der Deutschen Phil., p. 118.

drawn, and it shall be made clear that Christianity contains nothing which may not be reasonably believed. "In matters of religion to be willing to disregard reason is in my eyes an almost sure indication of an egotism which approaches fanaticism, or, what is yet worse, of hypocrisy." It is apparent that we have in this system, reposing peacefully side by side as though unconscious of their coming warfare, the principles representing the antagonistic forces which have rent the modern world. Rationalism thus enters the field of German thought as the champion of Christianity; and in fact all through subsequent history the liberal thought of Germany has usually retained this avowed purpose, and for the most part sincerely. The suspicions of the pietists of Halle, however, in reference to Wolff's specious attempt to make Christianity reasonable, have been fully justified by the subsequent development. Under the treatment of its rationalistic defenders Christianity has been gradually transformed until the logical and inevitable outcome of the movement appears in the Logos (reason) religion of Hegel, where the traditional and historical elements of Christianity have simply vanished.

In reconciling faith and reason, Leibnitz makes

a distinction between that which is above reason and that which is contrary to reason. A revelation concerned with the infinite and eternal may be expected to contain much not readily comprehensible to finite creatures, yet it must not contradict the general laws of human thought. In this region which transcends but does not contradict reason, Leibnitz finds place for the miracles of Christian history. The physical laws of the universe have as their end the perfection of the world, and are subordinate to the moral purposes of the Creator. It is not unreasonable, therefore, that these lower physical laws should be at times superseded by an activity in accordance with a higher spiritual law. Leibnitz undertook to demonstrate the existence of God, necessarily assumed as the source of the preëstablished harmony, and as supplying the infinite mind in which the eternal truths of reason are grounded. He also used the cosmological and ontological arguments, in forms corresponding with his philosophical standpoint. It is evident that in his doctrine of innate knowledge — all truth slumbering unconsciously in the mind — is found the impulse to extend the use of the reason far beyond the realm of experience, in the attempt to penetrate the infinite mysteries;

a tendency carried to such extremes in the Wolffian school as to give rise to the critical reaction of Kant.

Wolff was not a man of original creative power, but is of importance as the systemizer and popular expositor of Leibnitz. Leibnitz's doctrines, which had been discussed in letters and brief treatises, are here brought into unity and developed into a system comprehending all branches of learning. There are slight departures from the position of Leibnitz in some particulars, as, that preëstablished harmony is applied only to the union of the body and the soul, while a physical influence is assumed between lower beings. The most marked general difference concerns the relation of God to the world. To the profound and penetrating spirit of Leibnitz, the divine Being, while transcending the world, was yet the immanent principle of reason and order in it. To the matter-of-fact understanding of Wolff, God seems to create and govern the world from without, with the general purpose to advance the comfort and well-being of men; much as a carpenter builds a house, with a view to the satisfaction of its future possessors.

Pure philosophy, according to Wolff, deals with God, the soul, and the physical world — Theology,

Psychology, and Cosmology. Natural theology is carefully distinguished from the revealed knowledge of divine truth. The former is useful as laying a basis for faith in truth naturally known; for in it the existence of God, his principal attributes, the immortality of the soul, etc., are conclusively demonstrated. Wolff's general method — a concisely stated proposition, followed by a quasi-mathematical demonstration — may be illustrated by the first few sections in his Prolegomena to the "Theologia Naturalis."

§ I. Natural theology is the science of those things which are possible through God; that is, of those things which relate to him and are known to be possible through those things which relate to him.

§ II. All things treated in natural theology must be demonstrated. Natural theology must be a science (§ I). Wherefore, since science has the method of demonstrating what we affirm or deny (§ 594 Logic), those things which are treated in natural theology must be demonstrated.

§ III. One who studies natural theology acquires certain knowledge of God.

§ IV. In natural theology the existence of God must be demonstrated.

On the title-page of the second volume of the Theologia Naturalis (Leipsig, 1741) Wolff sets forth the important results he expects to accomplish. "Part Second, in which the Existence and Attributes of God are demonstrated from the Notion of the Most Perfect Being, the nature of the soul is proven, and the Foundations of Atheism, Deism, Fatalism, Naturalism, Spinozism, and other errors concerning God are overthrown." The existence of God is proven by the cosmological and ontological arguments; from the dependence of all natural things, a self-existent Creator must be assumed; and from our notion of a most perfect being we conclude the necessary existence of God.

Wolff refers to miracles and revelation both in the Cosmology and the Natural Theology.

Cosmology, § 510. "That is supernatural, the sufficient reason of which is not contained in the essence and nature of being. It is also called miraculous."

Then follow twenty-four propositions minutely discussing the relation of the miraculous to the natural. I give three of these: —

§ 525. A motion, which does not conform to the laws of motion, is not natural but miraculous.

§ 526. Miraculous motion is contrary to the laws of motion.

§ 527. Laws of motion are not absolutely necessary but contingent.

§ 448 to § 496 of the Natural Theology deal with revelation. "That God should reveal his will to men is not impossible. A revelation of God cannot be made immediately to man except by miracle." Beginning with § 451, Wolff gives various criteria for testing the genuineness of an alleged revelation: —

(1) "A divine revelation ought to contain things necessary to be known by man, but which can be learned in no other way."

(2) "Things which are divinely revealed must not be in the least antagonistic to the divine attributes. In a divine revelation contradictions have no possible place. That is said to be above reason which cannot be proven from principles of reason; but that is said to be against reason which is repugnant to or contradicts the principles of reason." After a series of trivial propositions the conclusion is reached (§ 462): "Mysteries do not contradict the principles of reason," and (§ 463) "In a divine revelation there is a place for mysteries."

(3) "Divine revelation cannot contain that which contradicts reason and experience."

(4) "Divine revelation cannot teach that which is repugnant to the law of nature and the essence and nature of the soul."

(5) "If it is possible to show how he who affirms that something has been divinely revealed to him, by the use of the natural faculties of the mind, would have been able to arrive at the knowledge of that which he asserts as divinely revealed; it is not necessary to hold this as divinely revealed."

After discussing for twenty propositions revelations by means of dreams and visions, he concludes with the instructive proposition (§ 487), "That which becomes known to any one through natural vision, should not be held to be divinely revealed; but that which becomes known through supernatural vision, that is divinely revealed."

(6) "God does not effect through a miracle what may be accomplished naturally."

(7) "In a divine revelation particular things ought to be uttered in those words and represented under those figures by means of which he to whom the revelation is made may thoroughly understand the mind of God, who speaks or reveals."

Wolff proceeds here to discuss the number of words which should be used, — no more and no less than will answer the purpose, — and concludes the discussion of revelation with the proposition (§ 496): "In a divine revelation the style should conform not less to the universal rules of grammar than of rhetoric."

I have given this much space to Wolff's treatment of revelation, because in it is found nearly all the material used by the rationalists of the Aufklärung, and it is presented in a way entirely characteristic of the period. In treating of revelation, every minute and trivial detail must be discussed pro and con and subjected to the scrutiny of so-called reason. Wolff remarks concerning the possibility of revelation (under § 449): "It is possible, either that God should produce sounds in the air such as are produced by the vocal organs, so that he to whom He reveals his will should seem to hear God speaking to him; or that God should produce motions in the auditory organ such as are produced by the voice of one speaking; or that perceptions should be produced in the mind such as arise when we hear one speaking. It is therefore clear that it is not impossible that God should reveal his will to

men." It is evident that this method of treating the miraculous, however sincere the writer's purpose might be to demonstrate its possibility, must inevitably produce just the contrary effect in a period of marked skeptical tendency. To bring forth the miracle from the obscurity of mystery, and rigidly excluding the ideality of religious feeling, to analyze every step of the miraculous process in the light of a matter-of-fact reason, exhausting the resources of a cumbrous learning and a prolix and tedious method of exposition in the minute elucidation of every trivial detail, — the result could only be to bring out into clear and possibly ludicrous distinctness the apparently insuperable repugnance of the miracle to the common sense of mankind. It was therefore not surprising that the alliance between orthodoxy and the Wolffian philosophy was of a troubled and transient character, and that Wolff's statement of the orthodox doctrine of miracle forms the transition to its complete denial by the later rationalists.

Orthodoxy at this time was not the all-powerful hierarchy of the preceding century, but had been greatly weakened by the growth of pietism on the one hand and skepticism on the other. It

was natural enough that the orthodox party should lay hold of the Wolffian philosophy as the coming deliverer, for the two systems agreed in emphasizing the intellectual, as opposed to the emotional extremes of the pietists. We accordingly find a group of theologians who aim to adapt the Wolffian philosophy to the demonstration of the main doctrines of orthodox theology. Even the mathematical method of proof was applied to the profoundest mysteries of the faith, as the Atonement and the doctrine of the Trinity. "Darjes (died 1791), of Jena, attempted in 1735 to prove the 'pluritas personarum in Deitate ex solis rationis principiis methodo mathematicorum,' but the theologians found no fewer than twenty-two errors in his treatise." [1] It soon became apparent that the orthodox alliance with Wolffianism was an unnatural one, for as theology grew more rational it became less religious. This conviction is very properly expressed by Cappelliar in his epistle against Darjes: "We will never concede that miracles can be demonstrated from the principles of reason alone, which no true philosopher or theologian, not to say true Christian, ever has admitted or can admit." [2]

[1] Pünjer, Hist. of Phil. of Religion, p. 532. [2] Ibid. p. 532.

Wolff's limitations are conspicuous enough, yet these should not blind us to his great services to German philosophy and culture. His intellect is dry and mechanical, his style of exposition is methodical and redundant to a degree both wearisome and exasperating. We find nowhere a suggestion of the noble ideality so attractive in Leibnitz, nor a single original and fruitful point of view. Yet, largely from this very character, Wolff accomplished an important work in the existing state of German letters. Germany was beginning to recover from the disasters of the Thirty Years' War, and as the national feeling began to assert itself under the leadership of Frederick the Great, the people awoke to the consciousness that they had been far surpassed in philosophy and literature by France and England. The dominant impulse of the period was to free themselves, on the one side, from the unfruitful speculations of the Aristotelian scholasticism, still largely influential in the universities, and on the other hand, from subservience to foreign, especially French, influence in art and letters; the positive purpose being to develop a genuinely enlightened and national type of culture. It was in these relations that the Wolffian philosophy was widely useful.

Its clearness and apparent orthodoxy won a speedy victory over the scholastic philosophy of the theologians; and as Wolff lectured in the German language, expounding the original principles of Leibnitz, the result was an essentially German school of philosophy.

CHAPTER III.

THE AUFKLÄRUNG.

THE impulse mentioned above, to bring Germany abreast with modern culture, found expression in the general movement known as the "Aufklärung." This movement took the form of a popular philosophy, much like English deism in spirit and purpose. The speculative subtleties of the schools were disregarded, a rational view of life was sought in harmony with the natural understanding of mankind, and the practical aim was found in the general advancement of human happiness. Many of the Illuminati are Wolffian in their type of thought, though the cumbrous metaphysical terminology is abandoned and the principles are set forth in simple and popular form — in elegant, often aphoristic, literary style. I will refer to two of the best representatives of this movement — Mendelssohn and Reimarus.

It is commonly agreed that the noblest representative of the Aufklärung is Moses Mendelssohn (1728–1786). The son of a Jewish schoolmaster,

and in manhood remaining in the humble position of a bookkeeper, he was able, in spite of poverty and the disadvantage of his nationality, to gain a general knowledge of the learning of his day and exert a wide influence in the literary world. He was on terms of intimacy with Lessing, Lavater, and the other prominent literary men of the period, being universally esteemed for his mild and estimable personality and the noble and kindly spirit of his writings. He is Wolffian in his general principles, though he replaces the Wolffian form of exposition by a pleasing and popular style. His works are for the most part devoted to the discussion of the truths of natural religion, proving the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. The argument for the latter is developed in the "Phaedo" (1767), where it is held that the soul, being simple (uncompounded) substance, cannot cease to exist except by annihilation, which is inconsistent with the goodness of God. The argument as to the divine existence appears in the "Morgenstunden, oder Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes," published the year before his death (1785). We find here a curious example of the effect upon the Wolffian school of Kant's denial of the reality of

the external world. The argument begins with the Ego, instead of the material world, and from human knowledge, reason, and will is inferred the existence of a being who possesses these faculties in perfection. The endeavor is made to give the discussion the nature of a mathematical demonstration, but the author evidently feels, as he states [1] somewhat plaintively in the preface, that he belongs to a bygone philosophical age, since the Pure Reason "des alles zermalmenden Kants" has appeared (1781). He expresses the hope that the "Business (of restoring philosophy to a position of general respect) may be reserved for better hands (than his), for the penetration of a Kant, who, it is to be hoped, will build up again with the same spirit with which he has torn down." [2] The Practical Reason did not appear till two years after Mendelssohn's death (1788).

Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768) was professor of Oriental languages in the Hamburg Academical Gymnasium. His best-known work is "On the Chief Truths of Natural Religion" (1754). He is an orthodox Leibnitz-Wolffian, finding nothing in the universe but spiritual force. The world plainly points to an independent first

[1] Vorbericht, p. 2. [2] Ibid. p. 5.

cause and testifies of his wisdom and goodness. He gathers from every quarter of the world examples of intelligent purpose in nature: "Who taught these animals (wild goats and chamois) to measure the distances with their eyes that they may not leap too short or too far?"[1] The pantheistic atheism of Spinoza is opposed and French materialism is severely dealt with. "If that infatuated author (La Mattrie), after making man a machine, and treating him as a plant, instead of entitling his last book 'A Treatise on a Happy Life,' had called it l'homme bête, et plus que le bête, he would have clearly informed us of its real contents."[2] Reimarus lays great emphasis upon immortality, which is clearly evident on natural grounds, and paints a pleasing picture of natural religion, by means of which man, "like an ingenious and dutiful son, not only takes delight in his intellectual delights in knowledge and wisdom, but has the additional satisfaction to know that his sincere and constant application gains him the love of the universal Parent of mankind."[3]

This work of Reimarus shows us the tendency of thought in that day. Men were becoming deeply conscious of the intellectual difficulties

[1] Chief Truths, etc., Eng. Trans. R. Wynne, 1766, p. 244. [2] Ibid. p. 443.
[3] Ibid. p. 473.

connected with a supernatural revelation. Why then seek to retain such a religion, for we can easily demonstrate as good or a better one on natural grounds? While their minds were still unconsciously under the sway of their old beliefs, it seemed easy to find convincing evidence of God and immortality. But generations educated in the belief that a supernatural revelation is impossible, confronted by the evil and imperfection of the world, cannot easily convince themselves of the boasted truths of natural religion.

This work of Reimarus is especially remarkable because of his attitude towards the miraculous. It appears in his dissertation on "Providence," and is in fact the logical development of Leibnitz's strict determinism, with which the miraculous is irreconcilable. "It is clear from experience that God, by the decree of creation, had providentially in mind the whole future of natural events, according to his purpose. Therein, then, lies the proof that he must have determined and willed these wisely. . . . If a ruler should every instant change his laws and the decisions of his judges, and declare this or that man free from their sway, it would be the same as if there were no laws. If also God does all immediately and by

miracle, he would do everything alone; and wherefore has he chosen to create finite things? The more miracles he performs after creation the more would he destroy nature again and have created it to no purpose. In performing miracles he would make it appear either that he had not comprehended the natural means that were possible for his purpose, or he would be often changing his purpose and working against his own influence in the maintenance of nature." [1]

Wolff had inseparably joined miracles and revelation. If Reimarus denies miracles, what is his attitude towards revealed religion? This is made clear in his "Apology for the Rational Worshipers of God," to which he devoted his best powers for many years, but which was not published during his life. It was portions of this work which created such a commotion when published by Lessing, as the "Wolfenbüttel Fragments" (1774–1778). The purpose of Reimarus in writing the book was to "investigate thoroughly the faith which had caused him so many perplexities, and see whether or no it could subsist with the rules of truth." It was not to be published till after his death, "in more enlightened times." [2]

[1] Providence, Ger. Edition, 1791, p. 537.
[2] Stahr, Life and Works of Lessing, II, p. 234.

A rational man must not accept a religion merely because his fathers believed it. Reason must test religious doctrine, as even the theologians imply when they prove their tenets, so far as possible, on grounds of reason. We find here the fact so insisted on by Lessing, that we have no immediate revelation, and that a mediate and historical revelation falls under the common laws for estimating human evidence. And now the criteria for testing an alleged revelation, which Wolff had worked out so elaborately, are at length applied rigorously to Christianity. The judgment on the Old Testament is not a favorable one. "There is no history which is so full of contradictions, or in which the name of God has been so frequently and shamefully abused; for all the persons who are here brought forward as men of God cause utter offense, repulsion, and aversion by their conduct, to a soul that loves honor and virtue. The history consists of a tissue of utter follies, infamies, deceptions, and cruelties, of which selfishness and ambition were mainly the motives. What is said about supernatural inspiration, revelation, prophecy, and miracles, is mere delusion, deception, and abuse of the divine name."[1] The books of

[1] Pünjer, Hist. of Phil. of Religion, p. 555.

the New Testament were written by Christ's disciples in a natural way with no original claim to inspiration. Christ's teaching must be distinguished from the additions made to it by his disciples. Jesus looked for an earthly Messianic kingdom; but when his plan was frustrated by death, his followers stole his body and invented the story of his resurrection. In conclusion, revelation in general is discarded as impossible; and it is also superfluous, for the truths of natural religion are a sufficient guide and support in life, are known alike by all men, and should be regarded as sufficient for salvation.

Up to this point in the theological development, all parties, both Wolffians and Aristotelians, rationalists and orthodox, had agreed in identifying the Bible and Christianity. The liberals had attacked, and the conservatives defended the Scriptures in the conviction that as their inspired authority was established or overthrown the cause of religion was won or lost. The new element introduced by Lessing into the controversy was to distinguish the religion from the book.

Lessing (1729–1780) was a man of versatile genius, a towering figure in the history of German literature. He took no part in the theological

discussions of his time until in the closing years of his life, when he was already an author of world-wide reputation. In philosophy he favored Spinoza, though his Spinozism was tempered by an intimate acquaintance with the works of Leibnitz. It seems generally true of the gifted men of that period that, repelled by the crude supernaturalism of the prevalent orthodoxy, they found satisfaction in the logical consistency and immanent unvarying law of Spinozism. In his student days Lessing was skeptical as to the current orthodoxy, yet his profound nature early rejected the superficial French skepticism prevalent in the polite society of the time. The publication of the "Wolfenbüttel Fragments" (1774–1778) aroused an extraordinarily heated discussion, in which it is assumed by all devout adherents of the Lessing cult that, as the champion of the pure religion of Christ and of Luther, Lessing annihilated his antagonists.[1] In his little work on "The Christian Religion and the Religion of Christ," Lessing sets forth the evil effects of metaphysical theologies and ecclesiastical establishments in perverting the simplicity of Christ's religion — which is in the main the simple

[1] Stahr, Life and Works of Lessing, II, pp. 260–263.

religion of nature which we so often encounter in this period. Also in "The Testament of John" — "Little children, love one another" — Lessing represents the essence of religion as morality, in harmony with the ring parable in Nathan the Wise. In the "Education of the Human Race," supernatural revelation is represented as the primer of the race, bringing to men more easily and quickly what the unaided reason would have discovered in time.

Pünjer well remarks in reference to the Götze controversy:[1] "As long as the excessive overestimate of the merits of Lessing in relation to the philosophy of religion lasts, his often more rough than real polemic, and the empty evasions by which he turns away from the main question, 'What religion does Lessing understand by the Christian religion, and to which he confesses himself to belong?' will be too much admired in a one-sided way for justice to be done to his opponent." Here is undoubtedly suggested the pertinent question in the controversy, at least as concerns the future religious development. If Lessing is defending the genuine Christian religion against its corrupters, it is incumbent upon

[1] Hist. of Phil. of Religion, p. 573, note.

him to make very plain what this genuine Christianity is, after its traditional theological, ecclesiastical, and Scriptural forms have been stripped off. No such fine distinctions are necessary, however, if he merely chooses to consider Jesus as a representative of religion in general — understanding by religion the natural religion so commonly advocated in his day. He was evidently under the temptation, which I fear he did not always successfully resist, to hold the latter position by personal preference, assuming the former only as a controversialist. Augustine, Zwingli, and Luther agree that the Scriptures are largely superfluous for a man who has assimilated their essential content into the fiber of his spiritual life; and it was easy for Lessing, as it is for his successors in this field, to claim to stand on the high spiritual ground of the great leaders of the Church, as advocating the spirit against the letter. It is evident, however, that the original teachings of Jesus, at least in the opinion of the Church teachers above mentioned, did not coincide with the natural religion of the eighteenth century; so that the free-thinker who assumes this position exposes himself to the reproach of intellectual confusion or moral dishonesty. As to Lessing's

position in general, subsequent history has shown pretty clearly that the abandonment of churchly forms and Scriptural dogmas does not necessarily result in the universal diffusion of religion — the Christian or any other worthy sort.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FAITH PHILOSOPHY AND THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL.

AN interesting phenomenon in this period is the protest against the extreme intellectualism of the time by the faith philosophy of Hamann and Jacobi. Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788) gave utterance in confused and oracular fashion to many profound and suggestive ideas. The human understanding has led many to error, because it has analytically separated that which should be considered in inseparable relation. The aim of philosophy is to comprehend life, and life is the union of contradictory opposites. "Hamann will verily contemplate this coherence of things; he will take as the starting-point of all thinking the human individual viewed as an original microcosm, as an immediate unity of all opposites."[1] Mediate knowledge results in the skepticism of Kant — "the great analytical chemist." We must have recourse to immediate

[1] Pünjer, Hist. of Phil. of Religion, p. 611.

knowledge, based on "belief." The action of "reason" upon Christianity is to divest it of all that is noble and characteristic, and leave nothing but morality, so that the system loses its true and sublime contents. Christianity is the religion of the divine incarnation, realizing the hope of the union with God, dimly apparent in the blind strivings of the heathen faiths.

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819) brings the "Glaubens-Philosophie" to clear and methodical expression. He is the Scotch realist of German speculation, to whom Sir William Hamilton was indebted for much philosophical material. His deeply religious nature was aroused by the destructive results of the critical philosophy as he found it culminating in Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, and he found the fundamental error of these thinkers in a one-sided emphasis of the intellectual. The business of philosophy is "to exhibit in the most conscientious way humanity as it is, be it explicable or inexplicable." "Definition is its means, the way to its goal — its proximate, not its ultimate end. Its ultimate end is that which cannot be defined — the insoluble, the immediate, the simple." Jacobi suggests in fact the chief error of this whole philosophical period —

the endeavor to express all life, human and divine, in terms of intellectual definition. The result of this error is most strikingly shown in the abyss which yawns between Kant's Pure and Practical Reason. We are to act practically as though the ideas of the practical reason, illusion from the theoretical standpoint, were in fact true. There is plainly suggested here the insufficiency of the intellect alone, pure reason, as the standard of truth; and the necessity is shown for a higher standpoint in which the testimony of the whole man — intellect, feeling, and will — shall be the ground of valid knowledge, and from which the ideas of the practical reason shall *be* true. Jacobi remarks truly enough: "With pure metaphysics we can never gain the advantage over the reasons advanced by Spinoza against the personality of God, free will, and final causes." His solution of the difficulty, however, while correct in principle is objectionable in statement, when he says: "There is no other means of safety from the steep heights of metaphysics than to turn our back upon all philosophy and throw ourselves headlong into the depths of faith." No such violent performance is called for; the problem is simply to show the partial nature of the prevalent

philosophical standpoint, and to vindicate the rights of the moral and the emotional to be considered, as well as the intellect, in the mental judgment as to what is valid knowledge.

Traditional Christianity, however, does not derive much benefit from the "faith philosophy." Knowledge of the external world — which Jacobi makes immediate — is the result of an intuitive belief which may be called miraculous. Knowledge of God is of the same character, on the higher spiritual plane, so that revelation through external physical means is superfluous. "Revering that alone in Christ which is in itself divine, you do not debase reason and morality within yourself by idolatry. What Christ was outside of you, in himself, is a matter of indifference. What he is *in* you, this alone is important; and in you he is a truly divine being; through him you behold the deity, in that with him you ascend to the loftiest ideas."[1]

The limits of this work will allow but a word of reference to Goethe and the Romantic School, who are important for our subject, if only because of their early influence upon Schleiermacher. Rousseau's religion of sentiment was developed in

[1] Von den Göttlichen Dingen, Werke, vol. iii, p. 286.

opposition to the extremes of French materialism, which destroyed all that was ideal and morally worthy; and the same general movement is observable throughout Europe. This school also represents the farthest swing of the pendulum in reaction from the asceticism of the Middle Ages — a fact it may be well for a prosaic person to bear in mind when he encounters the evidence, which is plentiful enough, of the easy morals of these disciples of feeling. The school was also affected by the reaction against the extremes of intellectualism which appears in Hamann and Jacobi; the one-sided emphasis of reason in Germany had been little less destructive in its outcome than the materialism of France. There appeared, therefore, a somewhat general tendency of thought to seek the highest truth, not in the cold calculations of reason, but in the impulses of immediate feeling and the happy inspirations of genius. These various influences, in an age and country unusually prolific of poetic and passionate youth, produced a group of thinkers and writers who found the ideal character in the man who defied the traditional, the conventional, the "reasonable" — holding a man to be a genius in proportion as he was the creature of the momen-

tary impulse. Goethe seems largely to have outgrown these romantic vagaries, and to have developed a Spinozistic type of religious belief, vitalized and ennobled by his poetic sensibility. The Schlegels represent an unworthy extreme of this tendency. "In the wretched novel Lucinde, Friedrich Schlegel, the most impudent of these characters, erected to himself a fitting monument."[1] In this novel the deification of the natural as opposed to the artificial restraints of custom, heredity, and ascetic morality is carried to such a length that the author says of his interviews with his mistress: "Wir umarmen uns mit eben so viel Ausgelassenheit als Religion." This expression is significant, as suggesting the doctrine of Schleiermacher's "Discourses on Religion," that all normal feeling is religious. Friedrich Schlegel was Schleiermacher's room-mate in Berlin about the time the Discourses were written, and it was he who urged upon Schleiermacher the project of composing them.

[1] Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, vol. 1, p. 263.

CHAPTER V.

IMMANUEL KANT (1724–1804).

IN Kant's principal critical work, the "Critique of Pure Reason" (1781), the problem discussed is, how are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? An analytic judgment merely asserts of a subject something involved in the concept of the subject — as, Man is a vertebrate. A synthetic judgment makes a positive addition to knowledge concerning the subject — as, Man is immortal. *A priori* means apart from experience, on grounds of reason rather than of empirical fact. The answer to the question, How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? is negative; mental activities which are synthetic — enlarge the bounds of knowledge — are trustworthy only when regulated by experience. These principles determine, evidently enough, the question as to whether the speculative reason can demonstrate the existence of God, as was held by the popular theology and philosophy of the time. It is only possible to use the pure reason in proving God's existence if the

proposition, God exists, can be shown to be an analytic proposition. This is the assumption of the ontological argument, which is discussed pp. 476–483 [1] — the assumption being that the concept of God, as the most real or perfect being, includes his necessary objective existence. Kant replies that if it is assumed (which is the question at issue) that the concept of God includes objective existence, then of course the proposition, God exists, is objectively valid and "you have apparently won the game — but in fact have said nothing; for you have stated an empty tautology." [2] "Every reasonable person must admit that every proposition asserting existence is synthetic;" [3] very true, for the mental concept of a centaur does not guarantee that a centaur actually exists in nature. The cosmological and physico-teleological arguments are no more satisfactory. "Should the empirically valid law of causality lead to the original being, this being must belong, with the rest, in the chain of the objects of experience; but in that case it would itself be again conditioned, as are all phenomena." [4] The result of the Critique of Pure Reason is that the transcendental ideas of pure reason — the soul, the world,

[1] Kirchman's Edition, 1868. [2] Ibid. p. 479. [3] Ibid. p. 480. [4] Ibid. p. 507.

and God — can be held only as regulative, not as constitutive principles. We must not assume a higher sort of knowledge based on reason as superior to experience, and from this supposed higher standpoint construct the world of real things by deductive reasoning; we should rather study the given facts of experience, in humble consciousness of the limitations of our powers, and employ the ideas of pure reason merely to give theoretical unity to our thought. The result is in accord with the inductive tendency of modern times. Kant called himself the Copernicus of philosophy, teaching men that their mental world was not the center of the universe, but was only a part of a mighty system which must be studied as it really is, if we would know a valid truth.

If the outcome of the Pure Reason is not flattering to human vanity, the worth of human nature finds a higher estimate in the Practical Reason (1788). Freedom of will, untenable from the standpoint of pure reason, is here assumed as the condition of fulfilling the moral law, to which all are consciously obligated. Hence God must be assumed as the law-giver and judge, and immortality as affording a future state where the

inequalities of the present life may be readjusted according to individual desert. These three ideas of the practical reason are assumed not on theoretical but moral grounds — because they satisfy "a legitimate need to assume something without which that cannot be realized which man feels himself unavoidably obligated to regard as the object of his activity." [1] The fundamental law of the Practical Reason is: "So act that the maxim of your will at every moment could at the same time serve as the principle of a general moral law." [2] Kant is most rigorous in demanding obedience to the moral law. Expediency must never be considered, whether self-interest or the interest of others, when conflicting with the categorical imperative. The law of truth must be observed even when dealing with villains who intend robbery and murder. Religion "is the recognition of all duties as divine commands." [3]

These are in brief the principles of Kant's "epoch-making" philosophy. If accepted, whether in philosophy or in theology, the effect is revolutionary. "Kant cut away the base from both the supernaturalists and the rationalists; for what the former claimed to know from the Bible,

[1] Pract. Vernunft, Kirchman, p. 3. [2] Ibid. p. 35. [3] Ibid. p. 155.

and the latter from reason, could not be known by any means." [1]

It is commonly held that the Pure Reason, which gives us only knowledge of appearances, issues in skepticism, and that the Practical Reason, with its ideas which are confessedly not valid as knowledge, issues in illusion. Kant would probably deny both inferences, holding the theoretical knowledge to be real, and that we have a moral certainty as to the practical ideas which furnishes a sufficient guide and support in conduct. The result of his procedure, however, is to discredit still more the practical ideas, — at least of God and immortality, — for he develops a religious system which is simple morality. As the rationalist said that a revealed religion was unnecessary, for he could demonstrate a better one on grounds of reason, so Kant now says that both revealed and natural religion are unnecessary, for morality is sufficient. Kant may have felt that if morality was to fill satisfactorily the large place previously occupied in human life by religion, there ought to be a good deal of it; at all events, his ethical system is almost unequaled in the history of thought for the severity of its principles. This

[1] Russell, Lectures on "The Ground of Christian Faith."

tendency to the apotheosis of morality found its consummation in Fichte, to whom God was merely the objectivized moral law. Since the world has, as the result of these speculations, become accustomed to dispense with religion, the idea has naturally enough occurred to many that less morality and a milder type of it would answer every necessary purpose.

Kant's philosophy of religion is set forth in his "Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason" (1792). The keynote of the work is sounded in the opening sentence of the introduction of the first edition in 1793. "Morality, so far as it is grounded upon the concept of man as a free being, free, but just on that account subjecting himself by his reason to unconditional laws, needs neither the idea of another being over him in order that he may know his duty, nor does morality need a motive, other than that of the law itself, in order that man may observe it. . . . Morality does not consequently need religion at all, but by means of the practical reason is sufficient for itself."

The first section of the book expounds Kant's doctrine of original sin. He proceeds to show, in what seems at first sight a very orthodox fashion,

that "man is by nature evil." It soon appears, however, that Kant's original sin deviates widely from the traditional church dogma — a fact which is true of practically all the religious doctrines as Kant discusses them. "If we say, man is by nature good, or he is by nature evil, this means only that he contains a first ground (beyond the reach of our investigation) of the assumption of good or evil maxims; and this is true of him in general as man, so that in this fact he gives expression to the character of his race."[1] Kant's doctrine of original sin is rather nebulous, as evil is in some sense innate, and yet the individual is responsible for it. His interest in the matter, however, is evidently to show that man is always the responsible subject of the moral law; although he has a natural tendency to evil he cannot weakly excuse his immoral conduct on this ground, but always has a clearly marked moral character for which he is responsible. He refutes the doctrine of the "Indifferents," that man is partly good and partly evil; a man's character is never morally indifferent, for if he has chosen the moral law as the maxim of his conduct, he is good, and if he has not, he is evil.[2]

[1] Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason, p. 21. [2] pp. 23, 25.

How is it possible for a bad man to become good? This must be possible, for the moral law commands it. "If he changes the highest ground of his maxim by a single invincible resolution, he is so far, as respects principle and purpose, a subject receptive for the good; but is a good man only as he continues to work and develop. This is for him who beholds the heart — God — the same as to be actually a good man."[1] Here is Kant's doctrine of justification.

The doctrine of justification is discussed at length in the second section of the work. It is represented that we are saved "through faith in the Son of God"; but the terms here again have a new meaning — or rather essentially the old meaning we have encountered in the natural religion of the Aufklärung. "That which alone can make a world the object of a divine decree and the end of creation is *humanity* (the rational creation in general) in its moral perfection. This man, alone well-pleasing to God, 'is in him from eternity'; the idea of the same proceeds from His essence; he is in so far no created thing, but his only begotten Son; 'the Word (the Becoming!) through which all things are made.'"[2] The "Son

[1] Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason, p. 54. [2] p. 68.

of God" is therefore simply the ideal of a morally perfect humanity — here apparently identified with Jesus. Saving "faith," in Kant's system, is not the belief that Jesus "bare our sins in his own body on the tree," but rather the conviction that, had we been crucified on Calvary, we would have borne the shame and suffering as patiently and triumphantly as Jesus did. "In practical faith in the Son of God a man may hope to become well pleasing to God; that is, he who is conscious that he can believe and confidently trust that under like temptations and sufferings he would himself remain invincibly faithful to the ideal of humanity and imitate Christ's example in true devotion — such a man, and he alone, is warranted to regard himself as a not unworthy object of the divine favor."[1] It is to be feared that Luther would have found here a strong flavor of the Romish doctrine of salvation by works.

The supernatural occurrences recorded in the Scriptures, as Adam's fall and the incarnation, are to be interpreted in an ideal, spiritual sense. "The attempt to find in Scripture that sense which is in harmony with the holiest that the reason teaches must be regarded not only as per-

[1] Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason, p. 69.

missible but rather as a duty."[1] "The moral philosophers among the Greeks and Romans did the same with their mythological doctrines of the gods."[2] For a truly moral religion miracles are superfluous; "for it betrays a punishable grade of moral unbelief if one does not regard the mandates of duty, as they were originally written by reason in the heart of man, of sufficient authority, unless they are substantiated by miracles; 'except ye see signs and wonders ye will not believe.'"[3] Here again we observe the close relationship of Kant's religion of morality to the natural religion of the time; "the mandates of duty were originally written by reason in the heart." This passage also reminds one of Lessing, with his fiery invective against Pastor Götze, who clung to the letter and would not believe, except he saw signs and wonders. Kant follows the example of the preceding rationalists also in showing first that miracles are superfluous, and then that they are impossible. The ground of the denial of miracles is the scientific assumption of the uniformity of nature. "Miracles must be assumed as occurring daily or never; and in the last case we must not employ them as grounds of

[1] Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason, p. 98. [2] p. 131. [3] p. 98.

explanation or as rules of conduct; and as the first assumption is contrary to reason, it remains only to assume the last maxim." [1]

Kant discourses in an edifying way of the Kingdom of God and the Church. The servants of the moral law constitute a "people of God." [2] "The true (visible) Church is that which represents the (moral) kingdom of God on earth so far as this is possible through men." [3] On page 121 we have a pleasing figure of the Church life — but one which suggests again the reason religion of Reimarus. "The Church could best be compared to a household, under a common though invisible Father, in so far as his holy Son, who knows his will and also stands in blood relationship to all its members, occupies the place of the Father in the family, so that he makes the Father's will more distinctly known to the members, and therefore they honor the Father in the Son, and so enter among themselves into a voluntary, universal, and permanent union." The kingdom will come when men cease to hope for forgiveness of sins and moral perfection through the magical influence of some supernatural Saviour, and proceed resolutely to work out their own salvation

[1] Religion, etc., p. 104, note. [2] p. 117. [3] p. 119.

according to the principles of the religion of reason. The Church faith is to be gradually transformed into this rational religion. "Religion will be gradually freed from all empirical motives, from all statutes which rest upon history, and which, by means of a churchly belief, have provisionally united men for the furtherance of the good; and so the pure religion of reason will at last rule over all, 'that God may be all in all.'"[1]

There is no place in Kant's Church for prayer and the orthodox means of grace. "Prayer, as an inner, formal service of God, and therefore conceived as a means of grace, is superstitious illusion (fetishism); for it is merely a wish, expressed to a being who knows our thoughts, through which nothing is accomplished and consequently none of the duties are discharged which rest upon us as divine commands."[2] An earnest wish to be well-pleasing to God is the "spirit of prayer"; but its verbal expression is of little value, and all do not feel the need of it. Prayer is properly communing with one's self instead of with God, and can at best result in the resolute purpose to be faithful to moral duty; which is the only worthy consideration involved.

[1] Religion, etc., p. 144. [2] p. 234.

With Kant, prayer may not be "the brave man's hope," but it is certainly not "the coward's excuse." The orthodox sacraments are of doubtful value for the same reason; we are in danger of slackening the intensity of our own moral resolution if we place any reliance on means of grace which are more or less magical in their nature.

CHAPTER VI.

HEGEL (1770–1831).

I PASS now to consider Hegel's philosophy of religion. The religious philosophies of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher are of essential importance for the succeeding theological development.

DOCTRINE OF GOD.

Hegel's God is Aristotle's Prime Mover (who is pure thought, thought of himself as thought) supplemented by the Christian scholastic conception that the divine thought instantly realizes itself in concrete being. In this last conception is to be found the basis for Hegel's identification of thought and being — so confusing to the average student. In discussing the "Absolute Idea" (his term for God), Hegel says: "The idea as unity of the subjective and objective idea is the concept of the idea, to which the idea as such is object; an object in which all distinctions have disappeared. This unity is therefore the absolute and complete truth, the idea thinking itself, and here (thinking itself) as

thinking, as logical idea. . . . It is the νόησις νοήσεως (thought of thought), which Aristotle has already designated as the highest form of the Idea." [1] The content of the Absolute Idea, the thought about which God thinks, is his own inner thought life. Since the divine thought instantly realizes itself in created existences, the necessary and eternal order of the divine thought is the necessary order of the development of being in the world. Logic then, the law of the development of thought, will also be the law of the development of reality. "The content (of the Absolute Idea) is the system of the logical. . . . The true content is nothing else than the whole system, the development of which we have hitherto considered." [2] This is in general Hegel's philosophical method; find the logical law of thought, and this must be the law of the development in reality. Hegel attempts to verify the principle by applying it to history, religion, philosophy, etc.; and with a considerable degree of success, though the facts are at times distorted to fit the theory. "Reason rules the world, consequently the history of the world is rational." [3] "The substance, the essence

[1] Volständige Ausgabe, Berlin, 1840, Encyclopädie, p. 408.
[2] Ency. p. 409. [3] Phil. der Geschichte, p. 12.

of spirit, is freedom "[1] — consciousness of one's self as free, over against the world and everything without. Therefore in the development of history we find first the Oriental nations, "who do not know that man, in himself, is free; but know only that one is free "[2] — the despot. The second stage appears with the Greeks and Romans, who knew "that *some* men are free." Finally, "the Germanic nations, in Christianity, came to the consciousness that man, as man, is free; that the freedom of the spirit constitutes his essential nature." In the field of religion we find (1) the religions of nature, witchcraft, etc., where man is the superstitious slave of nature; (2) Religions of Spiritual Individuality — Hebrew, Greek, Roman; (3) Christianity, the Absolute Religion, of truth and freedom.[3] The same law appears in the movement of philosophical thought: "The work of the modern age is to grasp the idea as spirit — as the idea knowing itself."[4]

As the normal movement of thought, whether human or divine, is assumed to be everywhere the same, the development of the thought-life of man will give in general the mode of operation of the

[1] Phil. der Geschichte, p. 22. [2] Ibid. p. 23. [3] Phil. of Religion.
[4] Phil. der Geschichte, p. 620, vol. iii.

divine mind, and so the order of creation and history. The unfolding mind of the child comes to consciousness of itself in relation to an external world; goes out of itself, knows objects, and then, distinguishing these from itself, turns back into itself in self-consciousness. God's relation to the world is essentially the same in Hegel's view. God's thought, going out of itself, is realized in the creation of the world; knowing the world, he turns back into himself in self-consciousness. The old theologians would object that this doctrine makes God dependent upon the world. Hegel, however, though he speaks of God "before the creation" (as Father), held the creation to be timeless, and God's relation to the world to be eternal.[1] Hegel finds here the essential significance of the Christian Trinity. God, before creation, at peace in himself, "in the motionless tranquillity of the thinking spirit,"[2] is the Father; going out in thought which actualizes itself in the world, he is the Son; knowing himself in the Son, and returning in love, reconciled, into himself, he is the Spirit. We have here a typical illustration of the bewildering admixture of psychology, philosophy, and rationalized

[1] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 181. [2] Ibid. p. 180.

theology which constitutes Hegel's Philosophy of Religion. Many of the philosophical elements are profoundly suggestive and possibly true; many of the theological elements are true, in some sense, from the traditional Christian standpoint, though Hegel gives them a new meaning without explaining or justifying the change; and the result is confidently proclaimed as the final reconciliation of philosophy and theology. The historical outcome was as might be expected, in relation to such a system of specious half-truths. It is impossible to preach it to the people as Christianity, without endless confusion of thought and a growing perception that its principles are destructive of the historic faith; and it is almost equally impossible to refute it thoroughly, because of the (at least apparent) Christian truth which is so skillfully woven into it. We are often reminded in Hegel of Kant's remark that a sense must be found in Scripture which will harmonize with reason; so that we may expect to find Hegel, even as Kant and Lessing, sternly rebuking the theologians who hold to the letter of the traditional dogma, the true spirit of which the philosopher is sent to reveal.

Hegel treats the Philosophy of Religion in three

parts: (1) The Concept (Begriff) of Religion; (2) The Positive Religions; (3) The Absolute Religion (Christianity).

"Religion, according to its universal concept, is the consciousness of the Absolute Being."[1] "In Christianity the universal and the individual spirit, the infinite and the finite, are inseparable — this religion is their absolute identity, and has this for its content."[2] From the intellectual character of Hegel's system religion must lie for him predominately in the sphere of thought — in "denkendes Gottesbewustsein"[3]; "but it is a thought," Zeller continues, "not in the form of thought, but of feeling and sensuous understanding. It is thought, for only by his thinking does man elevate himself above the brutes, and the deity can reveal himself only to the thinking spirit." Hegel does not make very clear what he conceives to be the exact relation of these different elements in religion; but as the content of philosophy and religion is said to be the same, though religion has the lower form of feeling and sensuous understanding, the plain inference is that religion must ultimately lose this distinctive

[1] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 152. [2] Ibid. ii, p. 153.
[3] Zeller, Geschichte der Deutschen Phil., p. 667.

form, and philosophy will rule alone. In his polemic against religion as feeling, Hegel came into conflict with Schleiermacher, who was a fellow professor at Berlin. Hegel finds the ground of the Church's unity in its intellectual doctrines, as opposed to the view Schleiermacher so insists upon in the "Discourses," that the ignorant are often the most devout. "Religion may take refuge, as in clear thought, so also in sensation, in feeling, — may limit itself to this, so that it gives up the truth, renounces any content of knowledge; and consequently the Holy Church no more has any unity, but dissolves into atoms. For the unity is in the doctrine, but every individual has his own feeling, his peculiar sensations."[1]

In his Philosophy of Religion we find the familiar theological terms — revelation, miracle, witness of the Spirit, good and evil, redemption, etc.; but the things signified by these old terms have undergone a transformation extremely puzzling to the common sense thinker.

What is revelation? "Religion is the spirit's knowledge of itself as spirit."[2] "Spirit is this — to manifest itself. What reveals God, except that

[1] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 286. [2] Ibid. p. 156.

he is this revelation of himself! . . . What is revealed is that he exists for the other" (in relation with the sphere of the other, the world). "This is the definition of revelation."[1] Knowledge of one's self, in one's highest (spiritual) nature, is knowledge of God. By many external influences — physical, historical, etc. — we may be led to the truth that the world is the kingdom of the Son, the sphere of otherness over against God; that God is in it and *is* it, so that nature is a veil which reveals rather than conceals God. This idea may be presented in a poetically pious form which sounds eminently edifying and Christian; and indeed it does suggest an important Christian truth. In essence, however, it is simply the pantheistic doctrine that when a man knows himself and the world he knows God.

Hegel does not explicitly deny miracles, but ignores them as not furnishing convincing evidence as to spiritual truth. "The chief standpoint of the reason in reference to the miracles is, that the spiritual cannot be proven by external means; for the spiritual is higher than the external and can be proven only through itself and in itself. This is what is called the witness of the

[1] Phil. of Religion, p. 158.

Spirit. . . . Christ himself rejects the miracles as a true criterion of the truth."[1]

What is the "witness of the Spirit" to which the pious teacher directs us when we foolishly clamor for signs and wonders? "This may be manifold. In history the noble, moral, divine, speaks to us, and *our* spirit gives witness to it. It may also be connected with insight, thought. . . . The witness of the Spirit in its highest manifestation is the method of philosophy, that the concept, purely as such without presupposition, develops the truth from itself."[2] The Scriptural doctrine of the witness of the *divine* Spirit is here unostentatiously transformed into the response of the human spirit to what appeals to it as true. Of course the highest form of the witness appears in connection with philosophy; that is, if the Hegelian system appeals to a man as the final and perfect summation of truth, he is divinely called to philosophy and to salvation.

Hegel treats of the Absolute Religion — Christianity — under three heads. (1) The kingdom of the Father, in his eternal idea; (2) the kingdom of the Son, in the form of consciousness and sensuous understanding, or the Difference; (3)

[1] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 161. [2] Ibid. pp. 161, 162.

the kingdom of the Spirit, in the form of the Church. These three are related, as I have stated above: (1) is God in the repose of his eternal being; (2) is God, as the Word, going out to create the world and knowing himself in it; and (3) is the return into himself, reconciled in love.

When Hegel speaks of the "Kingdom of the Son," it must not be supposed he means the kingdom of the historic person Jesus, although he seems willing enough to give this impression. Hegel's kingdom of the Son is the universe considered as created and set over against God. There is a point of contact here with orthodox doctrine, in that the world is held to have been created by the preëxistent Logos; we find again in Hegel, however, the extreme Greek Neo-Platonic form of this theory which we studied in Origen. Hegel has it in common with the Greek metaphysical theologians of the early Christian centuries, that the human and historical Jesus is largely lost sight of in mazy speculations as to the Logos in relation to creation and the ultimate principles of the universe. The sphere of the other, the world of sense, is in a way separated from God, and in this separation lies the possibility of evil and the consequent need of redemption.

Evil is simply estrangement from God, and redemption is the restoration of the consciousness of union with God. Therefore in discussing the sphere of the other, "the kingdom of the Son," Hegel treats of what corresponds in his system to the Christian doctrines of sin and redemption.

He discusses here the end and destiny of man. We find first the opposed propositions, much as in Kant — man is by nature good, and man is by nature evil. Man is by nature good in the sense that he is good *in possibility*, has the natural endowments which, properly used, will bring him to the knowledge of God and union with him. This is a state of innocence like Adam in Paradise; the goodness must become actual in knowledge of God and union with him. Man, on the other hand, may be said to be by nature evil, in so far as the natural state, good merely in possibility, falls so far short of the realized good; he is also evil in a more positive sense when he voluntarily remains content in this state of separation from God — when "his will is filled with the content of individuality; that is, the natural man is selfish." [1] The moral development of man consists in passing out of the state of innocence,

[1] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 212.

where he knows no evil and consequently has no confirmed character, into consciousness of ignorance of and separation from God; here ensues a state of moral conflict in which the man learns to know God as at one with him, and so returns into himself with developed knowledge and strength of character. This process is Hegel's process of "redemption." It is in essence the old truism that character can be developed only in conflict with ignorance and temptation. It resembles the traditional Christian doctrine of redemption about as much as Hegel's Trinity accords with the orthodox dogma.

What is the nature of this state of separation ("Entzweiung"), Hegel's evil? Is it a real separation, in will and moral purpose, in which the finite spirit defies the will and power of God? If so, the human spirit has a real power of self-direction — has a proper personality apart from the absolute; and Hegel's system is not pantheistic. But no, this is not Hegel's view; "he knows nothing of evil as that which ought not to be but is, as the result of man's moral choice. Freedom, with Hegel, is only the freedom involved in the whole process of becoming what one becomes."[1] As

[1] Russell, Content of Faith.

God passes out of himself in creation and then returns into himself in self-knowledge and love, so man passes from the imperfection of moral innocence into the state of separation and then back into himself with developed knowledge and character. Both processes are necessary, and the sphere of the other, the separateness, is an indispensable element in the movement; so that Hegel's evil plainly does not possess the quality which constitutes the sinfulness of sin. "In itself this evil existence is not something foreign to God. . . . The evil is the same as the good."[1] Both evil and good are necessary elements in the eternal process of development.

"There are two stages of the wishes of men; the one is, to live in undisturbed happiness, in harmony with himself and outer nature, and the beast remains in this unity, but man has passed beyond it; the other wish is the desire for eternal life."[2] Therefore the physical world can no more afford satisfaction to the spirit, struggling upward from a state of nature. "This state of contradiction has in general two forms; (1) the opposition of the evil, as such, that the man himself is evil —

[1] Phänomenologie des Geistes, pp. 584, 585.
[2] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 218.

this is the opposition in relation to God; (2) the opposition in relation to the world, that he is out of harmony with the world — this is unhappiness."[1] Can a man, by his own efforts, escape from this state of moral conflict and attain to redemption? Kant has said Yes; Hegel says No, apparently with Paul and Luther. "That the opposition in itself is removed, forms the condition, the presupposition, the possibility, that the subject can remove it as related to himself."[2] The separating influence of evil is overcome by the consciousness of union with God; if this union did not exist in fact, man could not bring it about; therefore man cannot redeem or save himself. All that man can do is to pass by spiritual development from the stage where he mistakenly regards himself as in opposition to God into the higher state where he knows that he is and always has been in essential unity with God. There is in the redemptive process no change of sentiment or relation on the part of God toward the finite subject, such as is supposed in the orthodox doctrine of justification; that there is any such change is an illusion of human ignorance. "The state of separation, the finiteness, the weakness,

[1] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 221. [2] Ibid. p. 228.

the frailty of human nature cannot destroy that unity which is the essential element of redemption;"[1] just as the world, as the sphere of otherness over against God, is at the same time the Son of God and consequently "has in itself the fullness of the divine nature."

We find in Hegel's doctrine of redemption a union of truisms and trivialities and profound and suggestive reflections, set forth in a style whose obscurity is baffling and whose lofty pretensions are misleading — characteristic qualities of Hegel's work which have made his system the philosophical enigma of modern times.

What is the relation of redemption to the historic person, Jesus? It is evident that from Hegel's philosophical standpoint an historical incarnation is unnecessary; the revelation of God as the Logos, in creation, in the development of history, and in the human soul, is a sufficient revelation for the man who has attained to the full possession of his powers of thought. But on the lower stages of human progress, the incarnation, a visible object lesson of the unity of the divine and the human, may be useful — possibly necessary — as a temporary aid for humanity in its

[1] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 231.

struggles upward; much as Lessing makes revelation the primer of the race.

What was the essence of the unique relation in which Christ stood to God? Was he one with God, metaphysically, in a sense true of no other human being, or did he merely possess a perfect consciousness of the essential unity of the divine and human which is true in relation to every man? The latter is the usual interpretation, and plainly harmonizes with the general spirit of Hegel's system.

What is the significance of Christ's death? It is not sacrificial, as producing any change in God's relation to the sinner. It is merely a manifestation, in the most extreme form, of God's love, his essential unity with humanity. "Death is the highest proof of humanity, of absolute finiteness; and Christ has died the painful death of the transgressor; humanity has been manifested in him to the farthest possible point."[1] In that Christ rose from the dead, God appeared as the "death of death"; he showed that he was Lord of death, supreme in the sphere of the "otherness."

"The explanation of redemption is that God is reconciled with the world, or has shown himself

[1] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 249.

to *have been* reconciled with the world, that the human is not foreign to him, but that this sphere of the other, finiteness, is a stage of development in himself, but of course a transient one."[1] In the universe redemption is an eternal process; otherness, evil, is constantly emerging, and as constantly being annulled in the higher unity of the good. This eternal law is illustrated in pictorial form, in the history of Jesus. He presents the eternal truth of the unity of God and man in a form comprehensible to common, unphilosophical humanity.

We saw above[2] that, in the view of Hegel, Spirit is "the idea turning back upon itself and beholding itself as soul, as society, and as God." One needs to have in mind this Hegelian conception of spirit, rather than the ordinary Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as he approaches the study of Hegel's "kingdom of the Spirit" — the Church. Christ did not rise from the dead in bodily form — he "arose in the spirit of the Christian community."[3] The Christian community became somehow convinced, as the result of Christ's life and teachings, of the essential unity of God and man. "The consciousness of the

[1] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 254. [2] p. 128 *sup.*
[3] Zeller, Geschichte der Deutschen Phil., p. 671.

church of certainty as to the union of the divine nature and the human, this it is with which the Church begins, and this constitutes the truth on which the Church is built."[1] Hegel's treatment of the subject in the Philosophy of Religion is extremely vague, but the gist of it evidently is that the Christian community is conscious of union with God and of its mission to proclaim this truth to others, and therefore the Church is "spirit" in the Hegelian sense — as the idea in the form of self-consciousness. This "spirit" has no relation to the historic Jesus, no relation to an assumed third person of the divine Trinity — at least in the sense of traditional orthodoxy; it is rather to be compared to the *esprit de corps* of a social club or an army.

What of immortality? Hegel says it is a "principal element of religion that the soul is immortal; as object of the interest of God it is elevated above the finite."[2] This immortality is a "present quality, the spirit is eternal, in its freedom is not in the sphere of the limited."[3] The ambiguity of the Hegelian doctrine of immortality is cleared up somewhat in an interesting little fragment in the posthumous works of Professor

[1] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 254. [2] Ibid. p. 219. [3] Ibid. p. 220.

T. H. Green, perhaps the most conspicuous representative of Hegelianism in England. "The immortality of the soul, as = the eternity of thought = the being of God, is the absolute first and the absolute whole. As a determination of thought, everything is eternal. What are we to say then to the extinct races of animals, the past formations of the earth? They are eternal, as stages in an eternal process. Relatively to our temporal consciousness, they have perished; relatively to the thought, which, as eternal, holds past, present, and future together, they are permanent; their very transitoriness is eternal. The living agent, man, like everything else, is eternal as a determination of thought."[1] And so the Christian doctrine of personal immortality becomes the pale abstraction that the life of man is a transient incident in universal history, but known forever in the thought of God. When we inquire if we shall know God in a future life, we are told we shall be known through eternity by the Absolute Thought as having existed at a certain point of time, soon to vanish forever, so far as conscious personal existence is concerned, in the abyss of the infinite ages.

[1] Works, 1888, vol. iii, p. 159.

Hegel says at the close of the Philosophy of Religion: "The object of these lectures was to reconcile reason with religion."[1] It is evident that the outcome is much more rational than religious, although Hegel's style of exposition has enabled many to read into it vastly more of Christian truth than it really contains. The true relation of the Hegelian philosophy of religion to traditional Christianity became apparent when the later representatives of the Hegelian school of theology, especially Strauss and Biedermann, brought out into the light of clear statement what Hegel had prudently veiled in vague insinuation and ambiguous suggestion. "In truth, what happens here, with Biedermann as with Strauss, is not as intended a liberation of the spiritual kernel from the shell of the sensuous understanding and consequently a philosophical justification of Christianity, but the last act in the dissolution and destruction of the dogma. For this spiritual form of dogma, which Biedermann wins as the result of his dogmatic labor, is not the Christian faith, but the Logos speculation in a new manifestation, and in that which is cast aside as form of the sensuous understanding lies the Christian

[1] Phil. of Religion, ii, p. 288.

portion of the dogma."[1] Heinze states as follows Augustine's view of the Greek and the Christian Logos: "He (Augustine) admits that he has found in the Platonic writings all that the prologue of the Gospel (John's) contains, except the doctrine that the Logos has become flesh. In Christianity the Logos has assumed concrete form; in the heathen philosophers the Logos was diffused generally throughout the world. Here lies the fundamental difference."[2] The unsubstantial nature of Hegel's doctrine of the incarnation removes the element which clearly distinguishes historical Christianity from the Greek speculation.

[1] Kaftan, Die Wahrheit der Christlichen Religion, p. 232.
[2] Lehre vom Logos, p. 331.

CHAPTER VII.

THE RATIONALISTS.

REGARDING rationalism as the opponent of supernaturalism and naturalism, and as an opponent which appealed in the conflict almost exclusively to either the logical understanding or the moral sense as the criterion of religious truth, it may be said to have existed in Germany for nearly a century (c. 1740–1836), and to have flourished about half that length of time (c. 1760–1810) — that is, it took its rise simultaneously with the publication of Wolff's writings (1736–1750), displayed its greatest strength in Semler's critical works (1760–1773), and in Kant's philosophy (1781–1793), began then to decline gradually under the influence of the works of Herder, Jacobi, Fichte, and Hegel, and at last died out when Schleiermacher, especially in the department of theology proper, and Baur and Strauss amongst others in the department of Biblical criticism, had given currency to ideas and issues which

rendered its main contentions objectless and its criteria of religious truth invalid." [1]

Johann Semler (1725–1791), often called the "father of German rationalism," was long at the head of the theological faculty of Halle, the center of the rationalistic movement at that time. Semler was not a clear and rigidly systematic thinker, but his work as a critic of the Scriptures and of ecclesiastical dogmas was very important as opening the way and suggesting the problems to later critical students. He was the first to reject the equal value of the Old and the New Testaments, the uniform authority of all parts of the Bible, and in general the identification of revelation with Scripture. He doubted the Pauline authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews and claimed that the authorship of Peter's epistles is uncertain. He would exclude the Apocalypse entirely from the canon. He first brought into prominence the opposition between the Jewish and the anti-Jewish parties in the early Church, which figures so prominently in Baur's critical work.

A discussion of the development of German religious thought must suggest something at least of the extremes of the later rationalists.

[1] Ency. Brit., "Rationalism," XX, p. 289.

Johann Friedrich Röhr (1777–1848) was Preacher of the Court and General Superintendent of Weimar, the most influential leader of the Church in the Grand Duchy of Saxony. His purpose was to popularize the principles of Kant's Philosophy of Religion. Reason is the last resort and supreme authority in religion, and the only end at which religion aims is morality. Christianity is acceptable to reason only because of the morality it contains and inculcates. Christology should be discarded entirely. The traditional doctrine of the person of Christ is full of legendary and speculative elements and did not originate until after the death of Jesus, who teaches a morality so pure as to be conformable to the demands of reason.

Heinrich Paulus (1761–1851) is the most widely known of the later rationalists, bringing the movement to an end with an evident *reductio ad absurdum*. Like Reimarus, he was an Orientalist, being professor at Heidelberg during the greater part of his academic career. Paulus follows Röhr in proceeding from the Kantian standpoint; he aims to reduce Christianity to morality, and Christ to an ethical ideal. In the gospel history, therefore, only that can have really occurred which is

admissible from the point of view of Kant's philosophy. The problem of the Biblical critic is to show how the supposed miraculous events may be explained as natural occurrences; and here the peculiar genius of Paulus displays itself in the invention of the most extraordinary and absurd hypotheses. The angels who appeared to the shepherds at the birth of Christ were phosphorescent appearances; Christ used natural remedies in his works of healing which the evangelists have neglected to mention; Lazarus was not dead, but had fallen into lethargy; to the disciples, waking suddenly from sleep and seeing Jesus conversing with two unknown persons during a beautiful sunset, the Saviour appeared transfigured with a superhuman glory. The kernel of truth in the error and fable of gospel history is a man of noble moral character, teaching ethical doctrines adapted to promote the highest interests of humanity.

CHAPTER VIII.

SCHLEIERMACHER.

IN Schleiermacher, religion as faith and feeling is reasserted against the unsatisfactory and barren extremes of rationalism. This tendency is good, so far as it is a return to the spiritual intuitions of pure Christianity; it contains, however, false and contradictory elements, owing to unwise concessions to the prevalent philosophy. These errors, however, may have served a temporarily useful purpose in an age so intoxicated with the idea that since Kant all things had become new. God was a pantheistic first principle; personality, and such power of voluntary change as is presupposed in the traditional views of God's creation and government of the world, were rejected as an anthropomorphic limitation of the absolute; creation and the world development is an eternal and necessary process; miracle is of course impossible; prayer can be only a communing with your higher self — the oversoul — and immortality "to be eternal in every moment."

The fact that such a system met with general acceptance in Germany, and has a wide influence even yet, is a painfully striking evidence of the deep gulf which divided the intellect and the religious feeling of the time. Men were willing to seize upon almost any means to bridge the chasm, and were ready to close their eyes to inconsistencies if only something of the traditional faith could find expression in terms apparently satisfactory to critical culture. As to Schleiermacher's work in general, Professor George P. Fisher well remarks: "It is remarkable that Schleiermacher was able to crowd so much of Christianity into this pantheistic framework."

In his first important work, "The Discourses on Religion," Schleiermacher announces his characteristic doctrine; religion lies not in the sphere of intellect or will, of thought or conduct, but essentially in that of feeling. "Your feeling, in so far as it expresses the common being and life of yourself and of the All, in so far as you hold its particular elements as an activity of God in you, mediated by the operation of the world upon you, this is your piety. . . . These are exclusively the elements of religion; there is no feeling which is not religious, unless it indicate a diseased,

abnormal condition of life."[1] In speaking of Friedrich Schlegel above, I remarked that Schleiermacher was deeply influenced by the romantic school at the time of the composition of his "Discourses." We find an evidence of this influence, no doubt, in his assertion that all normal feeling is religious. It is an expression of the extreme of the reactionary swing from the asceticism of the medieval church. Commenting on this statement in the explanatory notes added to the Discourses in 1821, Schleiermacher says: "I wish to take back nothing from the universality of the assertion, and desire by no means to have it understood as a rhetorical exaggeration. It is clear that Protestantism can consistently assert, as a general principle, the admissibility of marriage for the clergy as opposed to the injurious superstition of the peculiar sacredness of the celibate life, only if it assumes and proves that marital love and all the accompanying intimacies of the sexes are not necessarily destructive of the religious disposition of mind."[2]

The proposition, however, that all normal feeling is religious is evidently in need of further definition. Feeling is a mental form which may

[1] Reden, p. 40. I quote the Berlin edition of 1878. [2] p. 93.

be filled with any content, from the lowest to the highest. It was Hegel's sarcastic comment on the religion of feeling that, on this theory, a dog is more religious than a man, for his mental life is feeling alone, unregulated by rational thought. However Schleiermacher may assert as above, that he still holds the opinion that all feeling is religious, yet we find, in fact, in his later writings, an effort to distinguish certain feelings as peculiar to religion. "The common mark of all otherwise differing expressions of religion, through which they distinguish themselves from all other feelings, and consequently the essence of religion, is this: that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent, or, what expresses the same thing, as in relation with God."[1] It is well for one who has been puzzled by the German term "God-consciousness," to note the closing words of this quotation. The consciousness of absolute dependence is to Schleiermacher the same as the consciousness of relationship to God. As the Hegelian regards God as thought, and it is never very clear whether this thought is human or divine, so that the philosopher can discourse in a pious way of "seeing all things in God," of

[1] Der Christliche Glaube, § 4, p. 14.

knowing God in the simplest act of knowledge; so the disciple of Schleiermacher, placing the essence of religion in the feeling of dependence, claims that in this subjective feeling of dependence we immediately know God. The pantheistic philosophy of religion, which prevailed in Germany in the early part of the century, obliterates the common distinctions of the divine and the human, and makes clear thought and intelligible language on these points well-nigh impossible. It is well for plain people to remember this fact when they find difficulty in getting a clear notion as to the "God-consciousness" of our German neighbors.

It is evident that, if religion is in feeling alone, the distinction of true and false does not apply to it. Schleiermacher admits this, and asserts that all religion is equally true; it differs only in being a more or less noble and complete expression of man's moral and spiritual nature.

I quote some passages from the Second Discourse, on miracle, revelation, etc.

"What is miracle? What we call miracle is everywhere called sign, indication. Every finite thing, however, is a sign of the Infinite. Miracle is simply the religious name for event. To me

all is miracle. The more religious you are, the more miracle will you see everywhere.

"What is revelation? Every original and new communication of the Universe to man is a revelation. Every intuition and every original feeling proceeds from revelation.

"What is prophecy? Every religious anticipation of the other half of a religious event, one half being given, is prophecy."

Schleiermacher's conception of God is suggested in the following: "The rejection of the idea of a personal deity does not decide against the presence of deity in a man's feeling. The ground of such a rejection might be a humble consciousness of the limitation of personal existence, in general, and particularly of consciousness joined to personality. . . . Whoever insists that the essence of piety consists in confessing that the Highest Being thinks as a person and wills outside the world, cannot have had a wide view in the sphere of piety." Zeller declares that Schleiermacher was, not unjustly, accused of a Spinozistic pantheism. "God and the world are, according to Schleiermacher, only different expressions of equivalent value. God is not an almighty will outside and above the world, who produces effects

in it as he desires; he is only the infinite essence of the world itself. In regard to the personality of God, Schleiermacher clearly controverted the fundamental assumption of ordinary theism. He did not believe in a creation of the world in time, he did not believe that the divine will interrupts the order of nature by miracle, or that the human will elevates itself through its freedom above the law of natural necessity."[1]

Immortality is discussed at the close of the Second Discourse. A self-conscious, personal existence beyond the grave, out of relations to space and time, is inconceivable; and were it thinkable, it is selfish for a man to aspire to it. It is this type of thought which Lotze has well characterized as "that Quixotism of pure reason which regards its efforts as almost disgraced if the kingdom of heaven and eternal blessedness were offered as their reward."[2] The test of a pious disposition is the willingness to be absorbed into "the One and the All" — to lose conscious identity, if this be the will of the Eternal — much as the test of genuine conversion among our Puritan forefathers was the willingness to be damned for

[1] Zeller, Vorträge, vol. i, p. 204.
[2] Microcosmus, vol. ii, p. 472.

the glory of God. "If our feeling nowhere attaches itself to the individual, but if its content is our relation to God wherein all that is individual and transitory disappears, there can be nothing fleeting in it, but all must be eternal. In the religious life, then, we may well say that we have already offered up and disposed of all that is mortal, and that we are actually enjoying immortality. But the immortality that most men imagine, and their longing for it, seem to me quite opposed to the spirit of piety. . . . Would they but attempt to surrender their lives from love to God! Would they but strive to annihilate their personality and to live in the One and in the All! Only the man who, denying himself, sinks himself in as much of the whole universe as he can attain, in whose soul a greater and holier longing has arisen, has a right to the hopes that death gives. . . . In the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite, and in every moment to be eternal, is the immortality of religion." [1]

Schleiermacher denies that he repudiates the Christian doctrine of immortality. Zeller's judgment, however, is doubtless correct where he says: "Schleiermacher knew, as philosopher, no

[1] Reden, pp. 100, 101.

continued existence of the individual after death, and at the loss of his dearest friend he could only say to the sorrowing widow (later his wife), that there is no destruction for the spirit, but that the personal life is not the essence of the spirit, it is only an outward presentment thereof." [1]

Schleiermacher's great theological work is "The Christian Faith according to the Principles of the Protestant Church" (1821). It is the fruit of the study and reflection of his best years. Its leading principle is the application of his conception of religion as feeling to the traditional doctrines of the Church.

Schleiermacher abandons completely the traditional method of prefacing the treatment of the specifically Christian doctrines by a natural theology — the attempt to form a basis for the revealed truths by proving, so far as possible on rational grounds, the existence of God, inspiration of the Scriptures, etc. Rationalism had abused natural theology, beginning with the attempt to prove, and ending by practically denying all Christian doctrine. Schleiermacher therefore will allow the reason no authority in religious matters, using as

[1] Zeller, Vorträge, vol. i, p. 204. The letter of Schleiermacher to Frau von Willich in Life of Schleiermacher, trans. by F. Rowan, vol. ii, p. 80.

the test of Christian truth simply the normal expression of Christian consciousness. Each has a half-truth, and the reconciliation of the two positions is in essence the fundamental problem of theology; it is difficult to say which position, emphasized to the exclusion of the other, is the more dangerous error. In preaching to the unconverted, or to those ignorant of Christianity, the natural pedagogical method is to lead them from some known truth to the Christian thought. This is Paul's method on Mars' Hill. His sermon, as we have it, is all natural theology excepting the last verse; and here, where Christ is first mentioned, a rational and historic proof is stated that Christ is the ordained judge — that is, God has raised him from the dead. At this point, it is to be observed, the discourse was interrupted by the scoffs of the auditors; so that, had Paul proceeded on Schleiermacher's method, he could have obtained no hearing at all. The point which Schleiermacher emphasizes — necessary to the proper control of the rationalizing tendency — is that Christian truth must be "spiritually discerned"; that it can be appreciatively known only in personal experience; he that doeth the will shall know of the doctrine. The fatal defect

of this position, when totally separated from natural theology and apologetics, is that it becomes completely subjective — it hangs in the air, with no basis in objective and universally valid fact. It is this subjective feature which makes Schleiermacher's system so incomprehensible to the common sense thinker. Why is Christ sinless? Why is he divine, so far as we consider him so? Because I find him such in my Christian experience. Schleiermacher's position shows the influence not only of the philosophical and critical conditions of the time but also of the German ecclesiastical system. In a country where the children are all baptized in infancy and confirmed a dozen years later, the efforts of the Christian teacher are directed not so much to the conversion of the ungodly, as to the defense of existing faith from the attacks of anti-Christian unbelief.

For Schleiermacher, then, the problem of theology is simply the analysis of the content of Christian experience. "Christian articles of faith are the conceptions of the religious states of the Christian mind, expressed in language." [1] Objective facts and relations, such as the creation of the world, are approached from this subjective

[1] Christ. Glaube, § 15.

standpoint. The section which treats of creation has the general heading, "Description of our religious self-consciousness, so far as the relation between God and the world expresses itself therein."[1] It follows from the feeling of absolute dependence on God that the world was created, and is sustained, by God; farther than this — the when and the how — Christian consciousness does not inform us, and we need not inquire. This method of treatment is thoroughly characteristic of Schleiermacher and should be carefully noted, as it suggests what are for him, in every case, the criterion and the limits of Christian truth. Who and what is Jesus Christ? He is the revealer of God, the Saviour. Why? Christian consciousness declares it. How does Christ reveal God and save men? Christian consciousness has no answer to these questions, and it is unnecessary to raise them. If you go farther, as most plain people will wish to do, and inquire on what grounds Christian consciousness lays claim to infallible authority, you cease to be a Christian, and Schleiermacher has nothing more to say to you.

Instead of beginning with a natural theology,

[1] Christ. Glaube, § 36.

the starting point for Schleiermacher is the experience of the Christian as a member of the existing Christian community, the Church. As a member of this community, the Christian is conscious of salvation from sin and of union and peace with God; this consciousness cannot flow from the Church itself, for it is composed only of erring and sinful persons; therefore, this religious consciousness finds its source in the founder of the community — Jesus of Nazareth. Theology, as I have said, is for Schleiermacher the systematic exhibition of the content of Christian consciousness. Sin is defined as that which hinders the development of the God-consciousness in the soul. Redemption is the influence of the Redeemer, working through the Church, which brings the believer into conscious unity and harmony with God.

In treating of the person of Christ, Schleiermacher begins by establishing the sinlessness and moral perfection of the Saviour. He does not, of course, appeal to an inspired Scripture or to Christ's miraculous power, but rests merely on internal grounds. In connection with the Christian community, the believer finds himself brought into consciousness of God and drawn toward

moral perfection. Whence comes this perfect moral influence? Not from the imperfect members of the community, but from its founder, who is therefore sinless. This does not appear a very substantial basis for a religious system; and it surely has its weaknesses; but we should not fail to recognize its strength — the powerful appeal to personal experience as the test of religious truth, "He that doeth the will shall know of the doctrine." The question here, as Strauss properly insisted later, is whether the Christian community might not have developed an ideal of moral perfection, from the humanly imperfect Jesus. As to the deity of Christ, it consists not in a supposed miraculous birth, or metaphysical oneness with God, but in the unique perfection of his God-consciousness. Any man whose personality is constantly determined by the God-consciousness is divine. This has been true, however, only of Jesus.

Christ's redeeming work is that he imparts to the believer a measure of his own God-consciousness. In accomplishing this, the Church is the medium of the Saviour's activity, standing in essentially the same relation to the believer as Christ, while in the flesh, to his disciples. The

doctrine of the Trinity is abandoned, and the Holy Spirit becomes merely the generic spirit or collective influence of the Christian community. "Under the expression Holy Ghost is understood the living unity of the Christian community as a moral person." [1]

Christ did not do anything, as a sacrifice or substitute for sinners, to make possible the forgiveness of sin. His sufferings and death were not necessary elements in his reconciling work. Christ's perfect example, affecting the believer through the moral influence of the Church, makes the believer ideally righteous, and he is so considered by the judge, — essentially as with Kant.

It is claimed as a great excellence of Schleiermacher's Christology, as contrasted with Kant's and Hegel's, that he preserves a direct relation to the historic Jesus. In the concluding dissertation of his Life of Jesus,[2] Strauss subjects Schleiermacher's view of the person of Christ to a penetrating criticism. Strauss holds that Schleiermacher's doctrine satisfies neither science nor the faith of the Church, and instead of presenting a genuinely historical Christ, issues logically in the

[1] Christ. Glaube, § 116, vol. ii, p. 231.
[2] Marion Evans' trans., vol. ii, pp. 884–887.

ideal view of Christ's person advocated by Strauss himself. Schleiermacher's Christology is unsatisfactory to science, in Strauss' opinion, for the assumption of such a unique God-consciousness as Schleiermacher attributes to Christ "involves the violation of the laws of nature by a miracle." It is unsatisfactory to the Church, for it abandons certain elements considered essential to Christian faith, as the resurrection and ascension. It is not necessary therefore for Schleiermacher to assume that the historic Jesus was a miracle of sinless perfection, but merely that the Church has idealized its founder. "We may now estimate the truth of the reproach which made Schleiermacher so indignant; namely, that his was not an historical, but an ideal Christ. The reproach is just in relation to the consequences of Schleiermacher's system, since to effect what Schleiermacher makes him effect no other Christ is necessary, and according to the principles of Schleiermacher respecting the relation of God to the world, of the supernatural to the natural, no other Christ is possible than an ideal one."

I have criticized Schleiermacher's general position as too subjective, and yet it is not subjective enough to accomplish his main purpose — to

reconcile science and Christianity. The principle of his reconciliation is the specious but impossible one of totally separating the scientific or philosophical sphere from the religious. This principle has been made familiar to us by Herbert Spencer. Spencer would limit the religious to the unknowable background of knowable phenomena; Schleiermacher to the subjective states of the devout consciousness. Neither attempt can succeed, for in each case the spheres of faith and knowledge overlap. Religion refuses to be relegated to the unknowable, to be reduced to "a x" power of mystery"; but persists in making some positive assertions about the known world, and in exerting a real influence in it. And it is just as impossible for a man to keep his religion — if he has any worthy of the name — cooped up within his own head; for it must assume some positive knowledge of, and must hold some real relation to, the historical and existing facts of the external world. Strauss is plainly right when he says of Schleiermacher's position: "If not by reason of their source, yet by reason of their content and expression, the theological propositions belong to the province of knowledge, so far as they assert facts, historical, psychological, and the like; and

here the demand of course appears that they contradict neither the formal nor the material laws of knowledge, that they involve us in no difficulty with science. . . . The conflict between philosophy and religion, therefore, in this situation returns anew." [1]

As I have remarked before of Augustine, however, it would be unjust to one of the noblest personalities in Christian history to estimate Schleiermacher entirely from this brief sketch and criticism. This can be fairly done, and one can comprehend his extraordinary influence in the German Church, only as he studies Schleiermacher's writings and yields to the sway of his lofty eloquence and spiritual intensity. His errors of theological theory belong to the infirmities of human intelligence; his deep sense of a divine call to preach a comforting and inspiring faith to his doubting age, and his stedfast and ardent devotion in this work, were doubtless the gift of the Spirit of Christ. "Divinely swayed by an irresistible necessity within me, I feel myself compelled to speak. . . . Nor is it done from any caprice or accident. Rather it is the pure necessity of my nature; it is a divine call; it is what

[1] Glaubenslehre, Einleitung, §2.

determines my position in the world and makes me what I am. . . . Acknowledge, then, with me what a priceless gift the appearance of such a person must be, when the higher feeling has risen to inspiration, and can no longer be kept silent; when every pulse-beat of his spiritual life takes communicable form in word or figure. . . . This is the true priest of the highest. The heavenly and eternal he exhibits as an object of enjoyment and agreement, as the sole exhaustless source of the things towards which the whole endeavor of common humanity is directed. In this way he strives to awaken the slumbering germ of a better humanity, to kindle love for higher things, to change the common life into a nobler, to reconcile the children of earth with the heaven that bears them, and to counterbalance the deep attachment of the age to the baser side. This is the higher priesthood that announces the inner meaning of all spiritual secrets, and speaks from the kingdom of God."[1]

[1] First Discourse.

CHAPTER IX.

THE HEGELIAN SCHOOL.

I HAVE said above that Hegel's theory of the development of history gave the controlling impulse to the Tübingen school of criticism. The prominent men in this school were Friedrich Christian Baur and David Strauss — the former by reason of his important conclusions as to the origin of the New Testament and the development of early church history, the latter because of his "Life of Jesus," a summary of the results of previous criticism which produced an extraordinary sensation.

Baur's general position is the Hegelian assumption that a miraculous revelation is impossible and unnecessary; the problem of the critic therefore is to account on rational grounds for the rise of Christianity. "Any faith in supernatural religion, with which he began his labors as a professor, ere long disappeared, and the great aim of all his studies and researches was to find the natural factors or principles out of which Christianity

arose in the world."[1] Proceeding from his primary assumption of the antagonism between the Petrine and Pauline parties, or between Jewish and Gentile Christianity, Baur arrived at the conclusion that the only genuine historical foundation of Christianity is to be found in the four epistles of Paul — I and II Corinthians, Galatians, and Romans. Our present gospels are of later origin, based upon oral tradition and upon earlier writings now lost.

It is not necessary to dwell at any length upon Strauss' Life of Jesus, as all the world is familiar with its totally destructive result. The principle of Strauss' historic criticism is expressed with naïve frankness in the preface to his "New Life of Jesus" (1864). "He to whom the conceptions, patronized by the Church and by the prevalent theology, as to the supernatural character and concatenation of the circumstances of the life of Jesus, have become intolerable, will find his best means of effectual release in historical inquiry. For having adopted the fundamental conviction that everything that happens, or ever happened, happened naturally — that even the most distinguished of men was still man, and that conse-

[1] Ency. Brit., III, p. 448.

quently the supernatural coloring in the accounts of early Christianity must be adventitious and unreal, he is induced to expect that the more exactly he can trace the true course of events, the more their natural character will appear."[1] Whatever may be the final result of the endless discussions of the critics as to the authorship of the New Testament writings (it is Strauss' opinion that German criticism is going to seed), he holds that this much at least is made out; "that in the person and acts of Jesus no supernaturalism shall be suffered to remain."[2]

The Hegelian school of criticism, however, has abandoned the crude conceptions of deism and rationalism as to the origin of religious ideas and institutions. Instead of tracing religion to the trickery of priests or the policy of political rulers, the Hegelian, to whom history is the progressive revelation or incarnation of the divine Idea, regards every religious phenomenon or conception as a manifestation of the Absolute Spirit, true and useful for the age and people when and where it appears. For the same reason, however, — its temporary and local truth and value, — this conception must be outgrown, and the advancing

[1] New Life of Jesus, Preface, p. x. [2] Ibid., Preface, p. xii.

race must develop and serve increasingly higher ideals. The central thought of Strauss' Life of Jesus is here suggested. A divine revelation, attested by miracles and imaged in a single historic person, was true and useful for the religious thought of the unenlightened past; but since science has destroyed miracle and Hegel has found spirit in all things material, religious aspiration is no longer content with the material form and circumscribed nature of the former revelation. The demand now is for a race-ideal — a synthetic inference from the best thought and noblest achievement of humanity. God is to become incarnate in the race, instead of in a single individual. "When it is said of God that he is a Spirit, and of man that he also is a Spirit, it follows that the two are not essentially distinct. . . . The Infinite Spirit is real only when it discloses itself in finite spirits; as the finite spirit is true only when it merges itself in the Infinite. . . . The true and real existence of Spirit, therefore, is in the God-man; in the interchange and withdrawal between the two, which on the part of God is revelation, and on the part of man religion. . . . This God-man uniting in a single being the divine essence and the human personality, it may be said

of him that he has the Divine Spirit for a father and a woman for his mother. Having the will to exist only for God, and not at all for self, he is sinless and perfect. . . . The God-man is taken by death out of the sight of his cotemporaries; he enters into their imagination and memory; the unity of the divine and human in him becomes part of the general consciousness. If reality is ascribed to the unity of the divine and human natures, is this equivalent to the admission that this unity must actually have been once manifested in one individual? This is indeed not the mode in which Idea realizes itself; it is not wont to express itself perfectly in one individual and imperfectly in all the rest. Is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures a real one in a far higher sense, when I regard the whole race of mankind as its realization, than when I single out one man as such a realization? is not an incarnation of God from eternity a truer one than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time?"[1]

I will refer to Strauss' Glaubenslehre (1840) only to call attention to his interpretation of Schleiermacher's doctrine of immortality. In the

[1] Life of Jesus, Evans' trans., vol. ii, pp. 892–895.

closing pages of the work Strauss suggests the conclusion that immortality can be predicated of the race only; the individual can live after death only in the admiring and grateful memory of posterity. "If the question is raised what result we reach of a positive nature over against these negations, all depends upon what Hegel suggests; that immortality be conceived not primarily as something future, but as a present quality of the spirit, as its inner universality, its power to elevate itself above everything finite to the Idea. . . . The saying of Schleiermacher, 'In the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite, and to be eternal in every moment,' is all that modern science is able to say concerning immortality."[1]

In Strauss' last important work, "The Old Faith and the New" (1872), it is plain that he has discovered the hollow and illusory nature of Hegelian Christianity, and he is ready frankly to admit that "we are not Christians." His discussion of immortality, which will indicate his negative result in general, shows that the above admission is very well grounded. "Perhaps the longest dissertation will be expected of me concerning the compensation which our conception of the

[1] Glaubenslehre, vol. ii, pp. 737, 738.

universe may offer in place of the Christian belief in immortality, but a brief remark must suffice here. He who cannot help himself in this matter is beyond help, is not yet ripe for our standpoint. He who on the one hand is not satisfied in being able to revive within himself the eternal ideas of the Cosmos, of the progress and destinies of mankind; who cannot, within his own heart, render the dead he loved and worshiped immortal in the truest sense; who, amid his exertions on behalf of his family, his labors in his calling, his coöperation with others in promoting the prosperity of his country as well as the general welfare of his fellow citizens, his enjoyment of the beautiful in art and nature, — who, amid all this, does not become conscious that he himself is only called to participate in it for a span of time, who cannot finally prevail upon himself to depart from this life in gratitude for all that has been given him, — well, him we must remit to Moses and the prophets, who themselves knew nothing of immortality, and yet were Moses and the prophets still." [1]

The general conclusion of Strauss in this work, logically sound from his premises, is that for future generations science and literature must hold

[1] The Old Faith and the New, Holt's trans., N. Y., 1873, p. 214.

the place which religion has occupied in the past. We find Strauss at last, therefore, in substantial agreement with our own Colonel Ingersoll, who would provide a young man with a physiology and a copy of Shakespeare as a sufficient religious equipment for the battle of life.

Of the later Hegelians, Alois E. Biedermann, who was professor in Zürich, is considered one of the strongest men. He is true to Hegel in asserting that ultimate being can be apprehended in thought, and that in the Christian life the Absolute Spirit in a sense realizes his own nature, so that in all religious experiences the Absolute Spirit is the efficient ground. Biedermann endeavors, however, to depart from Hegel in asserting of the finite spirit a certain self-subsistence which shall give reality to sin and conversion; thus introducing a contradictory element which must make his conclusion either ambiguous or illogical.

An important influence in current thought is the modified Hegelianism connected in England with the name of the late Professor T. H. Green, of Oxford — represented in its general theory by Professor Otto Pfleiderer, of Berlin, and Professor Josiah Royce, of Harvard University. From Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception"

has been developed an all-embracing World-Consciousness, in which the finite mind knows the external object, and the knowledge of which is religion. Finite beings and things are thoughts of the Infinite Consciousness, and the history of the universe is the progressive unfolding of the Absolute Thought. The transcendental unity of apperception has thus been made the source of all truth and life; it is the Hegelian God, deified and enthroned, and universal humanity is summoned to bow and worship. What is Kant's transcendental unity of apperception? It is simply the unity of the finite consciousness — the sense of oneness, selfhood, which abides through all changing mental states,[1] and makes possible the union of subject and object in the act of knowledge. One of the most extraordinary achievements of Kant's idealistic successors was to take this unpretentious principle of our inner life, disguise it in the garb of an unintelligible terminology, quote Scripture about it, and so metamorphose it into the Divine Being. The result is that we "see all things in God," "in the transcendental unity of apperception we live and move and have our being." This theory has manifest advantages

[1] See Seth, Hegelianism and Personality.

in dealing with ultimate philosophical and religious questions.[1] God here has two or three distinct meanings, and the philosopher can use the one which suits his convenience; so that there is little difficulty in refuting the common sense objector, or reducing him to speechless astonishment. God may mean (1) the unity of the finite consciousness; (2) the general principle of unity in the universe [(1) and (2) may fall together for the pantheistic idealist]; (3) the popular notion of Christian theism. It is very easy on this theory to prove the existence of God. Do you know the book or the table before you [in the unity of your inner consciousness (1)]? Then you know God [which means (3) to the hearer], for he is the principle of unity in this knowledge.

It is well to note that Professor Green, who developed this type of thought in England, is the Professor Gray of Mrs. Ward's novel, Robert Elsmere. When Elsmere has lost his faith in traditional Christianity, he goes to Gray for consolation; and Gray calls his thought, in orthodox Hegelian fashion, from the material and historical to the spiritual, from the dead Jesus to the living

[1] For a clear and thoroughgoing expression of this view, see Edward Caird's The Evolution of Religion.

revelation of God in his own soul. Elsmere then combines, more or less unconsciously, the conceptions of God distinguished above, (1), (2), and (3), in such a way and measure as suits his taste or religious need, and so constructs, no doubt, a reasonably satisfactory religion.

We should never fail, however, to recognize the element of truth in the Hegelian doctrine. This truth is the useful and necessary corrective of much of our current agnosticism — as that of Herbert Spencer. Spencer studies matter, mind, the religious nature of man, etc., and finds everywhere lines which run up and converge in an infinite principle of unity; and yet he asserts of this principle that in itself it is unknowable; we can only know that it is. It is manifest that if our reason is trustworthy, this principle must be adequate to account for the world, and therefore we know much more about it than its bare existence. The Hegelian contention, and in general it is a noble and true one, is that the laws of our thought are reliable, and therefore we are justified in assuming as invincibly true what logically holds good of this infinite being. The unwarranted and misleading element in the Hegelian exposition is that the remote logical inference that

there is an infinite principle of unity is treated as though it were immediately known in the simplest act of knowledge.

It seems very easy, on this type of Hegelian theory, to bring back the essentials of Christianity, which are supposed to be no longer tenable on traditional grounds; but it is almost or quite as easy, from the same premises, to destroy entirely belief in God and all religion. The Hegelian asserts that we know God in thought; and in his confident dependence on this doctrine, has discredited or denied every other means of knowing God. This position, however, is at variance with the conscious experience of practically all men; the testimony of self-consciousness, as commonly interpreted, is that the human mind possesses an independent power of knowledge and of self-direction. The unitary principle in knowledge is not commonly or necessarily attributed to the Absolute Spirit, but to the human understanding, unity of apperception — call it what you will. If, then, the Hegelian teaches the plain man that God exists and is known only in the unity of human knowledge, the easiest and most natural inference is that such a God is mere illusion; is only an unwarranted objectivization of

some aspect or faculty of the human mind itself. This is the inference drawn by Ludwig Feuerbach, in his "Essence of Christianity" (1841). "Religion, or at least the Christian religion, is the relation of man to himself, or more correctly to his own being; but the relation to his own being as to another being. The divine Being is nothing else than the human being."[1] "This being is nothing else than the intellect — the reason or the understanding. God is the objectivized being of the understanding. The pure, complete, faultless, divine Being is the self-consciousness of the understanding — the understanding's consciousness of its own perfection."[2]

"The true critique of doctrine is its history."[3] Strauss, the Hegelian, enunciated this proposition in relation to Christian dogma. It applies equally well to the Hegelian doctrine. In my opinion, Feuerbach's nihilism is the logical result and the unanswerable refutation of the Hegelian position.

Otto Pfleiderer, now professor of theology in Berlin University, was a pupil of Baur, and represents the traditional spirit of the Tübingen

[1] Essence of Christianity, Leipzig, 1883, p. 50. [2] Ibid. p. 76.
[3] Strauss, Glaubenslehre, Einleitung, § 6.

school both in its strength — wide and accurate scholarship, and power of luminous and comprehensive exposition — and also in its weakness — critical presuppositions which exclude the supernatural. His position is concisely stated in a recent German review, in an article on the "Essence of Christianity."[1] The characteristic essence of Christianity is the consciousness of being a child of God. This consciousness was the strikingly new element in the personality of Jesus; not in the traditional orthodox sense of an unique metaphysical union with God, but in the sense of an ethical and religious relationship to God which was first fully realized in Jesus, but may and should be realized in us all.[2] "Redemption in the evangelical sense is not a single miraculous event, which has been completed outside of humanity through a supernatural mediator between deity and humanity, but it is an inner process in the hearts of men which repeats itself everywhere and always."[3] Pfleiderer states much in Strauss' spirit the gradual idealization or deification of Jesus by the early Church. The Reformation made a beginning in the direction of

[1] Zeitsch. für Wissen. Theol., 1893. Erstes Heft.
[2] Ibid. pp. 4 and 5. [3] Ibid. p. 21.

abandoning this perversion of truth, and its resulting errors and superstitions; but only a beginning. "For in doctrine Christianity still clings essentially to the unspiritual, ghostly supernaturalism which from the time of the Jewish apocalypse and the Hellenic gnosis has dominated the thought of Christendom, and concealed the true essence of Christianity under mythological forms. To destroy these forms, and thereby to allow its liberated truth to stream forth in new light, its healing love to penetrate diseased humanity with new power, — this is the problem, the holy mission, of all those who believe in the victorious coming of the kingdom of the divine-sonship, and hope for the appearance of the new world where God shall be worshiped in spirit and in truth."[1]

[1] Ibid. p. 41. For an English version of Pfleiderer's article see "The New World," Sept., 1892.

CHAPTER X.

NEW ORTHODOXY AND NEW LUTHERANISM.

AS I have suggested above, we are not to suppose that liberalism, with its destructive critical results, has encountered no opposition in the field of German thought. Through the whole course of the theological movement we have been tracing, devout and scholarly men have devoted their powers to the defense of orthodox truth; and if they are less widely known than their liberal opponents, it is for much the same reasons that Colonel Ingersoll is more talked about than many an orthodox pastor who is of much more value and importance in the world.

Of the schools which have been most conspicuous in the defense of the traditional church forms and dogmas, are to be named "The New Orthodoxy" and "The New Lutheranism." The influence of these schools has been unfortunately limited by their alliance with illiberal and reactionary political tendencies, and also by the fact that their representatives, in their extreme

antipathy to the modern spirit of innovation, have too often engaged in a general crusade against all progress.

Claus Harms, of the new orthodox party, made a great sensation (1817) by his ninety-five theses in continuation of those of Luther, directed against reason, which he declares to be the modern Antichrist. Some of these theses read as follows: —

"I. If our Master and Lord, Jesus Christ, says, Repent! He wishes men to form themselves according to his doctrine; He does not formulate his doctrine according to men, as is done now.

"IX. The pope of our time, our Antichrist, is, in relation to faith, reason; in relation to action, conscience.

"XI. Conscience cannot pardon sin. Pardon belongs to God.

"XXIV. We read in an old hymn: 'Two places hast thou, man, before thee.' In our days they have put an end to the devil and plugged up hell.

"XXVIII. According to the old faith, God created man; according to the new, it is man who creates God.

"XXXII. The pretended rational religion is devoid of reason, or of religion, or of both.

"LI. We regard the very words of our revealed religion as holy; we do not consider them as a dress which can be taken off religion, but as its body. It is owing to them that it has life."

The most influential and renowned of the champions of the new orthodoxy was Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg (1802–1869). After 1824 he was connected with the theological faculty at Berlin, and as editor of the Evangelical Church Gazette maintained a fierce warfare upon rationalism in every form, especially in relation to Old Testament criticism, One deep purpose through his life was the uncompromising defense of the Augsburg Confession, as he was convinced that rigid adherence to the symbolical books of the Church was the only remedy that could be opposed to the destructive criticism of Strauss and Baur. He asserted the absolute infallibility and the literal inspiration of Holy Scripture, and ably defended the writings both of the Old and the New Testaments against the attacks of criticism.

The new Lutheran party came into prominence after the year 1848, when the German governments were using every means to repress the revolutionary democracy. "The object of New Lutheranism is to defend the throne and the altar,

the two divine institutions which are alike threatened by the democracy, and to combat to the death the anarchy of ideas and the progress of parliamentary institutions." [1]

In its conceptions of the Church and the ministry this party is strongly sacramentarian, making the Church a repository and dispenser of the divine grace. It is practically the Romish idea that when the sacraments are properly administered they possess an efficacy in themselves, apart from and irrespective of the faith of the recipients.

The most prominent figure in this school was Friedrich Stahl (1802–1861). "In his view the State is the kingdom of God upon earth, and the Church is a juridical institution, guaranteed by compacts and administered by the clergy. What the clergy are in the Church, the prince is in the State; he is the vicar of God, His delegate. In the State, God himself is the true master and legislator. The prince reigns only in His name; his authority rests only on the divine institution of royalty. In like manner, revelation is the authority in the Church, and reason owes it an absolute submission. Revolution and rationalism are the two inseparable scourges of modern times

[1] Lichtenfelder, Hist. of Ger. Theol. in 19th Century, p. 421.

which undermine the foundations of obedience and provoke the emancipation of man from God."[1]

The distinguished Old Testament scholar, Franz Delitzsch, was allied in many points with the New Lutheran school, especially in holding what approaches an *ex opere operato* view of the sacraments.

[1] Lichtenfelder, p. 428.

CHAPTER XI.

NEANDER AND WEISS.

JOHANN AUGUST NEANDER (1789–1850), a pupil and afterwards friend and fellow professor of Schleiermacher at Berlin, was distinguished as the church historian of the school of Schleiermacher. Of the many early works on the life of Christ written in reply to Strauss, Neander's (1839) is regarded as the most able and satisfactory. His introduction to this work contains some very judicious remarks as to presuppositions in critical discussion. "It has been often said that, in order to true inquiry, we must take nothing for granted. Of late this statement has been reiterated anew with special reference to the exposition of the life of Christ. At the outset of our work we refuse to meet such a demand. We cannot entirely free ourselves from presuppositions, which are born with our nature, and which attach to the fixed course of progress in which we ourselves are involved. They control our consciousness, whether we will or no; and the sup-

posed freedom from them is, in fact, nothing else but the exchange of one set for another. . . . The work of science can only be to distinguish the presuppositions which an inward necessity constrains us to recognize, from such as are purely voluntary. . . . What, then, is the special presupposition with which we must approach the contemplation of the life of Christ? It is one on which hangs the very being of the Christian as such; the existence of the Christian Church and the nature of Christian consciousness. . . . It is, in a word, the belief that Jesus Christ is the Son of God in a sense which cannot be predicated of any human being. . . . Now if we can show that the life of Christ, without the aid of the First Truth which forms the ground of our conception of it, must be unintelligible, while on the contrary, with its assistance, we can frame the life into a harmonious whole, then its claims will be established even in the exposition of the Life itself." [1]

These quotations will indicate the spirit and method of Neander, and show that he is well fitted to supplement Schleiermacher's work by bringing the subjectivity of Christian consciousness into harmony with the historic facts. He presents,

[1] Bohn's translation.

unquestionably, the proper standpoint for the Christian historian or student of history — to accept the truth of Christianity as a provisional hypothesis, and by a candid examination of the historic sources, to determine whether the hypothesis satisfies the conditions of the problem.[1] There is a constant temptation both for the clergy and the laity, in their philosophical and historical studies, to seek to grasp God by naked intellect, by historical proof or scientific demonstration, to forget the apostolic truth that divine things must be spiritually discerned. Neander well remarks on this point: "It is only he who has a 'Christian consciousness' that can recognize Christ in the fragments of tradition and the manifestations of history, or that can comprehend the history of Christ and his Church."

Neander stoutly asserts, against the school of Baur, that the Fourth Gospel was written by the apostle John. "It could have emanated from none other than that 'beloved disciple' upon whose soul the image of the Saviour had left its deepest impress."

Neander presents the view of Scriptural inspi-

[1] The danger of being unduly influenced here by your presupposition is properly emphasized by Weiss in criticizing Schleiermacher's Life of of Christ. See Weiss, Life of Christ, vol. i, p. 194.

ration which is perhaps the dominant one at present in most schools of German theology. "It may be regarded as one of the greatest boons which the purifying process of Protestant theology in Germany has conferred upon faith as well as science, that the old mechanical view of inspiration has been so generally abandoned. That doctrine, and the forced harmonies to which it led, demanded a clerklike accuracy in the evangelical accounts, and could not admit even the slightest contradictions in them; but we are now no more compelled to have recourse to subtilties against which our sense of truth rebels. . . . The chasms of gospel history were unavoidable in the transmission of divine truth through such lowly human means. But this only affords room for the exercise of our faith — faith whose root is to be found, not in science, not in demonstration, but in the humble and self-denying submission of our spirits. Our scientific views may be defective in many points; our knowledge itself may be but fragmentary; but our religious interests will find all that is necessary to attach them to Christ as the ground of salvation and the archetype of holiness." [1]

[1] I have quoted from the author's Introduction, ed. of Harper Bros., N. Y., 1851.

Probably the most important of the recent lives of Christ, from the conservative standpoint, is that of Bernhard Weiss, professor of theology in Berlin. He breaks most decidedly with the Tübingen criticism, in opposition to his colleague Professor Pfleiderer, in defending the Johannean authorship of the Fourth Gospel — regarding it as superior to the Synoptics in authoritative value. He rejects emphatically the attempt to "mediate" the mutually exclusive positions of naturalism and supernaturalism. "Between a supernaturalism which believes in the actuality of an objective divine revelation and of miracle in the proper sense, and the standpoint which regards both as inadmissible, there can be as little historical mediation as between the conception of Christ as a mere man, and the Christ worshiped by the Christian Church from the beginning as her divine Mediator and Redeemer." [1]

Weiss suggests a consideration which tends to remove the fundamental objection against the miraculous which we found in Reimarus. "From the religious standpoint it has been attempted to find grounds for the objection that it would be a depreciation of God's creation and therefore of

[1] Life of Christ, vol. i, Dedication, p. xi.

the Creator if from the earliest beginning the universe could not perfect its development by its inherent forces, but constantly, or at least at this one point, required the intervention of the great Master-workman. This objection would be quite relevant if we were treating of a phase in the ordinary development of the world. Not only, however, the apostolical announcement of Christ, but also every page of our evangelical tradition, proclaims the aim of Jesus' appearance to have been the bringing of salvation to a lost world. It is here supposed that the development of humanity had taken an abnormal direction, that it had been turned away from the appointed goal instead of approaching it, and that by itself it could neither return to where it was, find the right track, nor reach the goal."[1] The force of this objection to miracles, so influential during the past century, lies evidently in the pantheistic view which destroys the human power of choice and self-direction, and so makes sin, in any real sense, impossible, and an objective historical redemption unnecessary.

[1] Life of Christ, vol. i, p. 199.

CHAPTER XII.

THE MEDIATING SCHOOL.

THE most widely known theologian of the "mediating" school is probably Isaac August Dorner (1809–1884). He studied philosophy and theology at Tübingen when Baur's influence was at its height, and his thoughtful and religious nature early set for itself the task of reconciling traditional Christianity with the well-established results of modern culture. The fruit of his efforts is a system of theology in which nearly all the traditional theological forms are retained, but the effect of the author's early Hegelian associations is apparent in a "reconciliation" of the old and the new, which one is at last constrained to admit is largely a wordy ambiguity. Dorner lays great stress upon the doctrine of the Trinity, and his statement of it is essentially Hegelian. "The doctrine of the divine attributes leads back to the Trinity as it were to its underlying truth. In order to be the actual and absolute Primary Life, Knowledge, and Goodness, the

Godhead must be thought as self-originating and self-conscious, just as he must be thought as voluntary love. This is only possible by the Godhead's eternally distinguishing Himself from Himself and always returning to Himself from his other Self; that is, by God's being triune." [1]

Dorner's name has been brought prominently before the American public in connection with the "probation controversy" in the Congregational Church. The "new orthodoxy," the leading representatives of which are associated with Andover Theological Seminary, have attached themselves largely to Dorner's theology, and have made his views of the future state prominent in the discussions of the Congregational Church for the past ten years. In Dorner's eschatology "the intermediate state" between death and the final judgment plays an important part. The spiritual perfection and bliss of believers is not consummated until the end of the world; the final issues of everlasting life and death are not fixed until the second advent of Christ and the judgment. In the interval, believers may progress towards sinless perfection, and it is possible that souls "not yet ripe for judgment" may turn to God in

[1] System of Christian Doctrine, vol. i, p. 412, Clark's trans.

penitence and faith. Dorner admits that this doctrine must rest largely on grounds of inference and reason. "Holy Scripture says nothing expressly on this point with the exception of the passages in the First Epistle of Peter, and indeed of all those passages according to which the gospel must be preached to all, and God's purpose of grace applies to all."[1]

Dorner argues the point at considerable length in the fourth volume of his System of Christian Doctrine.[2] "The absoluteness of Christianity demands that no one be judged before Christianity has been made accessible and brought home to him. But this is the case in this life with millions of human beings. Moreover, those dying in childhood have not been able to decide personally for Christianity. . . . The descent into Hades implies that a salvation through knowledge of the gospel is possible also to the departed. Christian grace is designed for human beings, not for inhabitants of earth. It is not said: He that hears not shall be damned; but: He that believes not. Jesus seeks the lost; lost are to be sought also in the kingdom of the dead. The opposite view leads to an absolute decree of rejection in

[1] System of Christian Doctrine, vol. iv, p. 405. [2] pp. 408–410.

reference to all who have died and die as heathen, whereas Christian grace is universal."[1]

An interesting thinker, also associated with the mediating school, is Richard Rothe (1799–1867), after 1839 professor at Heidelberg. He developed a theory of the relation of the Church to the State which is of interest in view of our prevalent discussions as to Christian socialism. Jesus aimed to establish the kingdom of God, and this kingdom is the end of all Christian effort. It is an error, however, to identify this kingdom with the Church, for the State, which for Rothe embraces the whole of the moral activity of man, more perfectly represents, or should more perfectly represent, the coming kingdom. The mission of the Church is to regenerate the State and all civil society, and so to be gradually merged into the State. When the State is thus supreme, in the moral as well as the civil sphere, science will have an entirely religious character, theology and philosophy will become one, the sentiment of worship will be cultivated by means of art, and especially by means of the theater,

[1] Dorner himself did not regard the Probation doctrine as an important element in his system, and was displeased by the prominence given to it in this country. I give space to the discussion of this theory, however, because to most American readers Dorner's name is known in connection with the Probation controversy.

purified and made religious in its influence. It is evident that Rothe's "State" is of too ideal a character to find its counterpart in our present imperfect world; so that he might better use the common and traditional term, the kingdom of God, to characterize the future perfect society. There appears in Rothe that confounding of the ideal state or social condition with the kingdom of God so common in the Christian socialists of our day, who are usually not quite clear as to whether they are aiming at the kingdom of God or the socialistic State.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE RITSCHLIAN SCHOOL.

THE head of the Ritschlian or New-Kantian school was Albrecht Ritschl, late professor of theology at Göttingen.

"A new school has arisen between the mediating and the liberal schools, and now takes a distinct place. This latest school of German theology, attaching itself to Kant, professes itself at the same time to be directly descended from Luther and Schleiermacher, and it aims at turning the inheritance of these great masters of the spiritual life to the advantage of the young generations. Its professed object is to overcome in a definitive manner the sterile antagonism between supernaturalism and rationalism, or between faith and science; and to finally conquer an independent province for the religious consciousness, by disengaging religion from all essential association with metaphysics, with the natural sciences, and with historic criticism." [1]

[1] Lichtenfelder, Hist. of Ger. Theol., p. 576.

The characteristic aim of the Ritschlian theology is to construct a distinctively Christian system of truth, repudiating the authority of science and philosophy in the religious sphere, and proceeding from the testimony of Christian consciousness and the revelation of God in Christ as recorded in Scripture.

The school of Ritschl is called the New-Kantian. It attaches great importance to Kant's philosophical work, as effecting a separation between the moral and the intellectual. In knowledge we are limited wholly to experience, can attain to no ultimate reality; hence philosophy can pass no judgments upon ultimate spiritual verities, and man must follow his moral intuitions, as confirmed and intensified by the revealed truths of Christianity. In speculative thought, one must rigidly distinguish subjective feeling from objective fact; in the moral realm, feeling is a positive guide to truth. In the religious sphere, what *ought* to be *must* be — judgments of *worth*, not the conclusions of logical evidence, are the supreme and controlling principles. Hence Schleiermacher's attempt to separate theology and philosophy seems an accomplished fact. Ritschl admits,[1]

[1] Theologie und Metaphysik, 1881.

however, that the theologian must have a philosophical theory of knowledge; but this theory should be the Kant-Lotzian theory which Ritschl himself has adopted.

This principle of worth-judgments serves to solve the difficulties and contradictions of the moral life. Involved in the doubt and struggle of error and sin, we yet believe, on moral rather than intellectual grounds, in a perfect truth and a supreme good or happiness as existing and as attainable for men. God, freedom, and immortality are thus assumed as postulates necessary to give completeness and satisfying content to the moral life.

A theology based on feeling would seem to be in danger of fanatical extremes; but Ritschl, like Schleiermacher, repudiates all mystical tendencies, and asserts that the historic Christ and the historic teachings of the Church are alone the source of the genuine religious life. Here arises a controversy with the Hegelian school, as Pfleiderer, who asserts a constant and immanent revelation of God in the sense of Hegel's "Witness of the Spirit."[1] The anomalous situation, therefore, arises that the Ritschlians, starting from feeling, emphasize the

[1] pp. 197, 198 *sup.*

genuinely historic in Christianity, and the Hegelians, starting from intellect or reason, assert a mystical communion with and knowledge of God. When we examine it, however, we find Ritschl's historic Christianity as illusory as Hegel's mysticism. Ritschl's Christ is essentially Schleiermacher's, already shown by Strauss to be ideal rather than historic.

It is only necessary to suggest, in a word, Ritschl's teaching on two or three of the important doctrines.

He gives no dogmatic statement as to the origin of sin. We experience it as a fact of our personal life, for which we feel responsible. Faith has no knowledge or concern as to whether any will finally remain in the sinful state, and so be forever lost.

Christ, as the perfect revealer of God and founder of the kingdom of God, may be said to be divine. As with Schleiermacher, Christian consciousness does not raise curious and unanswerable questions as to his ultimate nature and peculiar relation to God.

Ritschl holds the moral influence view of the atonement. God forgives as Father; the only influence necessary is to convince men that God

is forgiving love, and induce them to turn to him in penitence and faith. This influence Christ brought to bear upon his disciples through his own personality, while in the flesh, and now he acts on the Christian through the Church.

Ritschl's system is a compound of Schleiermacher's Christian consciousness, Kant's practical reason, and Lotze's notion of "worth-judgments," read into the New Testament with a supreme disregard for exegesis and historic sense. The attempt is made to supplement the subjectivity of Kant's religion of morality by the false and illusory objectivity of Schleiermacher's Christian consciousness; but instead of Kant's method of allegorizing the Scriptures to suit the new theory, Ritschl coolly asserts that the New Testament writers meant to present Christ, in the Kantian sense, as the ethical Redeemer and revealer of God.

CHAPTER XIV.

CONCLUSION.

THE history of doctrine is theology teaching by examples. I have failed in my purpose in this sketch of modern religious thought, if it is necessary to dwell at any length upon the suggestions of truth it contains for the Church of to-day.

Each of the main tendencies of German liberal thought represents a partial truth which the Church should more fully recognize; and the present theological problem is to harmonize these fragments in the unity of a well-rounded system. Kant, a practical morality; Hegel, the antithetical truth of a living unity with God in spirit and in purpose; Schleiermacher vindicates Christian experience as a witness of spiritual truth; Ritschl carries out the same idea in denying the right of an un-Christian or anti-Christian philosophy to dominate the thought of the Church. The error common to all these schools is in yielding to science the assumption of an iron inflexibility of natural law, which excludes the supernatural, so

that with Kant and Hegel the miraculous is abandoned, and with Schleiermacher and Ritschl it appears only at one point — in a revealer of God. This revealer of God is prudently veiled from the eyes of the profane by the incense of worship; he is an incomprehensible *Unding* about whose real nature no questions must be asked; he is divine to faith but human to reason, so that we have a reappearance of the position which was properly regarded as the *reductio ad absurdum* of Scholasticism, namely, that a proposition may be true in theology and false in philosophy.

If we combine the truths represented by the partial tendencies just mentioned, and supplement them by the necessary religious assumption that God is not excluded by his own laws from his own world, we have the elements necessary for constructing a system of theology which shall be rationally satisfactory and yet consonant with Scripture, Christian experience, and the essentials of the traditional teaching of the Church. It would not be necessary for an adherent of such a system to defy the authority of science and philosophy when exercised in their proper spheres; it would not be necessary to wave off criticism from the Scriptures as concerned with a fairyland

where the laws of reason are annulled, and things are believed because they are absurd. It would be entirely proper and necessary, however, to demand that science and philosophy set up no unproved assumptions which render a revealed religion impossible, and that criticism do not proceed to test miraculous Christian history by presuppositions which deny the miraculous. It would not be necessary, for example, for the theologian to take the unscientific position that the story of Jonah and the whale is veritable history, because it happens to be in the commonly received canon; but he must demand that, if criticism will prove the book to be allegory or poem, it shall be on other grounds than the mere fact of the extraordinary contents of the book. This simple and proper demand, rigidly enforced, will render the greater portion of the advanced critical literature of the past century practically worthless for a Christian believer.

It is therefore evident, as I have suggested here and there through this work, that the conflict of Christianity with modern secular thought rests at bottom upon certain antagonistic principles and presuppositions which have always been operative in human history. Here is the present world — a

goodly and joyous world; here is man, with noble powers of thought and reason and a wide sphere for worthy achievement. Let us incite man to high endeavor by the loftiest conception of his gifts and possibilities, owning no limit to his possible supremacy in the physical or intellectual worlds. Let us erect a noble temple where Reason shall be enthroned; let us adorn life with art and luxury; let us live a life, free, sunny, and joyous, and let there be no death's head at the feast to bring vague fears as to the unknown beyond. This is the type of thought I have designated as the Greek. The contrasting type is represented for us by medieval Christianity. Human nature is the ruin of what should have been a noble work, the reason is perverted, the moral nature vitiated, the present world a vale of penitential tears — a moment of probation, swiftly vanishing into an eternity of joy or pain. And however extreme this view of Christianity may be, any true conception of Christianity must retain the "other-worldly" element — "we have here no abiding city"; so that the contrasting types of the Greek and Christian remain. The history of Christian theology is the struggle of these conflicting views of life. The Greek Logos

[Reason] religion gained a firm foothold in the early Church, especially through the theology of Origen; in Augustine appeared the reaction of the genuine Christian spirit, and the conditions of the middle ages produced an extremely one-sided development of the other-worldly type. The Italian Renaissance is a passionate protest against this extreme, and though suppressed by the Reformation and the counter-reformation in the Roman Church, it is yet prophetic of the conflict of Christianity with modern culture. The Greek type has been, perhaps, the dominant ideal in the science, philosophy, and literature of the past century, and the result has been a mingled evil and good. Good, in that man is urged to esteem himself lord of this lower world, and so to attempt and achieve great things in all lines of human endeavor. Evil, in that the boasted achievements of our civilization rest only upon the earth, the comfort and inspiration of a spiritual faith are ignored, and religion erects an altar to an unknown God, or is rationalized into a system of ethics. The religious problem of the modern world, as I have remarked above, is to harmonize these conflicting ideals and views of life — to bring into proper adjustment in a higher

and permanent unity the glorified heaven of the Christian and the glorified earth of the Greek.

In this work I have presented nothing, I of course admit, which directly substantiates the doctrines of the Christian religion; the work can be of value to Christian apologetics only as it makes plain the failure of the modern attacks upon our traditional faith. It is possible, as far as concerns anything I have advanced here, that Christianity may yet be overthrown and take its place on the roll of dead religions. I do claim for this work, however, that it makes clear that this destructive work has not yet been accomplished — that modern science and philosophy have developed nothing which, fairly considered, invalidates the claim of Christianity to the intellectual, moral, and spiritual allegiance of mankind. The advance-guard of modern culture may regard Christianity as obsolescent; but a little careful examination of the real facts of the situation will show plainly enough (to quote Bishop Butler's words concerning Christianity, written in somewhat similar circumstances) "that any reasonable man may be as much assured, as he is of his own being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing in it."[1]

[1] Analogy, Advertisement.

NOTE.

The Greek Logos Doctrine. — The Logos as a philosophical principle appears first with Heraclitus. Logos in Greek meant primarily a word, a proposition; and secondarily the faculty of the mind which is manifested in speech — reason. Heraclitus indicates the principle of order in the world by Logos, after the analogy of reason as the ruling faculty of the mind. His Logos, however, is not self-conscious, but is identified in a pantheistic or materialistic way with the general world-process. The Platonic school, following Anaxagoras probably, designates the principle of reason in nature as Nous instead of Logos. In the Stoic school we find again Heraclitus' Logos, except that providential care for the world and mankind is ascribed to it. Here are apparent points of resemblance between Greek and Hebrew conceptions, of which Philo availed himself when he sought to reconcile the two. Later Jewish teachers held to the creation of the world by the divine Word or Wisdom, and that God acted on the world through subordinate agents — angels, demons, etc. Philo therefore asserts that this series of subordinate powers between God and the world, called by the Jews Word, Wisdom, Angels, etc., was what the Greeks had indistinctly in mind when they spoke of the Logos. This early attempt to reconcile the Hebrew religion with Greek thought is extremely suggestive, as forecasting the result of the modern attempt to harmonize Christianity with the Greek conceptions of the Renaissance. The results in the two cases are perfectly analogous: God, instead of a personal heavenly Father, becomes a pantheistic first principle; God administers the world, not through personal spirits, angels, etc., but through natural forces; and God reveals himself not through miracle, but immanently, in nature and in man. The problem of Philo and of Hegel is essentially the same, and the outcome is essentially the same. The movement is from the historical, definite, and personal to the vague, impersonal, and pantheistic.

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